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**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR LAND FORCES:**

**A MATTER OF TRAINING, NOT LAWYERING**

A Thesis

Presented to

The Judge Advocate General's School  
United States Army

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of either The Judge Advocate General's School, The United States Army, or any other governmental agency.

by Major Mark S. Martins

United States Army

42D JUDGE ADVOCATE OFFICER GRADUATE COURSE

April 1994

Draft Footnote About the Author  
In the Event of Acceptance for Publication

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**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR LAND FORCES:  
A MATTER OF TRAINING, NOT LAWYERING**

by Major Mark S. Martins

**ABSTRACT:** This thesis examines the difficult problem of imparting rules of engagement (ROE) to individual soldiers and Marines. It argues that the present method of imparting ROE relies too heavily on a "legislative" model of controlling behavior. As a result, the present method suffers from a series of defects, culminating in a failure to account for the cognitive limits of humans under stress. The thesis concludes that commanders and judge advocates can minimize these defects by adopting a "training model." Such a model would include a set of standing rules on the use of force for soldiers, a series of training scenarios designed to reinforce the standing rules across the spectrum of potential conflict, and a format by which units may supplement the standing rules for particular operations.

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*"The Commission concludes that the . . . ROE contributed to a mind-set that detracted from the readiness of the [U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force] to respond to the terrorist threat which materialized on 23 October 1983."*

*Department of Defense Commission on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act That Killed 241 Marines<sup>1</sup>*

*"Furthermore, this [court-martial] strongly recommends to the convening authority . . . that rules of engagement, in general, were not clearly stated to the soldiers, and specifically, that the use of warning shots by the Platoon Leader and Squad Leader, to halt fleeing civilians who were suspect only because they were running away, was contrary to standards of due care and shows negligence on the part of the chain of command."*

*U.S. Army Court-Martial Panel  
Upon Sentencing Specialist James A. Mowris  
For Negligent Homicide of a Somali Civilian<sup>2</sup>*

## I. Introduction

U.S. soldiers and Marines face hard choices about what, when, and where they can shoot. As the two epigraphs suggest, and as this paper will maintain, these same soldiers and Marines often get little help from the rules of engagement (ROE).<sup>3</sup> Over the past three decades, ground force commanders and judge advocates have searched for an effective method of imparting ROE to subordinate commanders as well as to individual soldiers and Marines.<sup>4</sup> The stakes are high in this search. Without an effective method, at least two dangers to military missions become more imminent. The first danger is that troops will respond tentatively to an attack, thereby permitting harm to

themselves, to fellow soldiers,<sup>5</sup> or to some mission essential facility. The second, opposite, danger is that troops will strike out too aggressively, thereby harming innocents.


An example of the first danger occurred in Lebanon in 1983, when Marine sentries--having been given contradictory ROE--responded tentatively to the approach of a truck bomb toward their barracks at the Beirut Airport.<sup>6</sup> An example of the second danger occurred in Somalia in 1993, when an Army soldier--who later would claim that he was firing a warning shot as permitted by the ROE--killed an unarmed Somali civilian who was running away and posed no threat.<sup>7</sup> Yet an untimely over-tentative or over-aggressive result could turn a successful deployment into a political failure. In an age of instant global telecommunications, the achievement of strategic U.S. goals through military operations is vulnerable both to killings of soldiers at the hands of terrorists and to killings of defenseless noncombatants at the hands of American soldiers.

This paper argues that ROE will provide optimal guidance to U.S. ground forces<sup>8</sup> only after these forces refine their doctrine<sup>9</sup> and change the training of individual soldiers. The unpredictability of armed engagements and the inherent cognitive limitations of humans under stress define the role ROE can play in guiding individual soldiers toward appropriate decisions about when to fire. That role, though potentially decisive, is extremely narrow and must play itself out mostly before the shooting starts. For when shooting starts, soldiers follow those

principles that repetitive or potent experiences have etched into their minds. If those principles conform both to tactical wisdom and to relevant legal constraints on the use of force, then the larger system of ROE governing the ground component in a particular deployment<sup>10</sup> will best serve military objectives and national interests.

This paper thus formalizes the search for an effective method of imparting ROE by seeking the optimal placement of ROE within land force doctrine and training. Its starting point is a problem: how can ROE best help individual troops avoid the extremes of over-tentative and undisciplined fire? Solving this problem demands careful analysis as well as a rational choice among options.<sup>11</sup> The analysis should reveal the fallacies that doctrine and training have sometimes presumed while permitting senior decision-makers to optimize the diverse objectives that ROE further. This paper seeks to furnish the needed analysis and recommend improvements while recognizing that no course of action will eliminate all errors that might be made by those at the trigger or in the command post. *Figure 1* charts the problem-solving method this paper will follow,<sup>12</sup> while *Figure 2* depicts the unsystematic approach it attempts to avoid.<sup>13</sup>


Recent changes in Army doctrine, in national security strategy, and in the world at large have heightened attention to land force ROE because they call on modern land forces to be highly flexible.<sup>14</sup> Individual soldiers, as well as their units, must be capable of applying appropriate levels of force across



**Figure 1**

the spectrum of military operations. The ROE must not only permit the field commander to assert the important interests of mission accomplishment and force security, but also must keep calibrated military force under legitimate civilian control. Moreover, ROE must often serve these functions during politically delicate multinational operations.

Achieving optimal use of ROE will demand, among other measures, that soldiers receive scenario-driven training on a new individual task, that the Army and Marine Corps endorse revisions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) *Peacetime ROE (PROE)*, and that judge advocates develop skills to perform a more active and useful role in the ROE process. Yet these and other specific



**Figure 2**

recommendations require elaboration and support before readers accept them. Accordingly, part II of this paper introduces the problem of soldiers who are either over-tentative or undisciplined with their fire and notes that ROE alone cannot eliminate these extremes. Part III searches out underlying causes of the problem and identifies corresponding deficiencies in present ROE doctrine and training. Part IV considers theoretical cures suggested by the causes. Part V offers a program of specific actions. Part VI takes up potential objections.<sup>15</sup>

This paper addresses both war and operations other than war.<sup>16</sup> It contends that an international law adviser can

contribute to many kinds of military operations in more than the traditional roles of "advocate," "judge," or "conscience."<sup>17</sup> Accordingly, though authored by a lawyer, the paper is not a zealous prosecution of client interests within an adversarial setting;<sup>18</sup> it is not a determination of what legal rules or precedents require;<sup>19</sup> and it is not a statement about what is the moral or ethical thing to do.<sup>20</sup> The argument that land force doctrine and training should change is an argument about how to help solve a problem, only one part of which is "legal." In making the argument, the paper articulates a distinctly modern role of the lawyer as "counselor."<sup>21</sup>

## II. The Problem

Whether deployed as peacekeepers, counterinsurgents, peace enforcers, or conventional warriors, U.S. ground troops sometimes make poor decisions about whether to open fire. Far from justifying criticism of individual soldiers at the trigger, this fact provides the proper focus for systemic improvements. The problem arises when the soldier--having been placed where the use of deadly force may be necessary--encounters something and fails to assess correctly whether it is a threat. Then he either shoots someone who posed no such threat, or he surrenders some tactical advantage. The lost advantage may even permit a hostile element to kill him or a comrade.

A classic example of this deadly dilemma was the hesitant response of the Marine sentry near the Beirut Airport at 0620 on 23 October 1983. Consider the sequence of events:<sup>22</sup>

*Marine Sentry*

1. Stands guard just outside the Marine compound, watching over a parking lot.

3. Waits and watches the unfamiliar truck from his sentry post, which is sandbagged to protect against sniper fire.

5. Crouches in the corner of sandbagged post. Fellow sentry at nearby post loads magazine, chambers round of ammunition, but then fails to fire.<sup>23</sup> Contrary to instructions on a "rules of engagement" card in their pockets, neither sentry has magazine of ammunition loaded in his M-16.<sup>24</sup>

*Mercedes Truck*

2. Circles the parking lot twice, then gathers speed, crashes through concertina wire barrier, and barrels toward the compound.

4. Hurries toward a little-used rear gate of Marine compound.

6. Rolls through the gate and bursts across sandbag barricade. Crashes into the ground floor of the four-story headquarters building, and detonates load of TNT. Kills 241 Marines and sailors.

The first of the two epigraphs at the beginning of this paper reflects the official view that ROE contributed to the inadequate

security at the compound,<sup>25</sup> though blame for the tragedy properly lies with several causes.<sup>26</sup>

It is fair to evaluate the actions of the Marines in Lebanon, or any American troops engaged in operations other than war, by two criteria. First, troops should demonstrate initiative in defending themselves and members of their unit. Second, they should apply all levels of force only when necessary.<sup>27</sup> The first criterion recognizes that a military force must protect itself to accomplish its objective. The second acknowledges that use of excessive force could jeopardize claims to legitimacy and frustrate both short and long-term goals.

Soldiers too reluctant to fire their weapons prevent military units from achieving combat objectives. In a study of soldier behavior in combat during World War II, S.L.A. Marshall found that most infantrymen he interviewed never fired their weapons, even when directly confronted by enemy forces.<sup>28</sup> Among the nonfirers were those who "had seen clear targets and still did not fire."<sup>29</sup> Applying the axiom of infantry tactics that fire and maneuver are what defeat the enemy in combat, Marshall concluded, "Toss the willing firers out of an action and there can be no victory."<sup>30</sup>

Unduly inhibited soldiers also deny units success in operations short of large scale combat, as the example from Beirut illustrates. The destruction of the headquarters and a major portion of the armed American force marked a clear failure

to accomplish the stated mission: "to establish an environment that would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in establishing sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area."<sup>31</sup>

As soldiers feel more restricted in using force and as friendly deaths mount, public support for a foreign deployment may quickly fade in a nation that abhors U.S. casualties. The eventual result can be strategic victory for a weaker enemy. Eight months before the bombing of the headquarters at the Beirut Airport, an Islamic terrorist wounded five Marines with a grenade, beginning a stream of media reports that depicted the Marines in Lebanon as targets of fire from opponents of U.S. policy.<sup>32</sup> Within months of the airport bomb attack, the U.S. reversed policy and moved all Marines off-shore and out of Lebanon, leaving the fragile government there to fend for itself. Ten years later, press coverage of the more recent deployment to Somalia included caricatures of U.S. troops as targets before the death of 18 Americans in a firefight with a Somali faction.<sup>33</sup> Within days of that firefight, the U.S. announced a deadline for complete withdrawal from Somalia and abandoned major policy goals.<sup>34</sup> When fully sensitized by an undistracted press corps, America will not tolerate a perception that its soldiers are sitting ducks.

On the other hand, soldiers who fire too readily also erect obstacles to tactical and strategic success.<sup>35</sup> Soldiers who

spray fire when they should not do so sabotage any operation in which the United States seeks to bolster the legitimacy of a government or faction. The most important modern illustration of this is the conduct of some U.S. Army forces in Vietnam. There, soldiers did not win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people because, as one senior officer from that conflict has admitted, some soldiers were applying firepower "on a relatively random basis" and "just sort of devastat[ing] the countryside."<sup>36</sup> A British general who witnessed American operations in Vietnam described U.S. tactics as "prophylactic firepower, which means that if you do not know where the enemy is, make a big enough bang and you may bring something down."<sup>37</sup> Because the local civilian population rather than enemy guerrillas often received the fire, the Army foiled its own avowed counterinsurgency strategy and ensured the success of its enemy.<sup>38</sup>

A more recent example of the dangers of undisciplined fire is the case of Army Specialist James Mowris.<sup>39</sup> On the morning of February 14, 1993, Specialist Mowris' platoon was conducting a sweep of a Somali village to seize weapons and munitions that observers had sighted there.<sup>40</sup> If necessary, the platoon also had the mission to disarm members of one of the Somali bands that had been interfering with international famine relief efforts in that troubled country.<sup>41</sup> After initially sweeping the village and finding a few small arms and live mortar rounds but no armed Somalis, the platoon paused while an interpreter questioned a

villager. The platoon leader then noticed two Somalis running between buildings of a nearby abandoned military compound and ordered the platoon to chase them. In the ensuing chase, as one of the men ran from members of the platoon, the platoon leader and a sergeant fired shots into the air in an attempt to get the Somalis to stop. Specialist Mowris pursued one of the men into a bushy area away from the buildings and, after shouting "there he is,"<sup>42</sup> fired what he later said was "a warning shot in the dirt" to convince the Somali to stop running away.<sup>43</sup>

After examining ballistics and medical evidence and hearing testimony from another soldier who heard Specialist Mowris admit to killing the man,<sup>44</sup> a court-martial convicted Mowris. The crime? Negligent homicide. The victim? Osman Asir, a Somali national.<sup>45</sup> The convening authority later set aside the conviction.<sup>46</sup> Without entering the debate over Specialist Mowris' criminal innocence or guilt, a disinterested reader of the trial record notes that the soldiers of Specialist Mowris' platoon did not understand and had not received training on the written ROE issued by higher headquarters.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, as the second of the two introductory epigraphs indicates, the court-martial panel found that the warning shots fired in and around the village were excessive under the circumstances. Regardless whether one's sympathy lies with the soldier or the Somali, incidents such as this give credibility to opponents of U.S. policy and frustrate U.S. interests.<sup>48</sup>

An intuitive but insufficient approach to the problem of poor firing decisions is to issue ROE. These are directives that "set forth who can shoot at what, with which weapons, when and where."<sup>49</sup> Such rules, if not part of a wider commitment of resources or if inadequately reinforced by training, can deepen rather than solve the problem. Few senior leaders in Vietnam felt that soldiers understood ROE well before the My Lai massacre,<sup>50</sup> and even fewer believed that soldiers adhered carefully to ROE.<sup>51</sup> Perceiving that ROE restrictions designed to avoid noncombatant casualties unduly tied their hands, U.S. soldiers engaged in "creative application" of the ROE<sup>52</sup> or "ben[t] the ROE in favor of killing 'potential' insurgents, although in many instances they might have been innocent civilians."<sup>53</sup>

Today, operations officers on military staffs sometimes delegate the drafting of ROE to judge advocates with little knowledge of the combat arms or land force weapons systems.<sup>54</sup> As a result, soldiers may regard ROE as "'ivory tower' nonsense"<sup>55</sup> or as "handcuffs which impede combat operations and increase risk to soldiers."<sup>56</sup> Rather than helping matters, the ROE may simply add frustration or confusion to the already adverse circumstances under which soldiers must decide whether to fire.<sup>57</sup>

The cartoon posted on a bulletin board by Marines in Beirut after the 1983 bombing undoubtedly captures the view some soldiers have of ROE. A Marine rifleman is in a prone firing position behind a barricade in Lebanon. The President of the

United States is whispering in his ear, "Before you fire, I want you to consider the nuances of the War Powers Act."<sup>58</sup>

There is an alternative. Soldiers can learn to defend themselves and their units with initiative and to apply deadly force only when necessary. Clear and simple rules on the use of force can complement the learning process. Once assimilated into a soldier's judgment, these rules can provide a base of understanding upon which a larger system of contingent ROE may rest. Ground force trainers--a term comprising judge advocates as well as commanders--can anticipate scenarios, design rehearsals, promote role-playing, and demand brief-backs. In this way, trainers can condition soldiers to respond better and use force more appropriately across the entire spectrum of potential armed conflict.

### III. Diagnosis

How can ROE best help ground troops avoid over-tentativeness, at one extreme, and undisciplined fire, at the other? Framing the question in this way acknowledges that no mere system of rules, however well-designed, can ever eliminate all inappropriate omissions and acts of armed soldiers; instead, the problem is to determine how ROE can *best contribute* to minimizing inappropriate omissions and acts. A prudent diagnosis of the problem would begin by describing the different elements of the present method and providing a brief historical account of

how land forces came to use it. A truly complete diagnosis would then generate a theory of why the present method of imparting ROE to land forces is suboptimal. Accordingly, after describing the present method and observing recent historical trends that shaped the method, this part of the paper puts forth the following theory: ROE do not help land forces as much as they could because leaders and judge advocates issuing ROE--though undoubtedly motivated by noble intentions--are relying upon a legislative model of controlling conduct.

This model assumes, unrealistically, that leaders can create, interpret, and enforce ROE the same way governments create, interpret, and enforce laws. The model also neglects the stressful environment in which soldiers must decide whether to use force. Yet current land force doctrine and training on ROE implicitly rely on the model. This part of the paper thus identifies, in theoretical terms, what is lacking in current land force doctrine and training that if present might help resolve the problem.


#### A. *The Present Method--Key Terms and Distinctions*

Soldiers pulling guard duty during peacekeeping deployments, riding convoy during humanitarian assistance missions, or conducting air assaults into hostile territory receive ROE that originate with the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) but that undergo amplification at as many as nine subordinate levels of authority. To recognize that so many

layers filter and qualify the ROE reaching individual soldiers is to begin to understand the enormous difficulties any method of imparting ROE to land forces must surmount. See *Figure 3*.<sup>59</sup>

1. *The JCS Peacetime ROE.*--The mainspring of the present method of imparting ROE, at least officially, is a set of rules in a document called the *Peacetime ROE (PROE)*.<sup>60</sup> The *PROE*, which the JCS issued in 1988, direct the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified combatant commands<sup>61</sup> to exercise force consistent with the mandates of the United Nations Charter and international law.<sup>62</sup> The *PROE* apply to all military operations and contingencies<sup>63</sup> short of declared war or prolonged conflict and remain in effect until specifically modified or superseded.<sup>64</sup>

The CINC of the unified command, with the CJCS, modifies the *PROE* for specific operations or contingencies by supplementing the standing *PROE* with rules tailored to the mission.<sup>65</sup> The CINC then issues ROE to subordinate commands that are consistent with the *PROE*.<sup>66</sup> In turn, each subordinate commander is free to issue ROE specific to his unit, so long as they are neither less restrictive nor otherwise inconsistent with the ROE from higher headquarters.<sup>67</sup> The individual soldier typically learns of the ROE in a briefing from his immediate commander. Occasionally, he receives mission-specific instruction on the ROE from a judge advocate or a member of his chain of command. Later, he may consult a small card that purports to summarize the most




important and relevant ROE.

The JCS definition of "rule of engagement" is quite broad.<sup>68</sup> Accordingly, operations orders at all but the lowest levels of command contain ROE directed toward many decision-makers besides riflemen: fighter aircraft pilots, attack helicopter pilots, ship captains, air defense artillerymen, field artillerymen, tank commanders, subordinate unit leaders, and so on. Because it incorporates input from so many levels of command, prescribes the conduct of so many decision-makers, and changes particular rules from mission to mission, the present method struggles to sort ROE into clear conceptual categories.


2. *Purposes of ROE.*--For instance, the present method of imparting ROE sorts rules into three groups based upon the purposes they serve: policy, legal, and military.<sup>69</sup> An example of ROE that serve policy purposes is Executive Order 11850, which prohibits first use of riot control agents and herbicides without Presidential approval.<sup>70</sup> An example of a rule that serves military purposes is the common requirement in ground operations that the artillery tubes organic to a unit will not fire beyond a designated fire support coordination line, which ensures an efficient division of labor between fires controlled at one level and those controlled by higher levels of command.<sup>71</sup> An example of ROE drafted for legal purposes is the prohibition that "hospitals, churches, shrines, schools, museums, and any other historical or cultural sites will not be engaged except in self-defense."<sup>72</sup>

Yet the purposes of ROE quite often overlap, and rules implementing strategic policy decisions may well serve an operational or tactical military goal while simultaneously bringing U.S. forces in compliance with domestic or international law. See *Figures 4a*<sup>73</sup> and *4b*.<sup>74</sup> As a result, troops in the field may not appreciate the reasons why a leader fashioned a particular rule. Indeed, troops may not discern purposes even if the clear military disadvantage of the rule and its restrictiveness compared to a prior rule would make its policy origins apparent to an outside observer. It is unlikely that the sweaty private in Somalia understood or cared to understand the

ROE PURPOSES



ROE AND LAW



*Figure 4A*

*Figure 4B*

delicate policy aims of his superiors during October of 1993.

Then, what was effectively an abrupt shift in ROE prevented soldiers from patrolling the streets of Mogadishu and confronting Somali gunmen who were manning checkpoints there.<sup>75</sup>

3. *Wartime Versus Peacetime ROE.*--Recall that these initial sections of the diagnosis are intended to be more descriptive than evaluative. Yet even continuing in a descriptive vein, one notes that as the present method of imparting land force ROE struggles to sort rules according to their purposes it also struggles to draw a sharp conceptual line between war and

peace. Combatant commands draft and disseminate wartime rules in the same manner as they do peacetime rules; however, the rules themselves differ to reflect the increased justification for using force in wartime operations. Wartime ROE (WROE) permit U.S. forces to open fire upon all identified enemy targets, regardless whether those targets represent actual, immediate threats.<sup>76</sup> By contrast, the PROE merely permit engagement in individual, unit, or national self-defense--the sole legal ground for international use of force during peacetime.<sup>77</sup>

The training of the U.S. ground component emphasizes WROE rather than PROE. Training thus relies on a bright line distinction between war and peace even as land force doctrine is now blurring that same distinction.<sup>78</sup> Individual Army privates and officer trainees in all occupational specialties receive instruction and undergo evaluation on the following basic wartime rules: "Attack only combat targets. Use the firepower necessary to accomplish your mission but avoid needless destruction."<sup>79</sup> Army trainers also test in rudimentary fashion the trainee's ability to identify the persons, places, and things that are proper combat targets on the battlefield. Marine Corps training similarly stresses the basic wartime rule of attacking combat targets while seeking to impart some understanding of what those targets properly are.<sup>80</sup> The Department of Defense Law of War Program<sup>81</sup> and numerous Law of War publications issued for consumption by soldiers and judge advocates further illustrate the focus upon wartime rules.<sup>82</sup>

4. *Necessity and Proportionality.*--Despite training for war, soldiers often serve outside their warrior roles.<sup>83</sup> In such cases, the present method urges soldiers to conform their actions to the principles of necessity and proportionality. These principles help define the peacetime justification to use force in self-defense,<sup>84</sup> and ROE in operations other than war frequently contain restatements of these two principles. The most common PROE restatement of the necessity principle is that friendly forces may engage only those forces committing hostile acts or clearly demonstrating hostile intent.<sup>85</sup> This formulation--a quite restrictive rule for the use of force--captures the essence of peacetime necessity under international law.<sup>86</sup> In 1840, Secretary of State Daniel Webster opined, in a passage scholars now cite as international legal authority, that self-defense is justified only in cases in which "the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."<sup>87</sup> The rule of necessity applies to individuals as well as to military units or sovereign states.<sup>88</sup>

Definitions of "hostile act" and "hostile intent" frequently accompany the necessity rule in the ROE and make it more concrete. Although the *PROE* definitions of these terms bear security classifications that restrict circulation to those who "need to know,"<sup>89</sup> their gist is unclassified. A hostile act is "simply the actual use of armed force--attacking."<sup>90</sup> Hostile intent "is the threat of imminent use of force."<sup>91</sup> The precise

contents of these definitions become sensitive when the ROE describe specific behaviors as hostile acts or equate particular objective characteristics with hostile intent. For instance, the ROE might define a foreign uniformed soldier aiming a machinegun from behind a prepared firing position as a clear demonstration of hostile intent, regardless whether that soldier truly intends to harm U.S. forces.<sup>92</sup>

Ground force ROE typically restate the principal of proportionality in the form of a requirement that "soldiers will use only the amount of firepower necessary to accomplish the mission."<sup>93</sup> This rule expresses the international legal norm that nations and individuals must limit the intensity, duration, and magnitude of force to what is reasonably required to counter the attack or threat of attack.<sup>94</sup> The definitions of hostile act and hostile intent, the rule that one or both of them must be present before using force (necessity), and the rule that the use of force must be scaled to the threat (proportionality), constitute the core of what commanders and judge advocates distribute to ground troops as "ROE" in operations other than war.

5. *Functional Types of Land Force ROE.*--Of course, mere restatement of these core legal principles does not indicate specifically enough the circumstances under which soldiers may fire weapons in national, unit, or individual self-defense. Nor do these principles articulate the myriad restrictions that a

commander may impose on a force to serve the nonlegal purposes mentioned above. In practice, the present method of imparting ROE relies upon attorneys at numerous levels to participate in targeting cell meetings and ensure that targeting decisions comply with the ROE.<sup>95</sup> Also in practice, commands insert numerous specific rules into ROE annexes and soldier cards to elaborate further the rules of necessity and proportionality and to dictate precise terms of restrictions having little or nothing to do with law.

The specific rules follow no rigorous format, and variations are as numerous as units and missions, but ten functional types have emerged over time. Appendix A describes each type of ROE, provides samples that have appeared in actual ground force plans or in ROE cards, and notes the risks of using each type. Briefly, the ten types are as follows:

*Type I - Hostility Criteria.* Provide those making decisions whether to fire with a set of objective factors to assist in determining whether a potential assailant exhibits hostile intent and thus clarify whether shots can be fired before receiving fire.

*Type II - Scale of Force/Challenging Procedure.* Specify a graduated show of force that ground troops must use in ambiguous situations before resorting to deadly force. Include such measures as giving a verbal

warning, using a riot stick, perhaps firing a warning shot, or firing a shot intended to wound. May place limits on the pursuit of an attacker.

*Type III - Protection of Property and Foreign Nationals.* Detail what and whom may be defended with force aside from the lives of U.S. soldiers and citizens. Include measures to be taken to prevent crimes in progress or the fleeing of criminals.

*Type IV - Weapons Control Status/Alert Conditions.* Announce, for air defense assets, a posture for resolving doubts over whether to engage. Announce for units observing alert conditions a series of measures designed to adjust unit readiness for attack to the level of perceived threat. The measures may include some or all of the other functional types of rules.

*Type V - Arming Orders.* Dictate which soldiers in the force are armed and which have live ammunition. Specify which precise orders given by whom will permit the loading and charging of firearms.

*Type VI - Approval to Use Weapons Systems.* Designate what level commander must approve use of particular

weapons systems. Perhaps prohibit use of a weapon entirely.

*Type VII - Eyes on Target.* Require that the object of fire be observed by one or more human or electronic means.

*Type VIII - Territorial or Geographic Restraints.*


Create geographic zones or areas into which forces may not fire. May designate a territorial--perhaps political--boundary, beyond which forces may neither fire nor enter except perhaps in hot pursuit of an attacking force. Include tactical control measures that coordinate fire and maneuver by means of graphic illustrations on operations map overlays.<sup>96</sup>

*Type IX - Restrictions on Manpower.* Prescribe numbers and types of soldiers to be committed to a theater or area of operations. Perhaps prohibit use of U.S. manpower in politically or diplomatically sensitive personnel assignments requiring allied manning.

*Type X - Restrictions on Point Targets and Means of Warfare.* Prohibit targeting of certain individuals or facilities. May restate basic rules of the Law of War

for situations in which a hostile force is identified and prolonged armed conflict ensues.

Even though neither military nor legal doctrine recognizes them, the ten functional types furnish an accurate summary of the rules soldiers actually receive. See *Figure 5*.



Under the present method of imparting ROE, subordinate commands and individual soldiers receive some or all of these ten types of specific rules. The ten types are distinct in a practical rather than a logical sense, and a single sentence appearing in an ROE annex or card will frequently blend or combine two or more types. Command judgments about the nature of

the mission, intelligence on potential threats, surrounding terrain, strengths and weaknesses of troops, and time available to prepare for threats will drive which specific rules are disseminated. For instance, the commander of a noncombatant evacuation operation may direct troops to defend with deadly force certain mission essential equipment (Type III) and remind aircraft not to overfly neutral 3d party airspace (Type VIII), while the commander of a humanitarian assistance operation may issue a preferred graduated show of force to be used against unarmed but hostile civilians (Type II).

6. *The Self-Defense Boilerplate.*--In addition to the basic rules of necessity and proportionality and to the ten specific types of rules, the present method of imparting ROE features a prominent notice regarding the right of self-defense. This cautionary rule typically appears at the very beginning of written ROE, often in capital letters. One common version states that "nothing in these rules limits the rights of individual soldiers to defend themselves or the rights and responsibilities of leaders to defend their units."<sup>97</sup> Irrespective of mission or unit, this or similar boilerplate appears in every ROE annex and card prepared for ground forces; accordingly, it represents perhaps the only constant in the present method of imparting ROE to soldiers.

*B. Historical Background of the Present Method*

What are the origins of ROE, and how did the present method of imparting ROE to ground forces come about? One might begin answering these questions by identifying predecessors of modern ROE in tactical orders given on battlefields long ago. For example, on June 17, 1775, in the Battle of Bunker Hill, William Prescott issued his now famous order, "Don't one of you fire until you see the whites of their eyes."<sup>98</sup> That order, because it specified the circumstances under which friendly forces could initiate combat with other forces, would qualify today as a rule of engagement.<sup>99</sup>

One might also search for the origins of ROE in seminal writings on military strategy. The proposition of Clausewitz that war is but a means of achieving political objectives<sup>100</sup> is an obvious ancestor to the modern notion that ROE function as devices to help bring military operations in line with political purposes.<sup>101</sup> Strategy sets fundamental conditions for conflict, establishes goals in theaters of operations, assigns forces, and provides assets, whereas ROE set specific concrete limits on weapons and targets to serve these strategic aims.<sup>102</sup> The link between strategy and ROE is thus both strong and conspicuous.

Yet ROE are distinctly modern, as is the present method of imparting them. Although legendary battlefield orders and early writings on strategy are plausible precursors, the present method finds its most important roots no further back in history than

the early 1950's. The method builds upon precedents laid down by all of military services since the Korean War.

In the period since that conflict three factors have converged, impelling senior American leaders to issue ROE to harness military action more completely to political ends. First, weapons of mass destruction have been available to competing sovereign states, creating the specter of nuclear holocaust and the incentive to prevent minor incidents and conflicts from escalating.<sup>103</sup> Second, technological advances in communications and information processing have vastly increased a central authority's ability to direct the actions of subordinates, though these same advances have not achieved the sort of "perfect, real-time" information<sup>104</sup> that would conceivably make ROE unnecessary. Third, an aggressive and skeptical news media has emerged, willing to question the use of military force, capable of projecting the consequences of such force into millions of living rooms, and prepared to focus the wrath of the American people on a political leader who appears to have lost control.<sup>105</sup>

1. *Development of ROE for Air Forces.*--Although not yet referred to as such, modern rules of engagement first appeared during the air campaign over North Korea in 1950, when General MacArthur received orders from Washington that American bomber aircraft were neither to enter Chinese air space nor destroy the Suiho Dam on the North Korean side of the Yalu River.<sup>106</sup> While

flying sorties to destroy bridges over the Yalu, bomber pilots were to approach their targets on an angle parallel to the North Korean-China border so as to prevent overflight of Chinese territory. Historians have documented well the Truman administration's preoccupation with the risk that the United Nations' military response in Korea, begun in July of 1950, could escalate into nuclear conflict. General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the JCS, speculated that the restrictions on the Yalu bombings may have been "the first time the JCS had ever overridden a theater commander on a tactical operation."<sup>107</sup> In the most memorable American illustration of civilian control over the military since George Washington defused the Newburgh Conspiracy, President Truman relieved MacArthur because the general did not follow the rules of engagement.

Contemporaneous dogfights between American and Soviet aircraft, however, probably provided the impetus for the Pentagon to coin the term "ROE." Commentators have reconstructed, from Korean War documents that are now declassified, a tense series of incidents between aircraft of the two nuclear powers. During the period of September 3, 1950 to July 23, 1953, three U.S. aircraft and no fewer than three Soviet aircraft were downed in at least five separate air-to-air combat engagements. Indeed, the numbers of downed aircraft and engagements may have been much higher. These highly charged confrontations likely prodded JCS to issue, on November 23, 1954, a set of "Intercept and Engagement Instructions," which Air Force and Navy staffers termed ROE. In

1958, the JCS formally adopted and defined the term "rule of engagement."

The Vietnam conflict accelerated the development of ROE for American air forces. Tightly restricted by a provision of the 1954 Geneva Accords which prohibited arms transfers into Vietnam,<sup>108</sup> the Kennedy Administration introduced U.S. Air Force aircraft and crews into the Republic of Vietnam in 1961 under rules designed to conceal American assistance. For example, the ROE required American aircraft to fly with a combined U.S. and Vietnamese crew, to refrain from conducting armed reconnaissance missions, and to carry markings of the Vietnamese Air Force.<sup>109</sup> Even though by 1964 the United States had abandoned the position that American combat forces were not involved in the Vietnam War, the rules of engagement grew even more complex and restrictive as national policy in that theater evolved.

The policy of gradualism, implemented by the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign over North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968, resulted in ROE of unprecedented detail and restrictiveness. A 1969 Air Force review of the rules in force during 1966 summarized a portion of the ROE on targeting in and around Hanoi and Haiphong:

Attacks on populated areas and on certain types of targets, such as hydropower plants, locks and dams, fishing boats, sampans, and military barracks were prohibited. The suppression of [surface-to-air

missiles] and gun-laying radar systems was prohibited in this area as were attacks on NVN air bases from which attacking aircraft might be operating. In military eyes, these restrictions had the effect of creating a haven in the northeast quadrant of [North Vietnam] into which the enemy could with impunity import vital war materials, construct sanctuaries for his aircraft, and prop his [anti-aircraft] defenses around the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong.<sup>110</sup>

In statements to newsmen, President Johnson expressly sought and gained political value from strict adherence to the ROE.<sup>111</sup>

After a series of highly publicized inadvertent bombings of Laotian and Vietnamese villages in March of 1967, the ROE in southern Laos became almost as restrictive as the outright prohibition in effect near Hanoi and Haiphong. North Vietnam aggressively maintained a supply line running through the southern Laotian panhandle into South Vietnam. Still, all U.S. air strikes along that supply line required the double safeguard of approval by the American Embassy in Laos and control by a forward air controller on the ground. Because of these restrictions, an average time of fifteen-and-a-half days elapsed between identification of a target area in Laos and receipt of clearance to strike. Not surprisingly, such pauses often sacrificed the effectiveness of bombing, which required prompt responses to fresh intelligence.<sup>112</sup>

Vietnam created a highwater mark of political involvement in day-to-day operations of American air forces.<sup>113</sup> Depending on perceived progress at the negotiating table, political leaders alternated between imposing more and less restrictive ROE until the end of American participation in that war. In general, the ROE restricted military operations far more than did international laws of armed conflict. As President Truman had ended General MacArthur's career a generation earlier, political leaders ended the career of one Air Force general for alleged ROE violations.<sup>114</sup> Since the war, a debate has raged about whether the ROE created thousands of unnecessary combat casualties and sacrificed victory.<sup>115</sup>

Perhaps in part due to that debate and in part due to different styles of governance, administrations since that time have never again linked ROE for air forces so tightly to immediate policy aims. Loosening has occurred despite a tense Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union that would continue until 1990, an unmanned satellite program that would improve communications between Washington and aircraft worldwide, and a press corps that would grow more aggressive and skeptical of military missteps. During the air campaign in the 1991 conflict with Iraq, ROE were generally no more restrictive than international law.<sup>116</sup> Yet on a smaller scale, the removal of short-term policy aims from ROE had been underway for several years. An engagement in August of 1981 over the Gulf of Sidra illustrated this development, when American F-14s downed two

Libyan Su-22 Fitters in self-defense under ROE that had removed many restrictions unrelated to international law or military effectiveness.<sup>117</sup>

2. *Development of ROE for Seaborne Forces.*--The ROE exercised over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 were forerunners to the present *PROE*, which bear the stamp of the U.S. Navy more than any other service. Modern maritime ROE developed around the service-specific question whether U.S. ships were obliged to "take the first hit," though as with the air forces it was cold war tension, ever-improving communications, and emerging skepticism in the news media that made the question an urgent one. Long accustomed to operational conditions that permitted the fleet to receive initial fire from hostile vessels and then mount an effective--and easily justified--response,<sup>118</sup> naval leaders grew increasingly concerned in the late 1960's that tactical advantage could pass irrevocably to a hostile force which fired first.<sup>119</sup>

The Royal Navy had been wrestling with similar questions for years, and the eventual American approach to ROE strongly resembled British naval doctrine spawned in the mid-1960's.<sup>120</sup> Writing in 1975, D.P. O'Connell noticed that over the preceding decade the Royal fleet had placed increasing emphasis on rules "which specify in detail the circumstances under which fire may be opened."<sup>121</sup> O'Connell regarded these "rules of engagement" as the practical implementation of both international law and national policy.<sup>122</sup> He sought to provide a "theory of graduated

rules of engagement"<sup>123</sup> to assist planners in preparing precise advance guidance to naval commanders, and in so doing, avoid "the dangers of uncontrolled escalation."<sup>124</sup>

O'Connell cited a series of confrontations between British and various foreign vessels in and near Malaysian territorial seas in 1963 and 1964 to illustrate the hazards of improvising rules of engagement. The situation was one of high political tension. The state of Malaysia formed on September 16, 1963 in face of hostility from its neighbor, Indonesia, which claimed that Malaysia had absorbed unwilling populations from two islands. Indonesia set out to undermine the new Malaysian state by diplomatic, economic, and even military pressure, as Indonesian seaborne and airborne commandos made armed incursions into Malaysian territory. The Royal Navy took an active part in the defense of Malaysia, a former British colony.<sup>125</sup>

The guidance to ship captains in the area of operations was that they were to interrogate<sup>126</sup> vessels on the high seas that acted suspiciously or fled when challenged. They were to use force against vessels in Malaysian territorial seas exhibiting the same behavior. Finally, they were to fire upon any Indonesian vessels that refused to stop in Malaysian waters or that fired against any target in Malaysian territory.

O'Connell viewed these rules as dangerous. Although they partially accounted for differences in the legal character of the high seas and territorial seas<sup>127</sup> and for limitations on the right of innocent passage,<sup>128</sup> they expressly permitted

overaggressive action and generated a series of emergency decisions. Should the warships of a nation seeking peacefully and gradually to extricate itself from the crushing responsibilities of a worldwide colonial empire be boarding vessels of other nations on the high seas? Should they be firing upon merely "suspicious" vessels in territorial waters, to which the general rule of innocent passage applies? The captains improvised, and no international incidents erupted. Yet because of the confrontations during this period, "the concept of rules of engagement, as instruments of carefully devised policy, entered naval doctrine with a view to controlling events rather than reacting to them."<sup>129</sup>

In 1978 the U.S. Navy embarked on its own ambitious project to develop an authoritative set of ROE while laying to rest the notion that its ships could fire only if fired upon. Admiral Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, set out to standardize the guidance given to seaborne captains on the use of force without restricting the flexibility to respond to a changing crisis.<sup>130</sup> He directed a study, conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses, that generated the Worldwide Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Seaborne Forces (PMROE). The JCS approved the PMROE in 1981, and the F-14 pilots of Task Force 60 exercised them the same year over the Gulf of Sidra.

Admiral Crowe, CINC of Pacific Command and eventual CJCS, used the PMROE as a model for the all-service PROE that Secretary of Defense Weinberger approved in June of 1986 and that the JCS

issued soon afterwards.<sup>131</sup> The JCS made minor refinements upon updating the *PROE* in 1988. Yet these refinements came only after two incidents in the Persian Gulf had dramatically highlighted both the chill ROE may cast on military initiative and the inherently limited impact ROE will have on decision-makers once a crisis is underway.

According to some commentators, the attack on the *USS Stark* showed that even ROE incorporating the right of anticipatory self-defense can encourage an overabundance of caution when the same ROE also appear to set elaborate preconditions for the exercise of that right.<sup>132</sup> On May 17, 1987 thirty-seven U.S. sailors died when two Exocet missiles fired by an Iraqi Air Force Mirage F-1 aircraft struck the *Stark*, a frigate on escort patrol duty in the Persian Gulf.<sup>133</sup>

Although the ROE--because they incorporated the basic *PROE* formulations of necessity and proportionality--permitted the *Stark*'s captain to use force against any aircraft that either committed a hostile act or displayed hostile intent, they also specified a graduated scale of force that may have encouraged conservative judgments about whether to attack preemptively.<sup>134</sup> The Navy accurately identified the immediate causes of the missile hit to be warning and weapons system failures, as well as poor tactical judgments by individual officers. Understandably, the Navy thus blamed the *Stark*'s captain, rather than the ROE, for the American deaths. However, the combatant commander and the JCS subsequently accelerated the sequence of measures along

the scale of force<sup>135</sup> and added specific hostility criteria<sup>136</sup> to the Persian Gulf ROE. In doing so, these authorities implicitly conceded that the previous ROE were subject to restrictive misinterpretation, even if the *Stark*'s captain could not reasonably avail himself of that excuse.

The downing of a commercial Iranian Airbus by the *USS Vincennes* only 13 months later kindled attempts to pin part of the blame on "looser" ROE, while the official investigation found that stress-induced operator errors and psychological distortions of data were the major causes for the tragedy.<sup>137</sup> On July 3, 1988, the *Vincennes* fired two missiles at Iran Air Flight 655, destroying the civilian aircraft at 13,500 feet and killing all 290 people on board. Commentators have argued plausibly that because the revised ROE enabled the *Vincennes* captain to equate with hostile intent the Airbus' failure to respond to warning, they formed a "but for" cause of the decision to fire.<sup>138</sup> Yet the direct causes lay elsewhere. Sailors in the *Vincennes'* combat information center received erroneous data that the Airbus was a military aircraft because one sailor did not adjust the instrument that would have displayed Flight 655's commercial status and because he also failed to consult readily available air traffic schedules. The crew then fell prey to "scenario fulfillment" when it dismissed accurate information in favor of reinforcing its erroneous belief that the aircraft was a hostile F-14.<sup>139</sup> The captain gave the order to fire based on the resulting faulty information that the crew relayed to him.

3. *Development of ROE for Land Forces.*--While America's air and sea forces developed ROE for tense encounters that could occur at any time and then escalate rapidly into nuclear war, the ground component trained for mid-intensity conventional war and developed its ROE for every other type of operation on an "as needed" basis. Also, while aircraft and ships on duty around the clock worldwide could conceivably be expected to fire on a Soviet plane or vessel purely in national self-defense,<sup>140</sup> such scenarios were unlikely to confront land forces, whose main defensive concerns centered on individuals or units. Thus, development of ROE in the land forces was less preoccupied with rapid escalation into nuclear holocaust. Instead, the dominant influences were the improved communications between Washington and field commanders, the still imperfect communications between those commanders and frequently inexperienced individual soldiers, and the growing distrust between the military and news media.

Even though accurately labeled by historians as a limited war,<sup>141</sup> the Korean conflict U.S. ground forces fought was intense and deadly. Unrestrained by orders on either side resembling modern ROE, the ground fighting killed or wounded thirty thousand Americans per year.<sup>142</sup> Also, American ground troops fired all available conventional weapons. Despite facing in North Korean and Chinese infiltrators an unconventional foe, the U.S. Army made maximum use of superior firepower against two identifiable hostile forces. Americans, quite appropriately,

shot these forces on sight with no deliberations on the subtleties of hostile intent.

Even later in the decade when nearly 15,000 American ground troops deployed on a politically sensitive mission in Lebanon, the term "ROE" had not yet entered the language of the soldier. This was not due to any lack of restrictions on firing: the objective of maintaining urban peace and frustrating communist takeover of a land recently torn by civil war demanded extreme fire discipline on the part of individual riflemen.<sup>143</sup> Yet while air force pilots by this time were conforming their responses to "ROE,"<sup>144</sup> troops in Lebanon during the 1958 "Bluebat" operation merely followed a "standing order . . . not to return fire unless they had a clear target."<sup>145</sup> The intervention in Lebanon, which lasted 102 days and resulted in one casualty to enemy fire, inspired commentary by ground commanders on the virtue of restraint in low intensity conflict.<sup>146</sup> Still, the deployment was a contingency operation that challenged leaders to develop a plan under crisis conditions and that exposed gaps in existing plans and soldier training.<sup>147</sup>

Peacekeeping operations by American ground forces in the Dominican Republic during 1965-66 also required restraint.<sup>148</sup> However, a newly skeptical press corps, instant communications between ground commanders and Washington, and shifting packages of politically motivated ROE set the Dominican intervention apart from Bluebat and all prior ground deployments. Operation "Power Pack" at its height committed nearly 24,000 American troops to

America's unstable Caribbean neighbor to block what the Johnson administration perceived to be a communist grab for power. Once the intervention had effectively blocked the rebels, the military mission soon gave way to diplomacy, and political leaders tightly coordinated troop activities to enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement.<sup>149</sup> Soldiers trained to fire upon sighting of enemy units made an uncomfortable adjustment to restrictive ROE, for which they felt inadequately prepared.<sup>150</sup> The Dominican intervention helped make the term "ROE" familiar to American soldiers, who assimilated it into their vocabulary as a curse word.<sup>151</sup>

The Vietnam war widened soldier familiarity with ROE.<sup>152</sup> The war also triggered a reaction against ROE--a reaction which to some observers involved misinterpretation or outright circumvention of the published rules.<sup>153</sup> Familiarity with the term "ROE," and even ready availability of various specific rules in written form, was no substitute for proper training in fire discipline and proportionality. Still, the proliferation of written guidance insulated senior commanders when individuals committed serious or intentional violations.<sup>154</sup> Ground component headquarters in Vietnam required that all newly assigned officer and enlisted personnel receive information cards that recited rules against targeting civilians, wounded persons, and captives.<sup>155</sup> All commanders received a card containing the rule, "use your firepower with care and discrimination, particularly in populated areas."<sup>156</sup> The ROE issued by various

levels of command controlled virtually every type of ground force weapon and included most of the ten functional types of ROE outlined above.<sup>157</sup> The frequent sensational press reports of indiscriminate fire and brutality only served to increase the number and versions of rules disseminated to individual soldiers.<sup>158</sup>

Careful study of the regulations, directives, standard operating procedures, annexes, and cards used during Vietnam to impart ROE to soldiers reveals striking similarities to the documents used today. Vietnam institutionalized most features of the present method because it confronted so many ground units and leaders, over such a long period in the glaring public eye, with the imperatives of restraint as well as force security. The ROE used today in operations demanding restraint are not much different from the rules that governed employment of small arms and automatic weapons in American infantry divisions in Vietnam:

Individual and crew-served weapons . . . may be employed by commanders against:

- (1) Enemy personnel observed with weapons who demonstrate hostile intent either by taking a friendly unit under fire, taking evasive action, or who occupy a firing position or bunker.
- (2) Targets which are observed and positively identified as enemy.

(3) Point targets from which fire is being received. (This will not be construed as permission for indiscriminate firing into areas inhabited by non-combatants).

(4) Suspected enemy locations when noncombatants will not be endangered.<sup>159</sup>

Action (1)--although it somewhat begs the question "who is the enemy?"-- acknowledges the modern insight that ordinary people can become legitimate targets if they carry arms and show hostile intent. Actions (2) and (4) are completely consistent with the WROE embodied in the common tasks taught today to soldiers. Action (3) states the soldier's inherent right in peace or war to protect himself against hostile acts, a rule included today in most ROE annexes and cards. The close resemblance between present-day land force ROE and those of the Vietnam era provides a sobering illustration that despite twenty additional years of experience with operations short of war, ground units use the same basic methods in the attempt to bring their operations in line with political and legal constraints.

Nevertheless, three developments since the Vietnam war have changed land force ROE and the method by which leaders transmit them. First, references to "free-fire zones" and "specified strike zones" have disappeared. A free fire zone was a specifically delimited geographic area that political authorities had previously approved for use of all means of fire and

maneuver.<sup>160</sup> Although free fire zones never obviated the presence of military necessity or the requirement to avoid firing upon known protected targets, such as civilians discovered to be within a zone,<sup>161</sup> the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam in 1967 abruptly replaced the term with "specified strike zone,"<sup>162</sup> presumably because the language of "free fire" defied the goals of encouraging disciplined fire and engendering the affection of the Vietnamese people. Yet the latter term has also fallen out of use. So too have the procedures permitting a village to be included within a zone--and thereafter subject to unobserved artillery and mortar fire--once hostile fire had emanated from it and civilians had been evacuated or warned to leave.<sup>163</sup>

Second, ground component staffs now insert the self-defense boilerplate discussed above at or near the beginning of all ROE annexes and cards. This development has occurred in the aftermath of the 1983 terrorist killing of the Marines in Beirut. The official investigation into that incident commented that the ROE in force had adversely affected the "mind-set" of the Marines at Beirut International Airport because those ROE "underscored the need to fire only if fired upon, to avoid harming innocent civilians, to respect civilian property, and to share security and self-defense efforts with the [Lebanese Armed Forces]."<sup>164</sup> Even though other pertinent findings criticized the lack of specific guidance for countering vehicular terrorist attacks<sup>165</sup> and the inadequacy of preparatory training for dealing with unconventional military threats<sup>166</sup>, the single institutional

change in land force ROE from the Beirut defeat appears to have been that written ROE must remind troops, up front and in capital letters, that they have a right to defend themselves.<sup>167</sup>

Third, a clear trend toward joint service ROE<sup>168</sup> has resulted in the adoption by ground component staffs of a basic analytic framework and a set of terms that originated in Navy circles. Although many subordinate ground units continue to issue PROE in unique format, more and more others are providing definitions of hostile act and hostile intent, stating that one or both of these must be present before using force (necessity), and stating that soldiers must scale their force to the threat (proportionality). At higher levels of command, the adoption of this foundational framework is universal, despite the persistence of great differences in presentation and specific language even at division and corps level.

American operations between 1987 and 1990 in Panama provide a good snapshot of the present-day method of imparting ROE to soldiers. Military historians have recorded the political constraints bearing on the several distinct military operations conducted during that period.<sup>169</sup> These operations culminated in Operation Just Cause, the contingency mission undertaken to drive Manuel Noriega from power and reestablish order. It suffices here to note that American ground troops in Panama--when they had received background instruction in ROE--had been trained for the conventional task of shooting identified enemy forces on sight. Yet, most of the operations in Panama required troops to avoid

overt provocation of America's canal partner, lest the United States cede Noriega the moral high ground; accordingly, soldiers received a quick baptism in the PROE, and in the sometimes ambiguous waters of hostile intent and proportionality.

Although most troops performed both with admirable restraint and appropriate aggressiveness, the adjustment to restrictive rules proved difficult, with or without the distribution of pocket cards and despite the ubiquitous self-defense boilerplate. Troops responded to the lack of preparation with numerous sensible questions about hostile intent: is the only clear indication of hostile intent the receipt of hostile fire? Is a Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldier demonstrating hostile intent if he aims his rifle in my direction? What if numerous PDF soldiers have aimed their rifles previously without firing them? Commanders wrestled with the question whether and how to impose the most restrictive form of ROE: orders dictating which soldiers are armed and have live ammunition and when they may chamber rounds.<sup>170</sup> Marines objected to the rules requiring a verbal warning as part of the graduated measures leading to use of deadly force, citing the Beirut disaster and arguing that verbal shouts to armed intruders would endanger Marine sentries.<sup>171</sup> Inevitably, soldiers accused of using inappropriate force invoked aspects of ROE in their defense.<sup>172</sup>

More recently, ground force leaders and judge advocates in Saudi Arabia and Iraq (1991), in Los Angeles (1992), and in Somalia (1993) developed innovative ways to communicate and

reinforce ROE.<sup>173</sup> However, these innovations have not yet spurred systemic changes in the method by which most troops receive ROE. Doctrine and training in ROE remain as yet largely unchanged and overlooked.<sup>174</sup> The Gulf War--validating as it did the traditional military preference for conventional wars--could conceivably offer a rationale for leaving ROE alone, just as it has reinforced the perennial distaste of the mainstream military with low intensity conflict, ROE's most fertile soil.<sup>175</sup> Yet ground troops endured long months without combat in Saudi Arabia, and WROE issues, when they finally arose, were relatively simple to resolve. These factors spurred comments from judge advocate participants, who observed that for most of the deployment, "'rules of force' to protect people and property" were more germane than rules "for active engagements" and that "peacetime ROE do not seem adequately to address landpower force protection for pre- and post-hostilities."<sup>176</sup> Still, despite the likelihood that low-intensity conflicts will continue to be "the stuff of superpower interventions,"<sup>177</sup> the view that ground forces should prepare exclusively for conventional war enjoys considerable inertia.<sup>178</sup> At present, staffs tend to draft ROE for operations other than war only after crisis has arrived, and troops tend to receive these ROE only after the best opportunity for training has passed.<sup>179</sup>

C. *The "Legislative" Model of ROE*

The underlying problem with the present method of imparting ROE to ground troops is that it relies upon a legislative model of controlling conduct. Such a model serves certain established interests and provides a traditional role for judge advocates, but it is not optimal for inculcating initiative and restraint in a military land force. Rules of engagement in this legislative model are laws--primarily written texts that authorities issue, supplement, and perhaps supersede; that members of the controlled group consult, interpret, and sometimes obey; and that other functionaries implement, distinguish, and occasionally prosecute. A legislative approach to land force ROE can create danger when the time comes for living, breathing, sweating soldiers to translate the texts into results on the ground. Every analogy can be pushed too far, but the analogy here--between the present method of imparting ROE and the familiar social process of controlling behavior through legislation--furnishes a compelling summary of what is defective in present ROE doctrine.

1. *ROE as Law: Problems in Creation.*--Commanders and legislators share the sensible inclination to control individual conduct by creating rules. Giving an order, issuing a rule, announcing a policy, writing a law--these are all attempts to bring about desired behavior via a straightforward mechanism: "if I need them to act a certain way, I'll simply write instructions on how I want it done."

The advantages of this approach are readily apparent. Regardless of the circumstances, there is always a form of response available. Writing how one expects or demands individuals to act when faced with a set of facts can provide valuable coordination to otherwise chaotic or destructive group activity. Written pronouncements can also reaffirm and reinforce important group values. In addition, issuing fresh rules enables one to give special, tailored attention to each contingency as it arises, in all of its particular complexity. Legislators or commanders may never intentionally create rules to dispel the appearance of inaction. Yet one effect of rule creation is to dispel such appearances.<sup>180</sup>

Governing or leading by rule creation also has at least two disadvantages, though these are less readily apparent, particularly to an inexperienced rulemaker. First, the mere making of a rule does not change what one eminent jurist has called "primary, private individual conduct."<sup>181</sup> The wisdom contained in the adage "you can't legislate morality" applies to all sorts of rulemaking--in the sense that an abstract rule by itself has no grip upon concrete realities. Connections or hooks into individual behavior must come from something else, namely from willful obedience to or enforcement of the rule.

Second, rule creation easily tends toward rule overpopulation. With few obvious incentives to unmake rules, and with every incentive to create diverse rules of varying specificity to meet new challenges, legislators and commanders

alike will naturally produce thicker and thicker codes of rules, often with the help of others, namely lawyers. The result is that few rules are directly superseded or wiped off the books. Instead, supplements, qualifications, and explanations abound, contradictory rules emerge, and redundancies thrive as the rule creator inevitably neglects the hard work of integrating a new rule into the older web and of imposing hierarchical order on the entire mass. One legislator and commander replaces another, raising the perennial question: which of the former rulemaker's rules still apply?

Military commanders encounter other, special difficulties in rule creation because of the essential legal and moral difference between peace and war. For example, while a legislator seeking to proscribe murder will immediately find a pretty good first draft in the rule "thou shalt not kill, except in self-defense," the commander seeking to prevent murder on the battlefield must use many more words to account for the special immunity soldiers should and do enjoy for killing lawful combatants during armed conflict:<sup>182</sup> "thou shalt not kill, except in self-defense, and except during war; but even during war, thou shalt not use methods calculated to cause unnecessary suffering and shalt not kill civilians and wounded enemy soldiers, except in self-defense, etc."

Consider another example--this one taken directly from actual land force ROE--which illustrates how different headquarters guided by similar purposes, if left to themselves,

will create significantly different texts. The standing ROE for operations other than war used in the recent past by four infantry units of division or brigade size contain the following statements of the basic necessity rule:

*Unit A: You are authorized to use deadly force in self-defense [if]:*

- a. you are fired upon;
- b. armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life; [or]
- c. there is a clear demonstration of hostile intent in your presence.<sup>183</sup>

*Unit B: Soldiers will defend themselves. Soldiers under actual attack or facing a clearly imminent attack will use necessary force to defend themselves even if the attacker would be otherwise protected (e.g. a medic or civilian).<sup>184</sup>*

*Unit C: The right of self-defense is never denied. If a [Unit C soldier] is fired upon he may return fire in order to defend himself, his unit, and accompanying personnel.<sup>185</sup>*

*Unit D: Nothing in these ROE shall limit the right of an individual soldier to defend himself or a*

commander's right and responsibility to defend his command and/or those in his charge from attack. The right of self-defense is never denied. . . .

Engageable forces [include] . . . [t]hose committing hostile acts. . . . Hostile acts [include] actual attacks [and] threats of imminent attack.<sup>186</sup>

In this example, Unit C's drafter chose not to mention the hostile intent prong of the peacetime necessity rule--i.e., that a soldier may use force if confronted with clear indications of hostile intent--while Unit A's drafter chose to state this explicitly ("there is a clear demonstration of hostile intent in your presence"), Unit B's drafter elected to imply the possibility ("or facing a clearly imminent attack"), and Unit D's drafter chose to incorporate hostile intent into the definition of hostile act ("hostile acts include actual attacks and threats of imminent attack"). There is nothing inherently wrong with any of these formulations, but the inconsistency of texts across units within the same land force is one factor causing problems of interpretation and preventing standardized training.<sup>187</sup>

2. *ROE as Law: Problems of Interpretation.*--Problems at the level of interpretation hamper the legislative model of controlling conduct. The model assumes that members will consult and can assimilate the rules prior to acting. It also assumes

that members will be able to decide which rule takes precedence on the frequent occasions when many rules speak to a situation.

These assumptions are tenable for many ordinary social processes that occur in a modern state. The business executive can read the rules on claiming deductions for charitable contributions on an income tax return, can consult a tax attorney concerning which of two interpretations is legal, and can read opinions published by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service or judgments published by federal courts before deciding whether to make a claim and how much to deduct. Plenty of time, and a large, elaborate set of institutions equipped to interpret and provide advice can help produce conforming behavior in the individuals subject to the rules.<sup>188</sup>

Military staffs deliver advice and interpretive guidance to commanders and other decision-makers, thereby mitigating the confusion engendered by multiple rules. Thus, the Navy captain with a judge advocate on the bridge can arrive at a prudent interpretation of the ROE, even when one rule counsels restraint and another commands him to use necessary preemptive force, and even while a Soviet vessel is moments away from physically bumping his cruiser in an international dispute over the right of innocent passage. Similarly, the commander of an Army corps can select targets from a list recommended by a staff cell, the judge advocate for which has identified the potential targets that violate no ROE. However, land force commanders below brigade level do not have judge advocates readily available, and

battalion commanders are the most junior soldiers with staffs.<sup>189</sup> Accordingly, interpretive guidance is scarce within a deployed ground force.<sup>190</sup>

Education and experience in problem-solving on the part of those subject to the rules can also increase the legislative model's effectiveness at controlling behavior. College-educated Navy captains and Air Force pilots can sometimes interpret contradictory rules, even when time for consulting authoritative sources of interpretation is not available.<sup>191</sup> The 18-year-old assigned to an infantry platoon, whose guidance descends through many layers of command, is much more likely to violate the purpose of senior leaders' ROE, despite the fact that he desperately wants to do the right thing.<sup>192</sup>

3. *ROE as Law: Problems in Enforcement.*--Under the legislative model, violations of ROE too readily take on the appearance of criminal violations. Good judgment by commanders and judge advocates will always mitigate the effects, but this factor nevertheless frustrates the goal of fielding a land force infused with initiative as well as restraint. This factor also reinforces the stereotype of judge advocates as bureaucrats who are more efficient at prosecuting violators than at offering preventive advice. The dynamics stemming from enforcement highlight incompatibilities between the military operations occurring in the real world and the legislative model on which present-day ROE rest.

Even though the conduct it proscribes may constitute an independent crime under one or more punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a rule of engagement itself becomes enforceable criminal law only through a narrow channel. Article 92 of the UCMJ makes punishable certain failures to obey orders or regulations, but only after the order or regulation in question has run a gauntlet of statutory elements and constitutional doctrines any one of which can render it unenforceable. Orders found merely to "supply general guidelines or advice for conducting military functions" are unenforceable,<sup>193</sup> as are orders found by a military judge to be constitutionally vague<sup>194</sup>, overbroad<sup>195</sup>, or otherwise unlawful.<sup>196</sup> The highest levels of command specifically describe their rules of engagement to lower headquarters as policy, rather than as criminally enforceable orders. However, commanders may purposefully issue particular rules of engagement for the individual soldier as punitive general orders, creating the possibility of courts-martial for violators.<sup>197</sup>

The companion cases of *United States v. McMonagle*<sup>198</sup> and *United States v. Finsel*<sup>199</sup> demonstrate that violations of ROE can be enforced via court-martial. In these cases, which arose out of American operations in Panama in January of 1990, the accused infantry soldiers had received a general order from their division commander to not "chamber a round of ammunition unless enemy and/or criminal contact is imminent."<sup>200</sup> Although the mission of American forces in Panama never abruptly or clearly

shifted from "combat" to "stabilization,"<sup>201</sup> and although the two accuseds' company "maintained a secure posture to deter terrorist-type attacks,"<sup>202</sup> the company had not experienced any hostile actions in the previous several weeks, and "the threat level was considered low."<sup>203</sup> On 25 January, Private First Class McMonagle, Sergeant Finsel, and a third soldier from the unit intentionally violated the rule against chambering rounds when they not only chambered their firearms but then also shot them into the air above Panama City despite the complete absence "of hostile Panamanians or of hostile gunfire."<sup>204</sup> Subsequent courts-martial convicted McMonagle and Finsel of violating Article 92,<sup>205</sup> and a dissenting opinion to the appellate court's decision affirming McMonagle's conviction of a related crime made explicit that ROE establish a separate basis for prosecution.<sup>206</sup>

Yet it was the related crimes in this case that suggest how odd it seems to regard an ROE violation as just another crime to be prosecuted, a view that is central to the legislative model. McMonagle and Finsel unlawfully chambered their weapons during the very same episode in which one or each of them was drinking alcohol in violation of a no-drinking order,<sup>207</sup> having sex with a woman in a local brothel despite an order not have intimate personal contact with Panamanian females,<sup>208</sup> staging an elaborate mock firefight to cover up Finsel's loss of a 9mm pistol,<sup>209</sup> and finally murdering an innocent bystander who fell victim to a wild shot.<sup>210</sup> The ROE violations here were incidental to other serious wrongs, some among these being mala

in se.<sup>211</sup> Without criticizing the decision to prosecute the ROE violations in this case, the judge advocate instructing soldiers on legal rights to employ force understandably experiences discomfort at the notion that McMonagle and Finsel were "ROE criminals" as opposed to merely "criminals."

Poor dissemination of the facts surrounding a criminal allegation of excessive force can curb initiative and cause soldiers to hesitate. In the case of *United States v. Conde*,<sup>212</sup> a court-martial panel found fault with the accused's decision to fire his M79 grenade launcher out the window of a vehicle traveling through downtown Mogadishu, Somalia.<sup>213</sup> In addition to *Conde*, at least six criminal cases in Somalia involved Marines and other soldiers who allegedly had used force in excess of what the ROE allowed.<sup>214</sup> Regardless whether each received eventual exoneration or punishment in accordance with the facts, as deserved,<sup>215</sup> soldiers--as well as the press and other commentators--perceived that prosecution would follow every decision to fire.<sup>216</sup>

The investigation and court-martial conviction of Army Specialist Mowris,<sup>217</sup> for instance, had a restraining influence on soldier responses to fire. The convening authority decided to set aside Specialist Mowris' conviction for negligent homicide only after many soldiers received a strong signal. As one Army colonel who commanded in Somalia noted, "[b]ecause of this case, soldiers in some cases were reluctant to fire even when fired upon for fear of legal action. It took weeks to work through

this -- but we did. There is no doubt this case had a major effect on the theatre.<sup>218</sup> Another observer, noting a similar restraining influence, proposed that leaders do not explain why certain soldiers face criminal charges because clarifying explanations might trigger unlawful command influence allegations from defense counsel.<sup>219</sup>

Initiative is not the only casualty, however. The commander's interest in restraint, when appropriate, can also fall prey to the enforcement features of the legislative model. Criminal prosecution of deployed soldiers for excessive force is highly sporadic, for reasons well-illustrated by the case of *United States v. Bryan*. In that case, the shooting of a prisoner in Panama City would have gone unprosecuted had not one of the witnesses come forward and stuck to a controversial rendition of events that portrayed MSG Bryan as a murderer.<sup>220</sup> That investigators and judge advocates are often far from hostile spots, that many instances of excessive force have few surviving witnesses--these and other factors create wide evidentiary gaps that translate to erratic enforcement of ROE.<sup>221</sup> Not surprisingly, military historians of the Vietnam war attribute at least some of the excessive uses of force in that conflict to the command's failure to enforce the ROE by prosecuting violators.<sup>222</sup> As trial counsel warm to the task of prosecuting the few violators for whom there is enough evidence to proceed, the apparent role of the judge advocate under the legislative model becomes clear to commanders and soldiers. It

is the role of an outsider, a second-guesser who enters the picture after the shooting has stopped and articulates standards with sharp clarity. These standards, for the participants at the scene, may have been fuzzy and may have received no emphasis in training before the alleged crime. For good reason, the Department of Defense and the separate services require judge advocates to participate in the proper disposition, under the UCMJ, of alleged war crimes. Yet the availability of this traditional prosecutorial role, when not balanced by strong countervailing leadership from senior judge advocates, dampens the incentives for military attorneys to master some of the nonlegal, technical information that might permit advance training of soldiers on ROE: effective ranges, lethality and other characteristics of friendly and enemy weapons; likely indicators of hostile intent from potential enemy forces or terrorists; specific pieces of military doctrine and training that might appear to contradict the boilerplate ROE transmitted from judge advocates at higher headquarters and thus contribute to misinterpretation.

Most disturbing, however, is that the enforcement features of the legislative model of imparting ROE turn military doctrine and precepts into legal ones. Fighting wars, performing military missions in operations other than war, training soldiers--these are functions that embody a separate science and art, that inhabit a separate sphere, that require military rules, not legislated ones.<sup>223</sup> Given the shortcomings of a legislative

approach to controlling behavior, and given the constraints on a soldier's decision processes under stress,<sup>224</sup> military rather than legal principles should drive the ground component's doctrine and training, even in operations other than war.

4. *ROE as Law: Problems in Land Force Doctrine.*--Land force doctrine expounds military principles. Yet today that doctrine, at least as to ROE, mostly reinforces the legislative model. Even the Army--which far more than the Marine Corps records in written doctrine its authoritative guidance on how units fight wars and conduct operations<sup>225</sup>--has only begun to develop a doctrinal treatment of ROE that acknowledges some of the creation, interpretation, and enforcement problems discussed above. The present Army treatment of ROE in its doctrinal manuals, and derivatively in its training manuals,<sup>226</sup> remains inadequate to the challenge of fielding a force comprising soldiers with the proper balance of initiative and restraint.

Two chapters of *FM 100-5, Operations*, the Army's "keystone" doctrinal manual,<sup>227</sup> address ROE in a manner that reveals the authors' apparent recognition of them as a challenge more for military training than legal processes. In Chapter 2, entitled "Fundamentals of Army Operations," the reader learns that

[t]he Army operates with applicable rules of engagement (ROE), conducting warfare in compliance with international laws and within the conditions specified

by the higher commander. Army forces apply the combat power necessary to ensure victory through appropriate and disciplined use of force.<sup>228</sup>

Three paragraphs later, still in Chapter 2, readers learn that a commander ensures the disciplined use of combat power "by building good training programs that reinforce the practice of respecting those laws and ROE," and that "good training programs . . . force the practice of law-of-land warfare and ROE."<sup>229</sup>

Chapter 13, entitled "Operations Other Than War," offers a brief but promising discussion of ROE training in still greater detail:

Transmission of and assured understanding of ROE throughout the totality of units requires follow-through, rehearsals with situations to check understanding and compliance, and continuing brief-backs. Soldiers who thoroughly understand ROE are better prepared to act with initiative and defend themselves and members of their unit.<sup>230</sup>

This is a persuasive image of soldiers internalizing rules through rehearsals and scenario-driven training.

However, another image conflicts with this one. It is the image of new rules arriving on the scene too frequently for any of them to be absorbed into soldiers' trained responses:

The actions of soldiers and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. In operations other than war, these ROE will be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently.<sup>231</sup>

The allusion to specificity and to the prospect of frequent changes in ROE echoes other remarks from Chapter 2.<sup>232</sup> In this manner, the manual glosses over the commander's challenge of identifying the pertinent ROE far enough in advance to train them. The manual neglects the challenge of isolating certain core ROE into which leaders could integrate more specific ROE. This is the legislative view of ROE enshrined in military doctrine, and the doctrinal and training manuals subordinate to *FM 100-5, Operations* fail to dispel it.<sup>233</sup>

Perhaps in recognition that the JCS *PROE* provide little guidance to land forces,<sup>234</sup> *FM 100-5, Operations* makes no reference to the *PROE*. Yet neither does it or any subordinate manual refer to the terms "hostile act" and "hostile intent," or to the necessity and proportionality rules, a reference that might go far toward discouraging the varied formulations cited above.<sup>235</sup> Nor does any manual or circular acknowledge the ten distinct functional types of ROE surveyed above<sup>236</sup> or establish a format by which operations orders might disseminate these functional types in more comprehensible fashion.<sup>237</sup>

Furthermore, the entire doctrinal apparatus, built as it is upon the conventionally sharp distinction between peace and war,<sup>238</sup> reaffirms the view that contingency operations require "tailored" ROE, that conventional operations require "wartime" ROE, and that the two demand entirely separate drafting exercises.<sup>239</sup>

Security concerns about the sensitivity of the subject matter do not explain the absence of doctrinal guidance. Units have long trained to communicate via radio using frequencies and identifying information that have been declassified and systematically altered to permit thorough training on them. Similarly, the Army's Combatting Terrorism program permits effective training because it relies on random insertion of antiterrorism measures and the safeguarding of "essential elements of friendly information" to ensure operational security for what is otherwise a well-articulated, comprehensive, and largely declassified plan.<sup>240</sup> A system for imparting particular, mission-specific ROE could be protected with similar measures. In short, traditionalists can invoke neither the Army's need to keep secrets nor its need for mission-specific ROE as reasons to deny soldiers training on declassified, baseline ROE that leaders can later calibrate to the situation.

*5. ROE as Law: Neglect of Cognitive and Environmental Dimensions.--*Soldiers urgently need effective training on a baseline scheme of ROE because of the harsh environment in which they must decide whether, how, when, and where to use force.

This environment, usually far different from that in which the members of a civil society contemplate obedience to laws, tends to heighten the fear, the sense of being alone, and the stress of confronting a potentially dangerous foe.<sup>241</sup>

What specifically is missing from present training on ROE? The initial response to this question must be that most ROE training, when it occurs at all, is less "training" than "instruction." With few exceptions, attempts to expose soldiers to the impact of law and other external considerations on their actions consist of a small amount of formal instruction on the law of war.<sup>242</sup> When training objectives involving law of war or use of force issues do find their way into field exercises or unit evaluations at training centers, even realistic scenarios have no base of performance-oriented,<sup>243</sup> individual soldier training<sup>244</sup> upon which to build. Under the present approach, rules of engagement for operations short of war are things to be "briefed" not trained.<sup>245</sup>

A more extended response to the question contrasts this "training" of ROE with examples of truly effective training. Consider how the Army trains a soldier to correct common malfunctions of his M16 rifle. The soldier first receives a demonstration of how the task looks when performed to standard at full speed.<sup>246</sup> Then the soldier receives formal, step-by-step instruction. The instruction identifies the task, states the conditions under which the soldier will perform the task,<sup>247</sup> and describes the standards to which the sergeant will compare the

soldier's performance. The instructor sergeant's description of standards centers on the word "SPORTS," which the soldier soon learns can help ingrain the sequence of subordinate tasks into memory.<sup>248</sup> After individualized instruction, correction of deficiencies, evaluation, and any necessary retraining, leaders test the soldier's ability to perform the task during other training events. These include marksmanship training, live-fire exercises, and ultimately live-fire evaluations at training centers. At training centers, evaluators test the unit, all of its component systems, and individual soldiers on hundreds of tasks. By this time, "SPORTS," and the numerous associated proper movements and responses--reinforced by experience--have been ingrained into the soldier's thoughts and actions.

This essential training methodology succeeds even when the task is more analytical and the standards of performance follow no rigid sequence. For example, the Army trains junior officers to prepare effective orders for their subordinates by grouping together five concepts under the key word "METT-T."<sup>249</sup> That word is a memory device. It aids decision-making by reducing the risk that the officer has chosen a course of action without considering an important situational factor. Even though conceptually distinct, the five factors interact. The officer must periodically reexamine them as he prepares the order. Despite the more flexible standards of performance inherent in a "thinking" task such as this, the officer succeeds in assimilating METT-T into his judgment. He does this by applying

the factors again and again, by accumulating numerous experiences that give content to the factors, and by assessing the effectiveness of his orders during unit exercises and evaluations.

The Army's training methodology in these examples accords well with academic theories in the areas of cognitive psychology and human learning. Although adherents subscribe to many versions, the "information processing" and "schema" theories as a group carry practical implications for teaching individuals new skills.<sup>250</sup> These theories, like all cognitive learning theories, focus "on what happens in the mind and view[] learning as changes in the learner's cognitive structure."<sup>251</sup> Psychologists developing these theories attempt "to describe how sensory input is perceived, transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, retrieved, and used."<sup>252</sup> Educators and trainers seek to translate what psychologists discover about these cognitive tasks into techniques for better instruction.<sup>253</sup>

Central findings of research into information processing include the following:

1. Working memory can only store five to nine bits of information at any one time;<sup>254</sup>
2. A human must retrieve information from long-term memory and transfer it to working memory before he can incorporate it into his responses to stimuli;<sup>255</sup>

3. "[O]rganized structures of stereotypic knowledge," which researchers call "schemas,"<sup>256</sup> permit humans to retrieve information from long term memory into working memory.<sup>257</sup>

Corresponding training strategies include helping individuals "develop adequate schemas and modify their current schemas for better understanding," teaching them "to use memory strategies," and using other techniques to assist them "in organizing their long-term memories."<sup>258</sup>

Memory devices such as "SPORTS" and "METT-T"--once they have been accommodated or assimilated as schemata into the soldier's cognitive structure<sup>259</sup>--also stand a chance of improving decisions made under the stress of a crisis. The massive research literature concerning the impact of crisis-induced stress on decision-makers resists brief synopsis. However, few dispute that stress can impair cognitive functioning, resulting in "a tendency to seek familiar patterns, to relate the critical events to mental schemata or scripts."<sup>260</sup> If devices such as SPORTS and METT-T can systematically alter the schemata of the soldier to remind him when under stress of helpful examples, experiences, information, or principles from long term memory--then in theory they can mitigate such impairment of cognitive functioning. Although soldiers facing the prospect of hostile fire for the first time may distort perceptions or fall prey to other flawed cognitive processes regardless of their training

experiences, the most consistent prescription for improving decision-making under stress remains training, training, and more training.<sup>261</sup>

Yet meaningful ROE training cannot occur because the present, "legislative" approach to imparting ROE encourages commanders to make many diverse rules without imposing a clear hierarchical structure. It cannot occur because troops receive little interpretive assistance in the form of examples or illustrations. Even if some of what he hears about "necessity" or "proportionality" or "self-defense" or "clear hostile intent" penetrates to his long term memory, the values and rules he uses in crisis will come from schemata he formed much earlier. If his chain of command has trained him to "attack the enemy," then perhaps this simple combat rule will be his guide. If not, then perhaps no particular piece of information will come into his mind and move him to act.<sup>262</sup>

#### IV. Curative Approach

The elaborate diagnosis presented in part III serves a crucial purpose. By carefully describing the present method of imparting land force ROE, isolating historical trends that have shaped the method, and developing a theory of why ROE sometimes do soldiers more harm than good, part III laid the groundwork for choosing an approach that will address underlying causes and not mere symptoms. In short, the theory is that ROE are produced and

imparted using a legislative model, and that ROE thus produced and imparted are not as helpful as they could be in guiding soldiers to appropriate decisions about whether, when, where, and how to use force. A curative approach consistent with this theory should offer an alternative free from the shortcomings of the legislative model.

Lawyers, line officers, and scholars writing about ROE have tended inadvertently to reinforce the legislative model. Even though these dedicated and resourceful professionals have admirably drawn attention to ROE, identified key areas of concern, and stimulated valuable discussion, the model remains intact as a systemic barrier to improved soldier decisions on the use of force. The handbook to which most ground component judge advocates turn for information about ROE<sup>263</sup> provides a fair summary of conventional wisdom. The handbook stresses that ROE must both define and be defined by the particular mission.<sup>264</sup> It recommends intimate involvement by judge advocates in "the planning process."<sup>265</sup> It provides numerous tips for "drafting," "writing," "reviewing," "[t]ailor[ing]," "disseminating," and "brief[ing]" the ROE for particular operations.<sup>266</sup> It implies that wartime and peacetime are environments requiring wholly separate ROE.<sup>267</sup> Each of these prescriptions supports one or more assumptions of the legislative model uncovered above.

Yet aside from one statement urging that "[s]quad leaders should drill their troops on ROE,"<sup>268</sup> the handbook makes no reference to the sort of individual training that might actually

influence soldier decisions under stress. More important, the handbook and the literature it summarizes also clearly suggest that ROE come in countless and changing shapes, colors, and flavors.<sup>269</sup> There is a virtual absence of commentary on how to structure these many rules so that ordinary soldiers might assimilate the most important ones for their purposes and later--in a crisis--retrieve them from memory.<sup>270</sup>

Adhering roughly to the sequence of topics addressed in the diagnostic part of the paper, this part endorses a "training" model for imparting land force ROE. Part IV.A introduces terms and distinctions different from those employed in the present method and essential to the adoption of a training model. Part IV.B identifies the historical trends most pertinent to selecting "baseline" or "default" rules for use in training soldiers. Part IV.C then further describes the training model and contrasts it with the legislative model it is designed to replace.

#### *A. Refine Terms and Distinctions Employed in the Present Method*

An improved model of imparting land force ROE will require a sharper notion of "ROE." It will require more emphasis upon the distinction between "nonhostile" and "hostile" and less upon the traditional one between "peacetime" and "wartime." It will require that leaders unpack the self-defense boilerplate into meaningful components. This subpart of the paper takes up these three propositions in turn.

First, an improved model will require a more precise vocabulary. The JCS definition of "rule of engagement" is so broad that many different types of rules may be termed "ROE." In itself, this creates no confusion. A generic term has its role. Yet professional discourse on land force ROE will become precise only when participants agree to use a larger vocabulary, one that communicates important distinctions. It is no wonder that the artillery officer who conceives of ROE primarily as rules dictating approving authorities for use of weapons systems<sup>271</sup> will communicate poorly with the infantry officer who regards ROE primarily as hostility criteria clarifying whether soldiers can fire shots before receiving fire.<sup>272</sup>

The purposes of ROE--policy, legal, military--cannot furnish the basis for a more precise vocabulary. In the classroom, Venn diagrams depicting the overlap between these purposes<sup>273</sup> can remind readers of Clausewitz's insight that military orders must often implement policy goals. However, it is because of the frequent overlap in purposes that the insight is worthless as a labeling tool. Those receiving ROE cannot determine from the text of the rules themselves what purposes are being served.<sup>274</sup>

The better method for deriving a more precise vocabulary is to label the *content* or *function* of the rules themselves rather than the *purposes* to which leaders put the rules. The label "core rules" fairly names the content of the two basic principles stated in the JCS PROE: necessity--incorporating the definitions of hostile act and hostile intent--and proportionality. Also,

the ten "functional types" outlined above<sup>275</sup> provide accurate labels for specific rules based on how those rules actually operate to control the use of force. Widespread use of these terms could quickly dispel confusion.

Second, an improved model would refine the peacetime/wartime distinction. The distinction between "peace" and "war" has grown too elusive to be of use in imparting ROE to soldiers. For the soldier walking patrol during a show of force operation in a foreign land, it matters little whether the soldiers who might shoot him pledge allegiance to a state that has formally declared war on the United States. Similarly, the soldier's decision-making process on the use of force is no simpler when confronting civilians or prisoners in a war zone merely because Congress has declared war on one or more nations.

By contrast, the combatant commander gives all ground soldiers in his command crucial information when he designates a "hostile force." So long as those wearing the described uniform are not surrendering, American soldiers may shoot on sight. Before firing on those not wearing the described uniform, the core rules still apply: the soldier must first identify a hostile act or clear indications of hostile intent.

Land force leaders can meet the devilish challenge of getting soldiers to identify hostile intent through realistic training on the core ROE in a variety of scenarios. They can preserve a warrior spirit by helping soldiers master transition. Specifically, they can help soldiers move between protecting the

unit from individuals with ambiguous intentions and attacking a force that has been declared hostile. Leaders cannot inculcate good judgment in soldiers about the use of force merely by stating that America is or is not at war.

Third, an improved model would unpack the self-defense boilerplate. Telling soldiers in capital letters that they may "take all necessary measures in self-defense" is not a panacea. What are "necessary measures?" Is anticipatory self-defense allowed? What if my commander orders me to hold fire against an attacker so as to preserve the stealth essential to a decisive blow by my squadmate? What if my commander has prohibited me from carrying ammunition? Of course, any short verbal formula will be unable to capture the myriad factors a soldier may face. Still, the self-defense boilerplate begs too many questions to be one of the thoughts a soldier should bring to mind under stress. The separate military and legal principles that constitute self-defense provide a better basis for making the tough decisions on when, where, and how to use force.

#### *B. Acknowledge Historical Lessons and Trends*

Much as commanders and soldiers may sometimes chafe under them, rules of engagement are here to stay. The three factors that have given rise to modern ROE since the Korean conflict<sup>276</sup> show no signs of abating. First, although the United States is no longer locked in a tense standoff with another world nuclear superpower, many nations now control enormously destructive, if

not nuclear, weapons. As a result, the incentive persists for all states to prevent minor incidents and conflicts from escalating. Second, communications and information-processing technology continue to improve command and control over military operations by senior leaders. Still, no one anticipates a day when a combatant commander will be able decide whether to fire for each soldier standing guard. Third, the news media investigates and reports the use of military force as aggressively and skeptically as ever. There is no reason to expect that media scrutiny will decrease.

The structure of top-level rules developed over the past three decades by Navy and Air Force staffs and embodied in the JCS *PROE* should remain intact. A body of doctrine in the conduct of joint service operations already incorporates the *PROE*'s system of standing and supplemental rules, a system familiar to pilots, naval captains, and their judge advocates. Irrespective of the "Peacetime" in the name, the *PROE* themselves--if not the land force ROE implementing the *PROE*--acknowledge well the uncertain dividing line between peace and war and provide a mechanism for decision-makers to obtain guidance even in extended combat engagements.<sup>277</sup> Also, the *PROE* formulations of necessity and proportionality are sound restatements of the fundamental legal constraints governing all armed units and individuals. Recent history thus counsels that land forces adopt a model for imparting ROE that prepares individual soldiers to make tough

choices on the ground while still permitting senior commanders to comply with prevailing joint service practice.

The historic mission of the Army to prepare for mid-intensity conventional war will not likely change in the near term, regardless of how many brush fire conflicts American soldiers extinguish in operations other than war. Accordingly, force structure will likely continue featuring a mixture of heavy and light units designed to fight against a threat resembling the Korean Peoples Army of Kim Il-sung while also permitting "crisis response" across the full spectrum of conflict.<sup>278</sup>

A collection of mostly light units equipped for contingency missions might present an easier challenge in developing doctrine and training in ROE. Leaders could emphasize scenarios in which the predominant threats are terrorists, insurgents, or outlaws. ROE could educate soldiers on the finer points of hostile intent without also creating the mindset needed to mount a prolonged offensive against a large conventional force.

Yet American land forces do not face this easier challenge. The "baseline" or "default" ROE that become second nature to a soldier must guide him to wary but restrained actions both in combat when facing civilians or prisoners and in operations other than war when facing any individual or force that has not been declared hostile. Just as important, these "baseline" ROE must guide him to initiate aggressive action, regardless of the environment, against those who either fit the description of a

previously identified hostile force or display hostile acts or intentions toward American forces.

C. *Adopt a "Training Model" of Land Force ROE*

Specific recommendations are the project of part V of this paper. The immediate project in this subpart is to state--in theoretical rather than concrete terms--the elements of a model for controlling behavior that might produce better decisions by soldiers regarding the use of force. The five problems plaguing the legislative model,<sup>279</sup> correspond to five elements of a "training model" that avoids such problems.

First, under the training model, commanders would make rules far enough in advance for soldiers to train with them. As much as possible, the texts of the rules would not vary--either vertically between units in a particular operational chain or horizontally across similarly manned and equipped units. A single, brief "default" text would capture those ROE--perhaps better termed "principles"--that apply to individual soldiers in a wide range of circumstances. Training doctrine would standardize and package this text with a device, modeled after "METT-T," that would help soldiers remember the default rules. A commander would retain the flexibility to issue specific guidance to his entire force not by "tailoring" entirely new ROE during the planning process leading up to a specific mission. Rather, he would retain flexibility by using a preestablished structure of alert conditions<sup>280</sup> and by ensuring his staff has drafted ROE

annexes for contingency plans that anticipate all of the tasks the unit might be called upon to complete. These alert conditions and ROE annexes would build upon, connect with, and supplement the single schema of "default" principles to which leaders would be continuously training soldiers. See *Figure 6*.

A CONTRAST IN APPROACH	
<u>LEGISLATIVE MODEL</u>	<u>TRAINING MODEL</u>
EXTERNAL RULES	INTERNAL PRINCIPLES
WRITTEN TEXTS	MEMORY & JUDGMENT
MANY RULES	SINGLE SCHEMA
INTERPRETIVE SKILLS	PRACTICAL APPLICATION
ADVISERS & COUNSELORS	PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
ENFORCEMENT & PUNISHMENT	TRAINING & EVALUATION
"TAILORING" FOR MISSION	FORMATTED SUPPLEMENTS
LEISURELY ENVIRONMENT	FOG OF WAR

*Figure 6*

Second, under the training model, land force ROE on the soldier level would consist of internalized principles rather than external, written texts. Soldiers would apply these principles by drawing upon individual experience and judgment. The training model thus rejects the assumption that soldiers, short on time and interpretive guidance, can follow ROE in the same way a business executive follows the tax code. Under the

training model, leaders would assist soldiers in acquiring the judgment necessary to apply the default principles across a wide variety of situations. Leaders would achieve this by simulating those situations and evaluating soldier responses against preestablished standards.

Third, under the training model, instances in which soldiers break the rules would become learning tools. Because the training model seeks conformity with ROE through internalization rather than criminal prosecution, leaders would stress repetitive practice to demanding standards more than zealous enforcement by judge advocates at court-martial. Yet while courts-martial of soldiers charged with offenses involving excessive force can frustrate the goal of fielding a land force infused with initiative as well as appropriate restraint, a small fraction of soldiers will inevitably commit crimes that go beyond good faith technical infractions. The military justice system must hold this small fraction accountable for their actions. The training model would acknowledge this by ensuring that soldiers learn the facts of criminal cases in a manner that permits them to contrast allegedly criminal conduct with appropriate decisions under the ROE.

Fourth, land force doctrine under the training model would place less emphasis on "tailoring" entirely new ROE and more emphasis on supplementing an existing structure. Doctrine would stress the insight that "[t]ransmission of and assured understanding of ROE . . . requires follow-through, rehearsals

with situations to check understanding and compliance, and continuing briefbacks.<sup>281</sup> Pronouncements that "rules may change frequently"<sup>282</sup> and that "[a] force projection army tends to face a wide array of ROE"<sup>283</sup> would accompany references that the JCS *PROE* contain standing rules on use of force and that leaders continuously train individual soldiers on default rules consistent with the *PROE*. Doctrine would guide commanders to issue specific ROE by supplementing these standing rules through established alert conditions and existing formats. Furthermore, doctrine under the training model would assist "[t]ransmission of and assured understanding of ROE" by formally endorsing the "core rules" and the ten "functional types" discussed above.<sup>284</sup>

Fifth and most important, under the training model a single schema would organize the rules and give soldiers a realistic chance of retrieving them from memory during a stressful moment. Just as no logistical system will increase combat effectiveness if it demands that the soldier assaulting a beach carry 60 pounds of rations, equipment, and munitions on his back,<sup>285</sup> no system of ROE will improve decisions concerning use of force if it expects that the soldier under stress can consult, interpret, and deconflict a body of rules and orders that leaders heap upon him for the first time during the current operation. The training model rests upon the understanding that stress will impair cognitive functioning. It assumes soldiers will seek familiar patterns and "relate the critical events to mental schemata or scripts." Accordingly, the training model would feature

repetitive, scenario-based reinforcement of a schema containing only four rules, a size that could fit within the working memory of every soldier. The four default rules would exclude the WROE maxim to "shoot the enemy." They would exclude the PROE maxim to "take all appropriate measures in self-defense." These traditional boilerplates simply leave open too many questions for leaders to include them in a schema that, under the training model, must become second nature to soldiers.

#### V. Specific Remedial Actions

Although a careful analysis of underlying causes can suggest remedial steps previously ignored or downplayed, a theory seldom easily translates into a single small set of specific recommendations. This part of the paper recommends measures that are fully consistent with the approach outlined in part IV, heedful of the diagnosis presented in part III, and targeted at the problem defined in part II. Still, these recommendations are only some of the concrete steps, consistent with the training model, that might improve soldier decisions on the use of force. In order to achieve the specificity necessary for any recommendation to be practical, this part of the paper frames many suggestions in language and systems peculiar to Army training doctrine. Due to great similarities between training practices in the two land forces, the Marine Corps could adopt the recommendations with only slight modifications.<sup>286</sup>

#### A. The "RAMP" Rules

All soldiers should train to an individual task that incorporates "default" principles upon which the entire structure of land force ROE could build. Appendix B contains a proposed draft of this task, similar in format to other entries in the *Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks*,<sup>287</sup> published by the Army. Also see *Figure 7*. The proposed task, entitled "Use Force Appropriately," employs the "key word" device exemplified by "METT-T" and "SPORTS" and endorsed by learning theorists as a means of organizing long-term memory for rapid retrieval and application.<sup>288</sup> In short, "RAMP" is a single schema that once effectively assimilated by soldiers through training can avoid the disadvantages of the present "legislative" approach to ROE.

The proposed task incorporates a sensible approach to potentially complex legal issues. As the infantry platoon handling captured prisoners need not know the nuances of legal status under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the individual soldier facing a potential terrorist need not know precisely how the status of forces agreement relates to the civil trespass law of a nation hosting American forces. The infantry platoon trains to handle captured prisoners by giving all prisoners the humanitarian treatment accorded under law to the most protected class of captives; the platoon allows higher headquarters to determine the captives' precise legal status.<sup>289</sup> Similarly, under RAMP an individual soldier would train to use force within the universal legal principles of necessity and proportionality;

## STANDING RULES OF FORCE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

### "R - A - M - P"

**R**eturn fire with aimed fire. Return force with force. You always have the right to repel hostile acts with necessary force.

**A**nticipate attack. Use force first if, but only if, you see clear indicators of hostile intent.

**M**easure the amount of force that you use, if time and circumstances permit. Use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission.


**P**rotect with deadly force only human life, and property designated by your commander. Stop short of deadly force when protecting other property.

*Figure 7*

he would allow higher authorities to determine whether to supplement these basic principles.

Yet the component rules of "RAMP" are not abstract generalities. Even though they certainly permit soldiers to protect themselves, they convey more substance than the self-defense boilerplate. Although they demand that use of force comply with "necessity" and "proportionality" (within the meaning those concepts have acquired through hundreds of years of legal and military practice), the RAMP rules run less risk of being forgotten by the soldier who dislikes long words or misconstrued by the soldier who tends to interpret words literally.<sup>290</sup> RAMP is concrete because it incorporates not only necessity and

proportionality, but also functional Types I, II, and III. See Figure 8.



The proposed task provides the flexibility needed to permit its use across the range of potential armed conflict. The RAMP rules are default settings that a commander may supplement or modify for a particular mission.<sup>291</sup> Depending on the mission, the potential threats, the terrain, or the experience of his troops, a commander might supplement the "A-Anticipate Attack" rule with additional hostility criteria. A senior commander might even declare a particular force hostile, in which case he would supplement the "A" rule to permit preemptive attack on all forces fitting the given description. Also depending on

situational factors, a commander might supplement the "M-Measure" rule to include a more or less graduated escalation of force, or, by supplementing the "P-Protect" rule, order troops to defend certain mission essential property with deadly force.

Perhaps most significant, the proposed task heeds the warning of one commentator who recognized that there is no substitute for discretion and good judgment by individuals:

The ROE never will draw a line that, once crossed, automatically authorizes the use of force--except that very clear line a protagonist crosses when he fires first. The line otherwise cannot be drawn because it does not exist. Herein lies the frustration. While there is a reluctance to be the first to shoot, there is an equal desire not to be the first to be shot, shot down, or sunk; the temptation by many is to endeavor to write ROE that go beyond the basic self-defense language in receiving a clearer picture of the potential threat. Yet no word picture can be drawn that offers an effective substitute for the discretion or judgment of the man on the scene. The problem is not unlike that with which police are confronted in questions regarding the use of deadly force.<sup>292</sup>

The first rule in RAMP--"R-Return Fire With Aimed Fire"--draws the only clear line that can be drawn concerning authority to use

force. Unlike pocket ROE cards issued for particular deployments, the other default rules in the draft task do not purport to be a "word picture" conveying the proper response to an infinite set of contingencies. Rather, the RAMP rules provide standards with which leaders can supervise "judgmental" training, analogous to that conducted in police academies.<sup>293</sup>

#### B. Training Scenarios

Although in some operations other than war soldiers may feel as if they are policemen, a soldier will never be strictly analogous to a cop on the beat. The soldier's situation is distinctive in that his missions may exceed merely keeping the peace, his potential enemies may range from individual terrorists to large organized units, his arsenal may be smaller or larger than the policeman's, and his comrades may be more or less able than the policeman's to provide reinforcement. Training must account for these differences.

The Army should publish a training circular comprising numerous scenarios that pose problems on the appropriate use of force. Appendix C contains nine draft scenarios suitable for inclusion in such a circular, which could be a companion to the Army's training circular entitled *Selected Problems in the Law of War*.<sup>294</sup> The circular would formally implement an idea that was popular with commanders during operations in Saudi Arabia during 1990 and in Somalia during 1993, when leaders used brief "scenarios" or "vignettes" to illustrate aspects of the ROE.<sup>295</sup>

Yet the scenarios in Appendix C contain enough detail to ensure that training can meaningfully apply the standards embodied in Appendix B. Leaders will be able to train and evaluate, giving a more favorable evaluation to soldiers who apply the RAMP rules than to those who merely respond "it all depends."

The scenarios in Appendix C closely follow actual incidents recounted in authoritative sources--official investigations, scholarly research or interviews, and criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the skeptical soldier cannot assail them on the basis that they lack realism. Furthermore, the close linkage of certain scenarios to court-martial records provides an opportunity for trainers to clarify the extraordinary circumstances in which a soldier might face punishment for using excessive force. While staying clear of the command influence issues that might inhibit a commander from disseminating the facts of a pending prosecution, the training circular could illustrate how soldiers who apply the RAMP rules both comply with the law and accomplish the mission.

Experience is the best trainer. The draft scenarios could structure experiences challenging the soldier to transfer the memorized RAMP rules to the real world.<sup>296</sup> By learning to analyze each problem using the RAMP rules, the soldier could develop a single schema to guide responses even under stressful conditions. The RAMP rules themselves can be of no use in molding judgment without practice in an environment that simulates what soldiers might actually face. Just as the soldier

best learns to pull the charging handle of his rifle completely back by *doing* the "P" in "SPORTS" with an actual weapon in his hands,<sup>297</sup> he best learns to forego a warning shot along the scale of force by *doing* the "A" in "RAMP" with a simulated kamikaze truck barreling toward his comrades.

Some of the scenarios require soldiers to make the transition from noncombat to combat conditions. By illustrating how simple supplements to the RAMP rules will result in clear orders for such a transition, Appendix C provides a groundwork for creating in soldiers a mindset conducive to effective operations in all environments.<sup>298</sup> By placing the use of force on a continuum, the RAMP rules--when properly supplemented and reinforced--thus eliminate the misleading dichotomy between "peace" and "war" while preparing soldiers for both.

#### C. ROE Alert Conditions--"ROECONs"

Each division should incorporate a system of "ROE Alert Conditions" (ROECONs) into its tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP).<sup>299</sup> Appendix D contains a draft of such a system, suitable for the TACSOP of a light infantry division. Mechanized and armored divisions could draft similar systems suitable for their distinctive armament and tactics. The ROECONs would mesh with and supplement the individual soldier's RAMP rules, eliminating the inconsistent guidance and interpretive difficulties that plague the legislative approach to imparting ROE.

Ground units need a system of ROECONs to supplement RAMP because recent history has shown that the diverse and complex operations of a combined arms team may compel commanders to use any or all of the ten functional types of ROE in addition to the core rules. By design, RAMP embodies only the core rules, and only functional Types I, II, and III of those outlined in Appendix A. The ROECONs would permit commanders to control operations with Types IV, V, VI, and VII, while also establishing a format that enables advance training and rapid dissemination.

A system of ROECONs implements the idea behind functional Type IV: notify forces to assume a level of readiness for attack based on the degree of threat. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) used a system similar to the one in Appendix D for a period during the late 1980's, and the Marines in Beirut in 1983 operated under a comparable system, albeit one corrupted by contradictory orders from the chain of command.<sup>300</sup>

Two prominent applications of the alert condition concept remain in force, though the proposed system in Appendix D would differ from each in fundamental ways. The system of three ROECONs would differ from the five terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONS) specified in *The Army Combatting Terrorism Program*. The THREATCONS prescribe measures for all Army personnel and family members connected with U.S. installations or facilities, whereas the ROECONs would prescribe measures for units and soldiers during the conduct of operations in a tactical or training setting. The ROECONs would also differ from the three

weapons control statuses applicable to air defense assets.

Rather than merely announcing a posture for resolving doubts over whether to engage approaching aircraft, they would dictate measures of alertness for an entire division task force.

Unless otherwise stated in the TACSOP, the ROECONs--and the soldiers' RAMP imbedded in the ROECONs--would take priority over inconsistent provisions in other regulations or manuals. For instance, during tactical operations or even local training exercises, the ROECONs would displace provisions in the Army regulation pertaining to the carrying of firearms and the use of force in law enforcement duties.<sup>301</sup> In a tactical or operational setting, ROECONs and RAMP would similarly displace inconsistent provisions in Marine Corps manuals governing the application of deadly force for interior guard.<sup>302</sup>

Why establish the ROECONs at division level? The reasons are institutional more than logical, and nothing sacred dies if distinct ROECONs are published and then exercised by battalions, brigades, or corps. The division is the largest Army organization that trains and fights as a team.<sup>303</sup> It is the smallest Army organization that includes an attorney dedicated to international law matters.<sup>304</sup> Also, division commanders are responsible for evaluating battalions,<sup>305</sup> the tactical units around which the Army has traditionally oriented training management.<sup>306</sup> Accordingly, successive evaluations of battalions using the same ROECONs would provide a division staff

with the practical applications necessary to refine the ROECONs into a working system.

*D. Standard Formats for ROE Annexes to Plans and Orders*

Each division should prepare an ROE annex for every contingency plan that contributes tasks to the unit's mission essential task list (METL).<sup>307</sup> These annexes should explicitly build upon and reinforce both the soldier's RAMP and the division's ROECONs.<sup>308</sup> Appendix E contains a sample operations plan (OPLAN) annex. The annex assumes that a light infantry division has been tasked with the mission of providing a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies in a country resembling Somalia in late 1992. The sample annex follows the formats specified in the *Joint Operations Planning and Execution System*<sup>309</sup> and in *FM 101-5, Staff Operations*,<sup>310</sup> but it does so in a manner that ensures soldiers will receive guidance consistent with the single schema deliberately constructed through training.

In addition to preparing annexes in this format for potential combat operations of mid-intensity, staffs should prepare annexes for the entire spectrum of operations other than war. The OPLAN annex would provide a division commander the ability to control operations with the core ROE as well as with the entire range of functional types. Types VIII, IX, and X are more important for commanders of large tactical units, because these commanders must translate broad strategic and operational

goals into tactical guidance. The sample format in Appendix E would create the vehicle by which a division staff--the lowest level staff equipped for the job--could translate these goals into forms soldiers will have been trained to understand, namely RAMP supplements and ROECONS.

In annexes to OPLANS, division and brigade commanders could "tailor" the ROE to specific operations without recreating at soldier level the interpretive problems of the legislative model. Unlike individual soldiers, brigade commanders have staffs as well as extensive decision-making experience to help them reconcile pieces of the division OPLAN that might appear to be inconsistent.<sup>311</sup> As with ship captains and aircraft pilots, the assumptions of the legislative model of imparting ROE are more tenable as applied to brigade commanders than to individual soldiers, and the greater volume and complexity of guidance from authorities above brigade makes the legislative approach more defensible at that level.

Thus, for example, the ROE annex for a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO)<sup>312</sup> might prescribe ROECON Red for the initial phase, supplement the "A" of the soldier's RAMP to permit preemptive use of force on all individuals wearing certain police force uniforms, and permit hot pursuit of the police force across the border of a coalition partner state. The annex for a nation assistance mission in a relatively peaceful host nation might prescribe ROECON Green for the initial phase, make no adjustments to the soldier's RAMP, and forbid all crossings of international


borders. The annex for a domestic civil disturbance operation might prescribe ROECON Amber for the initial phase, supplement both that ROECON and the soldier's RAMP to incorporate a more detailed set of arming orders,<sup>313</sup> and issue other specific guidance consistent with higher level civil disturbance plans<sup>314</sup> or domestic law. Commanders could change the ROECON in effect or further adjust the RAMP through use of fragmentary orders.<sup>315</sup> At all times leaders could format guidance to mesh with the principles on which they have already trained their soldiers.

#### *E. Other Recommendations*

Leaders should keep the basic RAMP rules, the training scenarios, and the ROECONs unclassified to permit thorough dissemination and training. Land force units should maintain operational security by classifying OPLAN annexes as well as all mission-specific supplements to either the RAMP or the ROECONs. In addition, units should occasionally supplement the RAMP and ROECONs with random measures to further ensure operational security.<sup>316</sup> For example, the commander may announce that ROECON Green is in effect, but may direct that units implement the random measure of conducting armed security patrols around the perimeter of the compound or assembly area.<sup>317</sup>

Army training should thoroughly integrate the RAMP, the scenarios, the ROECONs, and the ROE annexes into existing doctrine and institutions. For example, training and evaluation outlines (T&EO's) in the mission training plans (MTP's) for

battalions should change to include assessments whether individual soldiers are using force within the RAMP standards and whether units are complying with their division's ROECONs.<sup>318</sup> The T&EO's in MTP's for division command groups and staffs<sup>319</sup> should test whether division staffs use the format appended to this paper for the ROE annex and whether they format all ROE for the individual soldier in terms of RAMP.<sup>320</sup> U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Schools should incorporate overviews of these topics into their curricula.



Consistent with the "battle focus" concept, training priorities will depend on the distinct METL's developed for each division.<sup>321</sup> Yet for many divisions, the soldiers' mastery of

RAMP should be a battle task,<sup>322</sup> and commanders' memoranda regarding training philosophy and quarterly training guidance should frequently list soldier training in RAMP and staff training in ROECONs among the areas of emphasis.<sup>323</sup> Because RAMP is a critical individual task, sergeants should monitor training status in leader books, soldier by soldier.<sup>324</sup> Field training exercises (FTXs), command post exercises (CPXs), and situational training exercises (STXs) should specifically include as training events the individual and collective tasks pertaining to ROE, as should deployments to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs).<sup>325</sup> Because during force-on-force training the action will not stop to permit detailed evaluation of individual thought processes, after-action reviews (AARs) would be crucial for determining if soldiers' minds are assimilating the RAMP schema: "Specialist Crimson, what were you thinking during the evacuation operation in the village when you fired at the guerilla who was dressed as a priest?" See *Figure 9*.<sup>326</sup>

The Army should develop and then use a full range of training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS)<sup>327</sup> to reinforce ROE individual and collective tasks. For example, the Army should contract with a private commercial producer of interactive video programs to create a simulator for evaluating soldier responses to the scenarios at Appendix C.<sup>328</sup> Police departments commonly use these programs, which incorporate laser disc technology.<sup>329</sup> A unit could reserve such a simulator from the Training and Support Center (TASC) and build proficiency on

RAMP during periods on the training schedule that would otherwise be unstructured.

Unlike training doctrine, keystone doctrine need only incorporate the refinements already mentioned. The next edition of *FM 100-5, Operations* should acknowledge the existence of the JCS *PROE* and the supplemental apparatus to those *PROE*, should endorse the "core rules" and the ten "functional types," and should give leaders the solemn responsibility of ensuring that the system of ROE remains directed toward effective soldier training.<sup>330</sup> At the joint service level, the name "Standing ROE" should displace "PROE" to make clear that a default regime governing the use of force is always in place.<sup>331</sup> Also, even though the most important changes in land force ROE must come below the combatant command level,<sup>332</sup> the JCS should incorporate the other minor refinements to the *PROE* recently recommended by representatives of all military services.<sup>333</sup>

## VI. Potential Concerns

One potential objection is that by making the "default" ROE similar to the current peacetime ROE," American soldiers and marines will lose their edge as warriors. This is the "flabby peacekeeper" objection, which proponents raise against those who imply the Army might find better ways to conduct operations other than war.<sup>334</sup> The response to the objection is that soldiers trained on RAMP could certainly better protect themselves and

accomplish missions in operations other than war,<sup>335</sup> but they could also better "RAMP up"<sup>336</sup> for combat engagements against identified hostile forces. Even though individuals trained exclusively on police techniques might lose the fighting skills and a spirit of the offensive necessary to conquer a determined conventional force, it is simply false to assert that fire discipline and appropriate restraint are inconsistent with victory in mid-intensity conflicts. To the contrary, even in conventional campaigns, the best and most aggressive warriors treat civilians, prisoners, and casualties according to RAMP principles. Moreover, fire discipline reduces the friendly fire incidents and masses available munitions where they can best help win the war: against the enemy.

A second potential objection is that the recommended system--comprising RAMP, ROECONS, ROE annexes, core rules, and ten functional types--is too complicated. Once commanders supplement the RAMP in the ROE annex, say by adding hostility criteria to the "A-Anticipate Attack" rule, the entire apparatus will become as difficult to understand as the system it replaced. The response to the objection is that the present method of imparting land force ROE is not a system, but rather a collection of frequently inconsistent written texts issued by hundreds of different headquarters.<sup>337</sup> Although the recommended apparatus would require practice, professional leaders accustomed to synchronizing complex operations and examining seven different battlefield operating systems (BOS)<sup>338</sup> could quickly learn to

set ROE according to these formats. Once trained on RAMP through evaluation in a variety of scenarios, soldiers could understand and act upon supplements to the RAMP, particularly when training includes opportunities to assimilate such supplements. The soldier who truly masters SPORTS<sup>339</sup> can correct malfunctions on his rifle even when a misshapen round prevents the extractor from properly ejecting a spent brass casing and even while hostile shots are slicing into earth on his left and right. A base of training on well-articulated standards makes possible the transfer of skills to situations that no controlled setting can ever anticipate completely.

A third potential objection is that RAMP and ROECONS ignore the nuances of coalition operations. According to this objection, diplomatic considerations will sometimes require unimaginable constraints, ones that RAMP and ROECONS cannot capture. The response to this objection is that while the recommended system creates a stable schema permitting advance training, it is nevertheless supple enough to permit leaders to control operations in a variety of ways, particularly by providing guidance in the ROE annex. Yet the ever-present need to explain the ROE to soldiers in terms of RAMP will not only compel senior leaders to make principled demands on American political officials and diplomats, but will also enable those officials and diplomats to confer with coalition partners in full knowledge of military needs and interests. Moreover, media reports exaggerate the degree of friction between U.S. interests

in ROE and those of coalition partners or multinational organizations.<sup>340</sup>

A fourth potential objection is that to develop special devices for imparting land force ROE is to overlook the growing importance of joint operations. Commanders of "land forces" typically command a large number of pilots and frequently request fire support from naval gunships, to name just two examples in which the "land force" concept can be soft on the edges. The response to this objection is that joint operations and doctrine will never eliminate certain essential differences between seaborne, air, and land forces. These differences, such as in the average age and experience of the individuals tasked to make firing decisions, are real, not imagined. While a legislative approach to imparting ROE might work tolerably well for the services which "man their equipment," it simply cannot work for the services which "equip their men."<sup>341</sup> Moreover, there is nothing in RAMP or ROECONS which defies either the *PROE* or joint doctrine.<sup>342</sup>


## VII. Conclusion

Having started by introducing the problem of occasional poor firing decisions by soldiers, this paper has now come full circle. Part II, which expressed the problem in terms of deficiencies in the real world, meets adequate resolution only in part V, which sets forth recommendations for the real world. Yet

the pivot upward into theory was no detour. See *Figure 10.*<sup>343</sup> Because they follow upon a search into underlying causes (part III) and implement an approach harnessing the theory of those causes (part IV), the recommendations avoid being just another assortment of ad hoc measures. Because it reveals many of the traditional measures to be linchpins of the legislative model, the paper perhaps persuades uncommitted readers that alternative measures within a training model are essential.

Rules of engagement for land forces must become a matter of training, not lawyering--at least not traditional lawyering. The implications of this assertion for judge advocates are significant and tangible: even while continuing to pursue excellence in the traditional roles of "advocate," "judge," and "conscience," they must develop new skills and greater enthusiasm for the role of "counselor."

Judge advocates perform four distinct roles. When representing the government or individual soldiers before courts-martial, administrative hearings, domestic courts, or international tribunals, a military lawyer has an ethical obligation to perform the role of "advocate," one who zealously guards the client's interests within an adversarial setting.<sup>344</sup> When called upon "for an opinion or ruling on the applicability of law or, more precisely, on the existence of a legal obligation or right," a military lawyer must perform the role of "judge," one who decides not on the basis of his own policy preferences, but rather, as far as possible, on "objective" reasons grounded



in the "law."<sup>345</sup> When confronted with the rare commander who refuses or fails to balance military necessity with the prevention of unnecessary suffering, the military lawyer must occasionally perform a role as the "conscience" of the unit, one who purposefully tries to inject humanitarian considerations into military decisions.<sup>346</sup> Finally, when assisting the commander to accomplish unit goals within the law, the military lawyer performs the role of "counselor," one who provides input beforehand so the unit can find solutions to problems and accomplish its mission within legal constraints.<sup>347</sup>

Greater emphasis on the "counselor" role has antecedents. Senior judge advocates have long exhorted military attorneys to

practice "preventive law"<sup>348</sup> and, more recently, to become "operational lawyers."<sup>349</sup> Yet a central position for training in land force ROE would pour new meaning into these terms. Judge advocates must not merely teach classes on the Hague and Geneva Conventions, involve themselves early on with the planners of operations, caution ordering officers on the legal limits of their authority, inform commanders of the law governing military assistance to civil authorities, and provide advice on the other manifold legal issues that will inevitably confront a deploying force. They must become trainers of soldiers.

To create optimal conditions for ROE to influence soldier decisions under stress, operational lawyers must master the rudiments of the training system. They must know the METL of the unit. They must be familiar with the commander's present training assessment of collective tasks and with the command sergeant major's present training assessment of supporting soldier tasks. They must understand the commander's training objectives for both units and soldiers. They must be able to decipher long-range, short-range, and near-term training calendars. If the RAMP, the scenarios, the ROECONs, and the ROE annexes become part of training doctrine, operational law attorneys must determine whether training aids and simulators are effective and whether exercise evaluators are testing portions of the MTPs dealing with these ROE matters. They must anticipate the supplements to RAMP that commanders likely will want, and then select or develop scenarios capable of making soldiers

comfortable with such supplements. They must be prepared to respond with concrete examples when questioned on how a hostility criterion in a RAMP supplement should affect a soldier's decision to fire.<sup>350</sup> Training in its fullest sense must become part of the judge advocate's craft.

U.S. soldiers face hard choices about what, when, and where they can shoot. These same soldiers often get little help from the ROE. Hard choices will continue to confront troops for as long as there are conflicts, but ROE training can help transform frightened reactions into appropriate decisions. Let the training begin!

**BINDERY COPY**

**10 APRIL 1994**

<sup>1</sup>DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TERRORIST ACT, OCTOBER 23, 1983, at 135 (20 Dec. 1983) (unclassified version) [hereinafter DOD REPORT].

<sup>2</sup>United States v. Mowris, No. 68 (Fort Carson & 4th Inf. Div. (Mech.) 1 July 1993) (sentence worksheet).

<sup>3</sup>The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined ROE as "directives issued by competent authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered." JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PUBLICATION 1-02, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (1 Dec. 1989) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 1-02]. The Army definition closely follows the JCS version. See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5-1, OPERATIONAL TERMS AND SYMBOLS, 1-63 (21 Oct. 1985) [hereinafter FM 101-5-1]. A few examples illustrate the broad range of rules that fall within this definition: requiring an F-111 crew to confirm that all target acquisition systems are operable to bomb a Libyan barracks abutting a civilian population center; prohibiting entry by U.S. Navy ships into territorial seas or internal waters of a neutral nation; authorizing an infantryman at a guardpost to use deadly force against saboteurs of mission-essential equipment. Although some commentators imply that orders to individual soldiers regarding the use of force are not strictly "ROE," see, e.g., Captain Ashley Roach, *Rules of Engagement*, NAVAL WAR C. REV. 46, 49 (1983) (stating that ROE do not address the right

to protect the individual from attack or threat of imminent attack), and although this paper will argue the need for doctrinal distinctions among many types of rules of engagement, see *infra* part IV.A, readers should note that hereinafter the term "ROE," until otherwise qualified, will refer to the entire set of rules that fit within the broad JCS definition and that have been termed by one or more headquarters in the past as "ROE."

<sup>4</sup>Judge advocates share a portion of the commander's responsibility for ROE because all ROE must conform to international law, because a Department of Defense Directive and service regulations give military attorneys a role in ROE compliance, and because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that attorneys will review all operations plans and participate in targeting meetings of military staffs. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM 2-4 (July 10, 1979) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 5100.77] (directing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands to ensure that rules of engagement comply with all international law pertaining to armed conflict); Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum MJCS 0124-88, subject: Implementation of DoD Law of War Program (4 Aug. 1988) (stating that legal advisers should attend planning conferences when ROE will be discussed and requiring legal advisers to review operations plans and ROE for consistency with the DoD Law of War Program); DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE, para. 2-1g(4) (requiring The Judge Advocate General to review plans and

rules of engagement for compliance with domestic and international law); Marine Corps Order MCO 3300.3, Law of War Program (2 Aug. 1984) (requiring Marine judge advocates to review all operational plans and advise commanders regarding compliance with the DoD Law of War Program).

The judge advocate's involvement in ROE is fundamentally grounded, though only implicitly, in treaties to which the United States is a party. *See, e.g.*, Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 2290, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 284 (requiring signatory nations to "issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the present Convention"); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 127, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 237 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III] ("The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire population."); *See generally* H. Wayne Elliott, *Theory and Practice: Some Suggestions for the Law of War Trainer*, ARMY LAW., July 1983, at 1, 7-9 (discussing the requirements for "dissemination" contained in pertinent treaties). Article 82 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which eventually may be

ratified by the United States, contains a more explicit role for judge advocates:

The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces in this subject.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), *opened for signature* Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, *reprinted in* 16 I.L.M. 1391.

<sup>5</sup>Throughout this paper, the term "soldier" will refer to U.S. Army personnel as well as to members of the U.S. Marine Corps. Exceptions to this general rule will be clear from context, as when a qualifying phrase describes the action of a particular Army ground unit.

<sup>6</sup>The facts of this incident--the focus of the Commission quoted in the first epigraph--are discussed more fully *infra* notes 22-26, 31, 164-166, 167 and accompanying text.

<sup>7</sup>This incident--the focus of the court-martial quoted in the second epigraph--is described more fully *infra* notes 39-48, 217-218 and accompanying text.

<sup>8</sup>Much of the argument that follows can apply to naval and air forces, as well as to U.S. Navy Seals, U.S. Army Rangers, and other special operations units that shoot, move, and communicate while on land. However, to permit a focused and thorough treatment of issues, this paper restricts the scope of its recommendations to ROE disseminated in conventional ground units of the Army and Marine Corps.

<sup>9</sup>As used here, doctrine is "the authoritative guide to how [land forces] fight wars and conduct operations other than war." See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS v (14 June 1993) [hereinafter FM 100-5, OPERATIONS]. Doctrine seeks to build on collective knowledge within the military, to reflect wisdom that has been gained in past operations, and to incorporate informed reasoning about how new technologies may best be used and new threats may best be resisted. See generally MAJOR PAUL H. HERBERT, COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE, LEAVENWORTH PAPER NO. 16, DECIDING WHAT HAS TO BE DONE: GENERAL WILLIAM E. DEPUY AND THE 1976 EDITION OF FM 100-5, OPERATIONS 3-9 (1988) (describing the function of doctrine in an army and charting the modern practice of publishing doctrine in manuals).

<sup>10</sup>To include rules aimed well above the individual soldier level.

<sup>11</sup>That is, senior leaders must themselves make a prior decision to adopt a method for improving firing decisions of soldiers in the field. Modern decision theory holds that in making a choice of any importance one needs to consider the available knowledge and possible alternatives before selecting the alternative that maximizes the objectives of the decision-maker. See DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, *A STRATEGY OF DECISION* 37-40 (1963); JOHN DEWEY, *LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY* 172 (1938); Frederick S. Tipson, *The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity*, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 535, 574 (1971). The Army incorporates decision theory into the problem-solving methodology it prescribes for use by staff organs and officers. See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS 5-1 (1984) [hereinafter FM 101-5, STAFF OPERATIONS]; DEP'T OF ARMY, TRAINING CIRCULAR 26-5, PROBLEM SOLVING (31 Dec. 1984). Soldiers pressed to make rapid choices to shoot do not have the luxury of reflectively applying decision theory. See, e.g., Gary A. Klein, *Strategies of Decision Making*, MILITARY REV., May 1989, at 56.

<sup>12</sup>Figure 1 depicts the four steps of the problem-solving model developed in ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, *GETTING TO YES* 68-71 (1983). This simple model conforms both to the tenets of decision theory developed in the sources cited in note 11, *supra*, and to the Army approach reflected in *FM 101-5, Staff Operations*. For the purposes of this paper, it is superior to the six step model typically used by Army staffs, see FM 101-5, STAFF OPERATIONS, *supra* note 11, at F-4,

because the Army model principally treats problems that are "well-defined" or of "medium structure," as opposed to "ill-defined" problems. See, e.g., Combined Arms and Services Staff School, U.S. Army, Staff Techniques Exercise F121-1, para. 4 (1992). The Fisher model addresses itself to problems at all levels of definition or structure. See, e.g., Harvard Negotiation Project, Overhead 1-5, Needed: A Tool For Joint Problem-Solving, para. III (1989) (referring to the four step model as a "'thinking tool' that is . . . Universal -- Applicable to anything") (copy in possession of author).

<sup>13</sup>Figure 2 depicts ROE as part of a traditional, unsystematic approach to the dangers of over-tentative and undisciplined fire. The disliked symptoms of undisciplined fire, unnecessary civilian casualties, unfavorable media coverage, and soldier frustration or tentativeness, discussed more fully in part II *infra*, are treated with intuitive remedies consisting of written guidance and punitive enforcement, discussed at length in part III.C *infra*.

<sup>14</sup>See, e.g., GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN & LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES M. DUBIK, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, LAND WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (1992), reprinted in MILITARY REV., Sept. 1993, at 13.

<sup>15</sup>Numerous authors have contributed to the expanding commentary about ROE. See, e.g., CENTER FOR L. AND MIL. OPERATIONS & INT'L. L. DIV., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (JA 422) H-92 to H-106 (draft 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter OP. LAW HANDBOOK];

JONATHAN T. DWORKEN, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, CRM 93-120, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM RESTORE HOPE (1993); BRADD C. HAYES, RAND/UCLA CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, N-2963-CC, NAVAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR CRISIS (1989); D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 169-80 (1975); George Bunn, *International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?*, NAVAL WAR C. REV., May-June 1986 at 69-80; Colonel W. Hays Parks, *Righting the Rules of Engagement*, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May 1989 at 83-93, and Sept. 1989 at 88-89 [hereinafter Parks, *Righting*]; Lieutenant-Commander Guy R. Phillips, *Rules of Engagement: A Primer*, ARMY LAW., July 1993 at 4-27; Roach, *supra* note 3; Scott D. Sagan, *Rules of Engagement*, in AVOIDING WAR: PROBLEMS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 443-470 (Alexander L. George ed., 1991); Charles Bloodworth, *Rules of Engagement: The Second C of C<sup>3</sup>I* (1989) (on file with the Center for Law and Military Operations, The Judge Advocate Generals School, Charlottesville, Virginia [hereinafter CLAMO]); Major Scott R. Morris, *Rules of Engagement: Its Origin, Practical Use, Doctrinal Integration, and Theoretical Concept* (1994) (on file with the CLAMO).

However, none of these authors has subjected the topic of land force ROE to the comprehensive and structured analysis demanded by methodical problem-solving techniques. Such analysis yields recommendations for specific actions, but only after examining potential underlying causes and developing a theory both of what is

wrong and what might be done. This paper seeks to fill the gap in the ROE literature; accordingly, parts II, III, IV, and V complete, in sequence, the four steps of the Fisher model corresponding to the quadrants of the circular chart at *Figure 1*.

<sup>16</sup>Examples include noncombatant evacuation operations, civil disturbance operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance or peace building, counterdrug operations, counterterrorism operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, shows of force, attacks, raids, and support for insurgencies or counterinsurgencies. See FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-4 to 13-8; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATION 3-0, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS I-3 to I-4 (9 Sept. 1993) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 3-0]. The term "operations other than war" is new. The Army uses it to describe what were previously termed operations in "low intensity conflict"--classically support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies--in addition to operations that previously avoided official doctrinal classification, such as disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. See generally DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-20, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (5 Dec. 1990) [hereinafter FM 100-20] (establishing previous Army doctrine for such operations); Colonel Richard M. Swain, *Removing Square Pegs From Round Holes: Low-Intensity Conflict in Army Doctrine*, MILITARY REV., Dec. 1987, at 2 (describing the evolution of doctrine for low intensity conflict); Sam C. Sarkesian, *The Myth of U.S. Capability*

*in Unconventional Conflicts*, MILITARY REV., Sept. 1988, at 2  
(discussing doctrinal categories for unconventional conflicts).

<sup>17</sup>See Matthew E. Winter, "Finding the Law"--The Values, Identity, and Function of the International Law Adviser, 128 MIL. L. REV. 1, 21-29, 31-33 (1990) (defining roles of the international law adviser).

<sup>18</sup>See *id.* at 21 (defining the role of "advocate").

<sup>19</sup>See *id.* at 26 (defining the role of "judge").

<sup>20</sup>See *id.* at 31 (defining the role of "conscience").

<sup>21</sup>That is, one who assists leaders in the decision-making process, see *supra* note 11, by serving as "a problem-solver, someone who advises 'on ways of using law and on the risks involved in proposed or alternative courses of action.'" See *id.* at 29-30 (quoting Oscar Schachter, *The Place of Policy in International Law*, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 6 (Supp. 2, 1972)).

<sup>22</sup>See generally DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 94-99; Review of the Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon: Hearings Before the House Armed Services Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); DANIEL P. BOLGER, AMERICANS AT WAR 1975-1986: AN ERA OF VIOLENT PEACE 191-260 (1988); MICHAEL PETIT, PEACEKEEPERS AT WAR (1986); Melinda Beck, *Inquest on a Massacre*, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1983, at 85.

<sup>23</sup>DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 95 (detailing the actions of the sentries on Posts 6 and 7).

<sup>24</sup>The Marines carried a "White Card" bearing the following text:

The mission of the Multi-national Force (MNF) is to keep the peace. The following rules of engagement will be read and fully understood by all members of the U.S. contingent of the MNF:

- When on post, mobile or foot patrol, keep a loaded magazine in the weapon, weapons will be on safe, with no rounds in the chamber.
- Do not chamber a round unless instructed to do so by a commissioned officer unless you must act in immediate self-defense where deadly force is authorized.
- Keep ammunition for crew-served weapons readily available but not loaded in the weapon. Weapons will be on safe at all times.
- Call local forces to assist in all self-defense efforts. Notify next senior command immediately.
- Use only the minimum degree of force necessary to accomplish the mission.
- Stop the use of force when it is no longer required.

--If effective fire is received, direct return fire at a distant target only. If possible, use friendly sniper fire.

--Respect civilian property; do not attack it unless absolutely necessary to protect friendly forces.

--Protect innocent civilians from harm.

--Respect and protect recognized medical agencies such as Red Cross, Red Crescent, etc.

These rules of engagement will be followed by all members of the U.S. MNF unless otherwise directed.

DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 49-50. These rules differed from the "Blue Card" ROE that had been distributed to Marines at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in that the "Blue Card" specifically deemed as "hostile acts" attempts by vehicles or persons to breach the perimeter fence. A truck bomb attack had killed 17 U.S. citizens at the U.S. Embassy in April of 1983. See DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 30.

In addition to the "White Card," the Marine guards at the Airport were subject to two other forms of guidance. First, the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/8 Marines Compound was supposedly observing "Alert Condition II," the second highest alert posture in a series of four conditions based on the probability of attack:

[Attack probable]

All positions reinforced to two sentries (off-duty guard force altered; LAW antitank rockets issued)

Machine guns and TOWs manned

Forward air controllers/artillery observers to roof

Reaction platoon alerted

Emergency departures only

Search of all entering civilian vehicles

Cobra helicopters alerted

See BOLGER, *supra* note 22, at 251. Second, the commander of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)--the immediate higher headquarters of the BLT 1/8--had modified the security posture with "a conscious decision not to permit insertion of magazines in weapons on interior posts to preclude accidental discharge and possible injury to innocent civilians." See BOLGER, *supra* note 22, at 252 (quoting *Situation in Lebanon and Grenada: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Appropriations* 28-29, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)). The outcome of this additional guidance was that the sentries at the critical guard posts would have to load a magazine and chamber a round before firing, in contradiction to the written guidance on their ROE cards.

<sup>25</sup>See also DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 51 ("In short, the Commission believes the Marines at [Beirut International Airport] were conditioned by their ROE to respond less aggressively to

unusual vehicular or pedestrian activity at their perimeter that were those Marines posted at the Embassy locations.").

<sup>26</sup>The "presence" and "peacekeeping" nature of the mission statement, the failure by the chain of command to increase troop dispersion in light of the deteriorating political situation, and the lack of timely intelligence concerning potential terrorist threats were the other causal factors cited in the official report. See DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 134-38; see also BOLGER, *supra* note 22, at 250 ("Although a nonmilitary state of mind, lack of dispersion, weak defensive works, and imprecise intelligence increased the scale of the eventual enemy success, intentional and unintentional deviations from security procedures proved to be the immediate causes of the disaster."); *id.* ("Unfortunately, the marines around [Beirut International Airport] kept their old [White] ROE cards."); Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 464 n.12 ("Unfortunately, these new [White Card] ROE were not extended to the U.S. Marines at the Beirut International Airport (BIA) whose ROE suggested they should fire only if fired on.").

It is important to emphasize that while the Beirut bombing contains teaching points about the ROE in effect, analysts of the bombing cannot reasonably conclude that "better" ROE would have prevented the tragedy. Such a conclusion would be wrong. The official investigation confirmed that even if the Marines on the outermost sentry positions had begun firing at the moment the truck

came into view, great damage and destruction would probably have occurred:

The FBI Forensic Laboratory described the bomb as the largest conventional blast ever seen by the explosive experts community. Based upon the FBI analysis of the bomb that destroyed the U.S. Embassy on 18 April 1983, and the preliminary findings on the bomb used on 23 October 1983, the Commission believes that the explosive equivalent of the latter device was of such magnitude that major damage to the BLT Headquarters building and significant casualties would probably have resulted even if the terrorist truck had not penetrated the USMNF defensive perimeter but had detonated in the roadway some 330 feet from the building.

DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 99.

<sup>27</sup>*Cf.* FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-4 (describing the principles of "Security" and "Restraint"). Army doctrine holds that six principles should guide actions during operations other than war:

*Objective*--Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective;

*Unity of Effort*--Seek unity of effort toward every objective;

*Legitimacy*--Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions;

*Perseverance*--Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims;

*Restraint*--Apply appropriate military capability prudently;

*Security*--Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

See *id.*, at 13-3 to 13-4. The principles bearing most directly on use of force by the individual soldier are restraint and security. The other principles speak primarily to commanders. Note that restraint is not inconsistent with employing "overwhelming" force, because it is entirely possible to overwhelm an opponent without physically harming him or others. See, e.g., General Colin L. Powell, *U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead*, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1992/93, at 32, 37, 39. ("When force is used deftly--in smooth coordination with diplomatic and economic policy--bullets may never have to fly."). See also JOINT PUB. 3-0, *supra* note 16, 27, at V-3

to V-4 (noting that the concept of restraint "does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment").

<sup>28</sup>S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE: THE PROBLEM OF BATTLE COMMAND IN FUTURE WAR 56-57 (1978).

<sup>29</sup>*Id.*

<sup>30</sup>*Id.* at 60, 64. Marshall proposed that a soldier's reluctance to fire stemmed from "the fact that he comes from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable." *Id.* at 78. He suggested that leaders train soldiers to anticipate correctly the dangers and distractions of the battlefield, *id.* at 37, and that they decrease soldier isolation and foster soldier-to-soldier communication as means of building aggressiveness. *Id.* at 123-78. For related views that unit cohesiveness contributes to combat effectiveness, see generally Edward Shils & Morris Janowitz, *Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II*, PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Fall 1948, at 281; JAMES FALLOWS, NATIONAL DEFENSE 107-38 (1981); MARTIN VAN CREVELD, FIGHTING POWER: GERMAN AND U.S. PERFORMANCE, 1939-1945, at 170 (1982); WILLIAM D. HENDERSON, COHESION: THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN COMBAT (1985). Although since Marshall's death in 1977 researchers have challenged both his data pertaining to the number of nonfirers in World War II and the link between unit cohesion and combat effectiveness, see, e.g., Gerald J. Garvey & John J.

DiIulio, Jr., *Only Connect: Cohesion vs. Combat Effectiveness; Ban on Gay Military Personnel*, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 26, 1993, at 18; *Role of Cohesion in Developing Combat Effectiveness in Relation to Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the Senate Armed Services Comm.*, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1993) (testimony of Lawrence Korb, Director, Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institute), Marshall remains unchallenged in his assertion that willing firers win battles. For a defense of Marshall's work, see JOHN D. MARSHALL, RECONCILIATION ROAD: A FAMILY ODYSSEY OF WAR AND HONOR (1993).

<sup>31</sup>DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 2.

<sup>32</sup>See, e.g., Jonathan C. Randal, *Attacks on Patrols in Beirut Wound 5 U.S. Marines, 8 Italian*, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 17, 1983, at A1.

<sup>33</sup>See, e.g., Keith B. Richburg, *U.S. Troops in Somalia Express Anger, Confusion Over Mission; Chief Role Now Is 'Dodging Bullets,' GI Says*, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 16, 1993, at A1; Bill Mitchell, *U.S. To Send 400 More Troops Into Somalia . . . , USA TODAY*, Aug. 25, 1993, at 10A (cartoon depicting three soldiers wearing bull's eye targets around their necks).

<sup>34</sup>See Susan Page, *Rangers Pulled Out; Clinton orders Somalia exit*, NEWSDAY, Oct. 20 1993, at 22 (reporting the President's promise to withdraw all U.S. forces by March 31, 1994).

<sup>35</sup>In combat operations, military units routinely struggle with the adverse effects of friendly fire--also "amicicide" or "fratricide"--that particular type of firing error that victimizes the fellow soldier. In a study of friendly fire incidents in both world wars, the Korean, and the Vietnam conflicts, one commentator concluded that some friendly fire incidents

delayed or even completely halted offensive operations, disrupted and weakened defensive operations, and, on occasion, precipitated withdrawal and local defeats. The negative impact of [friendly fire incidents] on friendly combat power is, however, often more complex and subtle. Each incident contributes in some measure to the subtle degradation of combat power by lowering morale and confidence in supporting arms so necessary to the successful pursuance of modern combined arms operations. This effect is, as has been mentioned, geometric rather than linear.

MAJOR CHARLES R. SHRADER, AMICIDE: THE PROBLEM OF FRIENDLY FIRE IN MODERN WAR 107-08 (1982) [hereinafter SHRADER, AMICIDE].

The high proportion of casualties due to friendly fire in Operation Desert Storm has renewed interest in Shrader's observations. There were 28 incidents of U.S. fire being directed against American forces during the Operation Desert Storm. In all, 35 of 148 American dead died from friendly fire. Ground fighting

accounted for 16 incidents, in which ground-to-ground fire killed 24 soldiers and wounded 57 others. Air-to-ground fire accounted for 9 incidents, killing 11 soldiers and wounding 15. See, e.g., Caleb Parker, *War Friendly Fire Prompts U.S. Call for Doctrine Shift*, DEFENSE NEWS, Dec. 9, 1991 at 4 (citing official data released by the Department of Defense on 13 August 1991).

It would be misleading to suggest that friendly fire incidents are an "ROE problem." Amicicide is multi-factored, with sophisticated studies indicating that ground-to-ground, direct fire amicicide is caused most often by a lack of "situational awareness" or by incorrect "target identification." See U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMBAT IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM 2 (Dec. 12, 1991). In the aftermath of the war with Iraq, the Army's plan for reducing fratricide called upon the defense industry to develop devices designed to mark U.S. and allied vehicles. Specifically, defense contractors have been asked to develop improved Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF) systems, better optics, and global positioning satellite (GPS) receivers for fighting vehicles. *Id.* at 4-5. But see generally Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader, *Friendly Fire: The Inevitable Price*, PARAMETERS, Autumn 1992, at 29, 43 [hereinafter Shrader, *Inevitable Price*] ("Even after we have applied the full range of technological and human preventatives, friendly fire incidents will continue to occur."); Memorandum, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, MACJ343, subject: Vietnam Lessons Learned No. 70: Friendly Casualties from Friendly Fires, Defense Technology Information

Center No. AD841510, at 4 (acknowledging that "adherence to proven techniques and established procedures does not completely eliminate the possibility of error").

Yet when seeking optimal use of ROE and when seeking lower rates of fratricide, land forces confront related challenges. Both challenges involve attempts to mitigate, to the extent possible, the "fog of war." Compare *infra* note 241 and accompanying text (asserting that the harsh environment in which soldiers must decide whether, how and when to use force "tends to heighten the fear, the sense of being alone, and the stress of confronting a potentially dangerous foe") with SHRADER, AMICIDE, *supra* at vii ("Noise, smoke, faulty communications, tension, hyperactivity, and fear all conspire to mask from the soldier and his leaders the true situation on the battlefield."). Moreover, though perhaps rare, there are occasions when ROE considerations can be directly linked to friendly fire incidents. See, e.g., Rowan Scarborough, *Broken Rule Caused Friendly-fire Deaths*, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 10, 1991, at 3 (citing official Army investigation, which found that an attack helicopter pilot mistakenly fired on friendly armored vehicles in part because he had flown his aircraft toward the vehicles from east to north, in violation of a ROE requiring attacks to come from the Saudi desert over friendly territory toward Iraq).

<sup>36</sup>ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., THE ARMY AND VIETNAM 199 (1986) (quoting statements made by General Harold K. Johnson during interview on 22 Jan. 1973).

<sup>37</sup>*Id.* (quoting Brigadier General W.F.K. Thompson).

<sup>38</sup>See *id.* at 199 ("Hatred was our enemy's major instrument to turn the people against us. . . . [m]ore often than not, it was the local people who were exposed to our fire because by the time it came, the guerrillas had fled or taken shelter underground." (quoting LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONG VAN KHUYEN, U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, INDOCHINA MONOGRAPH, THE RVNAF 300 (1980))).

<sup>39</sup>United States v. Mowris, GCM No. 68 (Fort Carson & 4th Inf. Div (Mech) 1 July 1993).

<sup>40</sup>See Exhibit 10 to Report of Article 32(b) Investigating Officer, Sworn Statement of First Lieutenant Brian K. Mangus, 20 Feb. 1993, at 1, *Mowris*.

<sup>41</sup>*Id.* Although Specialist Mowris' platoon, part of the 984th Military Police Company, consisted of military policemen rather than infantrymen, the mission resembled those of many Army and Marine Corps infantry units during the Somalia deployment. See Major General S.L. Arnold & Major David T. Stahl, *A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War*, PARAMETERS, Winter 1993-94, at 4, 20-21; Colonel F.M. Lorenz, *Law and Anarchy in Somalia*, PARAMETERS, Winter 1993-94, at 27, 31.

<sup>42</sup>Exhibit 8 to Report of Article 32(b) Investigating Officer, Sworn statement of Staff Sergeant Marvin J. Applegate, 20 Feb. 1993, at 1, *Mowris*.

<sup>43</sup>Exhibit 1 to Report of Article 32(b) Investigating Officer, Sworn statement of Accused, 15 Feb. 1993, at 2, Mowris. Specialist Mowris and his platoon were subject to ROE issued by the Commander of Army Forces in Somalia, Major General S.L. Arnold, also the 10th Mountain Division commander. Those ROE--consisting of five typed pages and thus too long to be reproduced here--read in pertinent part as follows:

Nondeadly force should be used if the security of U.S. Forces is not compromised by doing so. A graduated show of force includes:

- (a) an order to disband or disperse;
- (b) show of force/threat of force by U.S. Forces that is greater than the force threatened by the opposing force;
- (c) warning shots aimed to prevent harm to either innocent civilians or the opposing force;
- (d) other means of nondeadly force;
- (e) if this show of force does not cause the opposing force to abandon its hostile intent, consider if deadly force is appropriate.

Headquarters, 10th Mountain Div., Operations Plan for Restore Hope, Annex N, at para. 3(c)(3) (1993).

<sup>44</sup>See Testimony of Staff Sergeant Elizabeth C. Marmet, Record at 42, *Mowris*.

<sup>45</sup>See Findings Worksheet, *Mowris*.

<sup>46</sup>See Action by Convening Authority, *Mowris*.

<sup>47</sup>The platoon leader described it this way:

There was no indepth briefing concerning Rules of Engagement, they are vague. [sic] When I first got here some E7 told us that the Rules of Engagement are pretty vague. We were briefed by someone associated with 10th Mountain. We talk about the Rules of Engagement all the time. Its always the same thing, noone has anything new to add. [sic] I'm sure if I don't understand the Rules of Engagement my soldiers don't either.

See Testimony of First Lieutenant Brian Mangus in Report of Article 32(b) Investigation, at 6, *Mowris* (testimony summarized by reporter); see also Testimony of Staff Sergeant Elizabeth Marmet, Record at 41, *Mowris* ("Occasionally, some things would come up in regard to rules of engagement, but they were not discussed verbatim. . . . nothing was really discussed in depth. . . . [w]arning shots were not discussed that I remember until after the incident.") (testimony summarized by reporter).

<sup>48</sup>Coverage of the *Mowris* case in the print media was extensive. See, e.g., Peter G. Chronis, *Soldier Guilty of Lesser Charge in Somali's Death*, DENVER POST, July 2, 1993, at A1; Bruce Finley, *GI's Trial A Study in War Irony*, DENVER POST, July 1, 1993, at A1; Ft. Carson GI in Somalia Faces Manslaughter Charge, DENVER POST, Apr. 9, 1993, at A23; GI Convicted of Killing Somali, NEW YORK TIMES, Jul. 3, 1993, at A3; Kevin Simpson, *Did Somalis' Acts Inspire Court-martial Reversal?*, DENVER POST, Oct. 10, 1993, at C1; Peter Sleeth, *Guilty Verdict Thrown Out in Somali Death*, DENVER POST, Oct. 5, 1993, at A5.

An act of excessive force committed 12 days earlier by another American in Somalia drew contemporaneous media coverage. The case of Marine Corps Gunnery Sergeant Harry Conde, addressed more fully *infra* notes 212-213 and accompanying text, further heightened public scrutiny of the mission in Somalia. See, e.g., David Evans, *There's No Place for Trigger-Happy Marines in Somalia*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 12, 1993, at 21; Mark Fineman, *Use of Force at Issue in a Land of Anarchy*, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at A12; Jim Hoagland, *Prepared for Non-combat*, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 7, 1993, at A20; Donatella Lorch, *Marines Begin Shooting Inquiry*, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at A6; Keith B. Richburg, *2 U.S. Marines Face Charges in Somalia*, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 4, 1993, at A16 [hereinafter Richburg, *Marines Face Charges*]; Keith B. Richburg, *Marine Testifies to Perils of Mogadishu*, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 6, 1993, at A23; Keith B. Richburg, *Marine is Convicted in 'Sunglasses' Case*, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 7, 1993, at A20; Liz Sly, *Marine Relives Somali's Attack*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 6, 1993, at 1.

<sup>49</sup>Colonel Fred Green, *An Address to the American Society of International Law, on the Subject of Implementing Limitations On the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity* (1992) (using this informal definition of ROE and discussing the role of ROE in U.S. operations during the 1991 war against Iraq), reprinted in 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39, 62-67 (1992); see also DEP'T OF ARMY, SUBJECT SCHEDULE 27-1, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 AND THE HAGUE CONVENTION NO. IV OF 1907, para. 3a (29 Aug. 1975).

<sup>50</sup>This tragic and notorious incident took place on March 16, 1968, when a combat task force from the 11th Light Infantry Brigade of the 23d Infantry Division assaulted by helicopter into the village complex of Son My, in the province of Quang Ngai, South Vietnam. There, the American forces found only unarmed civilian women, children, and old men, rather than the anticipated large force of enemy soldiers. Despite encountering no resistance, some members of the task force began to round civilians up and gun them down, under the direction of several junior officers. American troops put more than 200 of the villagers to death during the killing spree. See generally Major Jeffrey F. Addicott & Major William A. Hudson, Jr., *The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons*, 139 MILITARY L. REV. 153, 156-59 (1993).

<sup>51</sup>See KINNARD, THE WAR MANAGERS 54-55 (1977) (citing results of survey of Army generals), quoted in KREPINEVICH, *supra* note 36, at 199.

<sup>52</sup>See KREPINEVICH, *supra* note 36, at 199.

<sup>53</sup>KREPINEVICH, *supra* note 36, at 202.

<sup>54</sup>See, e.g., Memorandum, Colonel Walter B. Huffman, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army VIIth Corps to The Judge Advocate General of the Army, subject: After Action Report on Operations Desert Shield and Storm (22 Apr. 1992), quoted in U.S. ARMY LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY, THE DESERT STORM ASSESSMENT TEAM'S REPORT TO THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY, Operational Law-2 & Issue # 161 (22 Apr. 1992) [hereinafter DESERT STORM ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT] (stating that meaningful involvement of judge advocates in ROE matters "requires knowledge of combat arms and weapons systems" and that "JAG's need more training here").

<sup>55</sup>Memorandum, Captain James Durkee to Colonel Richard H. Black, Staff Judge Advocate, 7th Infantry Division (Light) & Fort Ord, subject: "Just Cause" After Action Report (23 Feb. 1990), quoted in Morris, *supra* note 15, at 56.

<sup>56</sup>See Bloodworth, *supra* note 15, at 3.

<sup>57</sup>See, e.g., Major Paul D. Adams, *Rules of Engagement: The Peacekeeper's Friend or Foe*, THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Oct. 1993, at 21 ("The real point is that the rules [the Marine] must play by may also kill him, and frequently, the rules are stacked against him."); John Lancaster, *Mission Incomplete, Rangers Pack Up; Missteps, Heavy Casualties Marked Futile Hunt in Mogadishu*, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 21, 1993, at A1 ("'We played by our rules and

he doesn't play by our rules,' the [military official stated], . . . 'He surrounds himself with women and children and stays in the most crowded part of the city.'"); Richburg, *supra* note 33, at A8 ("[The GIs] complained that the rules of engagement under which they operate in this hostile environment are far too restrictive, requiring them, for example, to clearly see an attacker before returning fire."); Beck, *supra* note 22, at 8 (quoting one Marine as stating "[i]f we see someone out there running around with an AK-47, we should waste him, cut and dried," and another as stating "[t]hey should either pull us out or let us loose").

<sup>58</sup>The cartoon is described in Beck, *supra* note 22, at 9.

<sup>59</sup>Figure 3 illustrates the levels at which land force ROE may be made in a typical deployment as well as the forms the ROE may take.

<sup>60</sup>SECRET Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Peacetime Rules of Engagement (PROE) (28 Oct. 1988). Note that hereinafter, reference to this JCS document within the text of the paper will be to the *PROE* (italics typeface). Reference merely to rules by which one or more subordinate authorities implement the *PROE* will be to PROE (roman typeface).

<sup>61</sup>A unified combatant command is "a military command which has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments." 10 U.S.C. § 161(c)(1) (1988). The President, acting through the Secretary of Defense and with the

advice and assistance of the Chairman of the JCS, establishes unified combatant commands, *see id.* § 161(a), of which there are presently eight:

- U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM);
- U.S. European Command (USEUCOM);
- U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM);
- U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM);
- U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM);
- U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM);
- U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM);
- U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM);

DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE PUBLICATION 1, THE JOINT STAFF OFFICER'S GUIDE 46-47 (1988) [hereinafter AFSC PUB. 1]. Although the defense organization of the United States has been molded into its modern form by no fewer than seven major pieces of legislation over the past forty-six years, *see id.* at 32, the definition of a unified combatant command has not changed since Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. *See id.* at 42.

The purpose of that Act was to incorporate into law the lessons World War II had taught about the hazards of parochialism among the military services and thus "provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." *See id.* at 42.

The most recent significant development in the trend toward a unified command structure occurred in 1986, when Congress designated the Chairman, JCS, the principal military adviser to the President, transferred duties of the corporate JCS to the Chairman, specified that the operational chain of command shall run from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the combatant commanders, and authorized the President to communicate with the combatant commanders through the Chairman. *See Dep't of Defense Reorganization (Goldwater-Nichols) Act of 1986*, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 1012-17 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 161-66 (1988)); *see also* DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5100.1, FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS (25 Sept. 1987) (exercising the President's authority by directing that the Chairman "function[] within the chain of command by transmitting communications to the commanders of the combatant commands from the President and the Secretary of Defense"). *See generally* AFSC PUB. 1 at 32-45.

<sup>62</sup>*See* OP. LAW. HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15 at H-95.

<sup>63</sup>A contingency is "[a]n emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations." *See* JOINT PUB. 1-02, *supra* note 3. Because of "the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment." *Id.*

<sup>64</sup>See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-94. The PROE may remain in force through many stages of an armed conflict. For instance, during all but 43 days, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91 operated under PROE. See Interview with Lieutenant Commander James P. Winthrop, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, Former Staff Judge Advocate, Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO, Stationed on Board the *USS America* (CV 66), in Charlottesville, Va. (Mar. 26, 1994).

<sup>65</sup>See Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 86 (describing the system of supplementation). In situations of war or prolonged conflict, the CINC drafts an entirely separate set of ROE and submits it to the CJCS for review and approval. See Morris, *supra* note 15, at 33 n81 (citing telephone interview by author with W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, International & Operational Law Division, U.S. Army Office of The Judge Advocate General (Oct. 4, 1991)).

<sup>66</sup>U.S. commanders, beginning at the top of the military operational chain with the CINC, issue ROE as part of an operations plan, which then is implemented by a subsequent operations order. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATION 5-03.2, JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) VOLUME II: PLANNING AND EXECUTION FORMATS AND GUIDANCE, at III-205 to III-206 (10 Mar. 1992) [hereinafter JOPES FORMATS] (depicting the format by which CINCs are to issue ROE to subordinate commands and locating the ROE at Appendix 8 to Annex C

of the main operation plan). See generally FM 101-5, STAFF OPERATIONS, *supra* note 11, at 7-1 to 7-2 (describing types of military orders).

<sup>67</sup>See OP. LAW. HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-95.

<sup>68</sup>See *supra* note 3.

<sup>69</sup>See HAYES, *supra* note 15, at 13; cf. Roach, *supra* note 3, at 48 (distinguishing diplomatic, political, military, legal purposes); Parks, *supra* note 15, at 86-87 (distinguishing between ROE serving purposes of domestic law, national security policy, operational, and international law).

<sup>70</sup>Exec. Order No. 11,850, 40 Fed. Reg. 16187 (1975). The United States maintains that international law does not prohibit these modes. See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 38 (18 July 1956) (C1, 15 July 1976) [hereinafter FM 27-10], construing Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571. Accordingly, the prohibition contained in the executive order is the product of political sensitivities rather than the implementation of a requirement of international law. See Parks, *supra* note 15, at 90. Note that on April 4, 1994, when this paper was submitted, the impact on Executive Order 11850 of a recent international agreement, see United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons,

and on Their Destruction, with Annexes, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) (signed by the United States on Jan. 13, 1993, but not ratified as of this date), was undergoing interagency review within the executive branch. See Interview with Colonel Raymond C. Ruppert, U.S. Army, Chief, International & Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General (Mar. 23, 1994).

<sup>71</sup>See FM 101-5-1, *supra* note 3, at 1-32.

<sup>72</sup>Headquarters, Joint Task Force South, Operations Order 90-2, ROE Card, para. L (20 Dec. 1990) (summarizing ROE stated in Annex R of the Corps level Operations Order for Operation Just Cause in Panama) (on file with the CLAMO). This rule approximates the U.S. treaty obligation, in sieges and bombardments, "to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes." Annex to Hague Convention No. IV Embodying the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 27, 36 Stat. 2295, 2303, 205 Consol. T.S. 289, 293.

<sup>73</sup>Figure 4a is an adaptation of the Venn diagram devised by Roach, *supra* note 3, at 48, to depict the frequent overlap between ROE purposes; see also HAYES, *supra* note 15, at 13 (condensing "diplomacy" and "policy" to a single circle labeled "political").

<sup>74</sup>Figure 4b adapts another Venn diagram published by Roach, *supra* note 3, at 47, to illustrate that ROE restrict military operations more than the requirements of international or domestic law and that law provides an outer boundary within which all ROE must fall. The requirement that ROE be lawful is also captured in the JCS definition, which states that ROE are directives "issued by competent authority." See *supra* note 3. For a helpful discussion of the distinction and relationship between international policy and international law, see Roger Fisher, *Intervention: Three Problems of Policy and Law*, in ESSAYS ON INTERVENTION 3-30 (Roland J. Stanger, ed., 1964).

<sup>75</sup>Cf., John Lancaster, *GIs in Somalia Dig, Duck and Cover: Mean Streets Get Meaner as U.S. Military Avoids Conflict*, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 31, 1993, at A1 (summarizing the purpose as "want[ing] to avoid offensive measures that could foil diplomatic efforts to broker a peace settlement among [faction leader Mohamed Farah] Aideed and rival clans"). Note that as an official matter, what were termed "ROE" did not change, though "mission guidance" from leaders had the practical effect of halting U.S. security patrols in the streets of Mogadishu. See Interview with Major Walter G. Sharp, U.S. Marine Corps, Former International Law Adviser and subsequently Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Joint Task Force Somalia (Mar. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Sharp Interview]. Because this paper argues for a vocabulary based on functional rather than conceptual categories, see *infra* notes 271-275 and accompanying text, it

purposefully regards such "mission guidance" as "ROE." This approach is supported by the literal meaning of the JCS definition--that is, prohibiting security patrols "delineate[s] the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered"--and by the prior practice of ground units that have labeled such "guidance" as "ROE." See, e.g., Headquarters, 101st Airborne Div., Operations Plan for Operation General Tosta, Appendix 1 (ROE) to Annex C (1986) (listing the prohibition on combat patrols as a ROE).

<sup>76</sup>For a lucid discussion of the change in the legal consequences of "war" in light of the modern prohibition on interstate use of force, see generally YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 140-61 (1988) (concluding that even when the United Nations Security Council deems armed action by a state to be unlawful aggression, individual soldiers on either side who kill enemy soldiers are immunized from criminal prosecution so long as they have complied with the rules of warfare).

<sup>77</sup>See generally DINSTEIN, *supra* note 76, at 166-67; Bunn, *supra* note 15, at 78-79; O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 54; Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Erickson, *Use of Armed Force Abroad: An Operational Law Checklist*, THE REPORTER, June 1988, at 3.

<sup>78</sup>See FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 2-1 (depicting "conflict"

and "combat" as potentially occurring during operations other than war).

<sup>79</sup>DEP'T OF THE ARMY, SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATION NO. 21-1-SMCT, SOLDIER'S MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS, SKILL LEVEL 1 at 726 (1990) [hereinafter COMMON TASKS MANUAL].

<sup>80</sup>See MARINE CORPS BATTLE SKILLS TRAINING HANDBOOK, BOOK 1, PVT-GYSGT, GENERAL MILITARY SUBJECTS, 1-1-19 (1993) [hereinafter MARINE BATTLE SKILLS HANDBOOK].

<sup>81</sup>DOD DIR. 5100.77, *supra* note 4.

<sup>82</sup>See, e.g., DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-2, YOUR CONDUCT UNDER THE LAW OF WAR (23 Nov. 1984); FM 27-10, *supra* note 70; DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 27-1, TREATIES GOVERNING LAND WARFARE (7 Dec. 1956); DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 27-161-2, INTERNATIONAL LAW VOLUME II (23 Oct. 1962); DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 27-1-1, PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (1 Sept. 1979); DEP'T OF ARMY, TRAINING CIRCULAR NO. 27-10-1, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WAR (26 June 1979) [hereinafter TC 27-10-1]; DEP'T OF ARMY, TRAINING CIRCULAR NO. 27-10-2, PRISONERS OF WAR (17 Sept. 1991); DEP'T OF ARMY, TRAINING CIRCULAR NO. 27-10-3, THE LAW OF WAR (12 Apr. 1985).

Note also that the Army regulation addressing soldier training in rules of engagement focuses exclusively on wartime rules. See DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 350-41, TRAINING IN UNITS, Ch. 14 (19 Mar. 1993) [hereinafter AR 350-41]. Indeed, in listing the nine "Soldiers'

Rules" to be taught to all entering soldiers, the regulation styles the subject matter as "basic law of war rules:"

- (1) Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.
- (2) Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. Disarm them and turn them over to your superior.
- (3) Soldiers do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war.
- (4) Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
- (5) Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
- (6) Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.
- (7) Soldiers treat all civilians humanely.
- (8) Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.
- (9) Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war. Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superiors.

*Id.* at para. 14-3b.

A superseded but still influential Army regulation addressing rules of engagement also focuses on training in wartime rules. See DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 350-216, TRAINING: THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 AND HAGUE CONVENTION NO. IV OF 1907, paras. 7-8, (7 Mar. 1975) [hereinafter AR 350-216] (including ROE within the scope of required training,

affirming that such training is a command responsibility, and directing that legally qualified personnel will conduct training together with officers having command experience), *superseded by AR 350-41, supra*, (29 Jan. 1986). Though superseded, AR 350-216 continues to guide instruction by judge advocates. See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at Q189. AR 350-216 treats the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, international agreements that apply principally in time of war. Specifically, AR 350-216 outlines the following areas of emphasis for "Training in the Conventions":

- (1) the rights and obligations of U.S. Army personnel regarding the enemy, other personnel, and property;
- (2) The rights and obligations of U.S. Army personnel if captured, detained, or retained;
- (3) The requirements of customary and conventional law pertaining to captured, detained, or retained personnel, property, and civilians;
- (4) Probable results of acts of violence against, and inhuman treatment of personnel;
- (5) Illegal orders;
- (6) Rules of engagement;
- (7) War crimes reporting procedures.

AR 350-216, *supra* note 82, at para. 7; cf. DOD DIR. 5100.77, *supra* note 4 (requiring that the Law of "War" program must "encompass[] all

*international law with respect to the conduct of armed conflict, binding on the United States or its individual citizens, either in international treaties and agreements to which the United States is a party, or applicable as customary international law")* (emphasis added).

<sup>83</sup>See, e.g., BARRY M. BLECHMAN AND STEPHEN S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 3-5 (1978) (analyzing 215 interventions short of conventional war between 1946 and 1975, many of which included deployment of ground troops).

<sup>84</sup>The principles of necessity and proportionality also help define the broader justification to use force during "war," though in the wartime context the principles have correspondingly broader formulations. See FM 27-10, *supra* note 70, at 4 ("The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by 'military necessity,' which has been defined as that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.") and at 19 (stating that "the loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained").

<sup>85</sup>See, e.g., Roach, *supra* note 3, at 49-50.

<sup>86</sup>See, e.g., O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 170-71; Bunn, *supra* note 15, at 74-75; Roach, *supra* note 3, at 74-75.

<sup>87</sup>2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-12 (1906), quoted in Bunn, *supra* note 15, at 70. Secretary Webster penned his now famous words in the aftermath of an attack on the U.S. steamship *Caroline* by Canadian militia in 1837. See generally, Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., *The Caroline Incident and the Development of International Law*, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493 (1990); R.Y. Jennings, *The Caroline and MacLeod Cases*, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).

<sup>88</sup>Jennings, *supra* note 87, at 91 ("Even Webster, in his letter of April 24, 1841, the source of the formulation of the classic definition of self-defense, says: 'It is admitted that a just right of self-defence attaches always to nations as well as to individuals, and is equally necessary for the preservation of both.'"); cf. XIII UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Case No. 81, at 149-51 (1949) ("The finding of the Court [to acquit Erich Weiss and Wilhem Mundo, tried on 9-10 November 1945 by U.S. military commission for the alleged unlawful killing of an American prisoner] is evidence that self-defence which, according to general principles of penal law is an exonerating circumstance in the field of common penal law offenses when properly established, is also relevant, on similar grounds, in the sphere of war crimes.").

<sup>89</sup>See generally DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5200.1, INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM (June 7, 1982); DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 380-5, INFORMATION

SECURITY PROGRAM, para.1-327 (25 Feb. 1988) (defining "need to know" as "[a] determination made by a possessor of classified information that a prospective recipient, in the interest of national security, has a requirement for access to, or knowledge, or possession of the classified information in order to accomplish lawful and authorized Government purposes").

<sup>90</sup>Roach, *supra* note 3, at 50.

<sup>91</sup>*Id.*

<sup>92</sup>As early as 1975, O'Connell recognized the imprecise boundaries between hostile act and hostile intent when he described the "conundrum" of translating hostile intent into hostile act. See O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 171; see also DWORKEN, *supra* note 15, at 9-11. Another way to create a rule with similar but more sweeping effect is to designate a "hostile force"--and therefore permit gunners to target--any soldier of a particular uniform, regardless whether that soldier subjectively wishes to harm U.S. forces. Commanders at high levels have the authority to declare forces hostile, a measure which when taken effectively transforms PROE into WROE with respect to posture toward the hostile force. See Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 445-46 & n.14.

<sup>93</sup>Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Standing ROE for OPLAN/OPORD Annexes at J-2 (1991) (on file in CLAMO).

<sup>94</sup>See Roach, *supra* note 3, at 50.

<sup>95</sup>See Green, *supra* note 49, at 64.

<sup>96</sup>FM 101-5-1, *supra* note 3, at 1-19.

<sup>97</sup>Headquarters, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Operation Desert Shield (1990) (soldier card).

<sup>98</sup>JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 446 & n.1 (Emily M. Beck, ed., 14th ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1968) (attributing slight variations of the same statement to Prince Charles of Prussia, Israel Putnam, and Frederick the Great).

<sup>99</sup>See, e.g., Phillips, *supra* note 15, at 5 (citing Prescott's remark as "a classic instance of ROE"); Morris, *supra* note 15, at 14 (referring to Prescott's remark as "arguably a rule of engagement").

<sup>100</sup>KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1832).

<sup>101</sup>See, e.g., DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, PROJECT CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL EVALUATION FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (CHECO) REPORT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 1 JANUARY 1966-1 NOVEMBER 1969 (1969), reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. 5248, 5249 (1985) [hereinafter CHECO REPORT 1969]; MAJOR MICHAEL A. BURTON, U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION FILE NO. AD-A184 917, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE DESIGN OF OPERATIONS 8 (1987); Morris, *supra* note 15, at 12-13.

<sup>102</sup>See BURTON, *supra* note 101, at 8-9.

<sup>103</sup>See generally HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION 94-133 (1965) (discussing the "nuclear threshold").

<sup>104</sup>SULLIVAN & DUBIK, *supra* note 14, at 17 & n.34 (citing MARTIN VAN CREVELD, COMMAND IN WAR 261-75 (1985), RICHARD SIMPKIN, THE RACE TO THE SWIFT: THOUGHTS ON TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WARFARE 227-55 (1985), and CLAUSEWITZ, *supra* note 100, at 100-21).

<sup>105</sup>See generally Peter B. Clark, *The Opinion Machine: Intellectuals, The Mass Media and American Government*, in THE MASS MEDIA AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 48 (Harry M. Clor, ed. 1974); PETER BRAESTRUP, BIG STORY: HOW THE AMERICAN PRESS AND TELEVISION REPORTED AND INTERPRETED THE CRISIS OF TET 1968 IN VIETNAM AND WASHINGTON (1977); MICHAEL J. ARLEN, THE LIVING ROOM WAR (1982).

<sup>106</sup>See Morris, *supra* note 15, at 17-20. Unless otherwise noted, this two paragraph overview of Air Force ROE development prior to the Vietnam conflict is based on Morris, *supra* note 15, at 17-26. In addition to completing original research in the archives of the military services and conducting interviews with living participants in that early development, Major Morris' sources included CRISIS STABILITY AND NUCLEAR WAR (Kurt Gottfried and Bruce G. Blair, eds. 1947), Martin Licherman, *To the Yalu and Back*, in AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY DECISIONS: A BOOK OF CASE STUDIES 580, 581, 586, 596, 604-05, 634 n.7 (Harold Stein, ed. 1963), DAVID REES, KOREA: THE

LIMITED WAR xi, 378-79, WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF A JUST AND LIMITED WAR 245 (1981), OMAR N. BRADLEY & CLAY BLAIR, A GENERAL'S LIFE 585 (1983), ROBERT F. FUTRELL, THE U.S. AIR FORCE IN KOREA: 1950-1963 208-11 (1961), DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 330, 389-95 (1964), ROBERT E. OSGOOD, LIMITED WAR: THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY (1957), Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 445 & n. 52, 464 n.7, and Commander Joseph F. Bouchard, Use of Force in Crisis: A Theory of Stratified Crisis Interaction 235-90 (1989) (on file in Stanford University Library).

<sup>107</sup>BRADLEY & BLAIR, *supra* note 106, at 585.

<sup>108</sup>The Geneva Accords were signed on 20 July 1954 between France and the government of Ho Chi Minh. They ended the war between those two parties and divided the State of Vietnam into northern and southern partitions. See generally KHUYEN, *supra* note 38, at 5. Although the United States was not a signatory to the Accords, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations decided to abide by them. See Memorandum for the Record, by the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Army General Staff Lieutenant Colonel E.B. Roberts, subject: Report of Chief of Staff's Trip to the Far East Southeast Asia, and Pacific Areas, 16 March-12 April 1957, para. 6 (Apr. 16, 1957), reprinted in DEP'T OF STATE, I FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: VIETNAM 783-84 (1985); see also DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, PROJECT CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL EVALUATION FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (CHECO) REPORT: EVOLUTION OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA (1965), reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. 4636, 4637 (1985) [hereinafter CHECO REPORT 1965]

(quoting Chapter III, Article 17(a) of the Accords: "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces ordinance, jet engines and jet weapons and armored vehicles, is prohibited.").

<sup>109</sup>See CHECO REPORT 1965, *supra* note 108, at 4637 (citing Military Assistance Command Vietnam Directive Number 62 of 24 November 1962 and referring to these constraints as "operational restrictions"). Note that the "ROE" pertaining to air operations in Southeast Asia actually had three separate names:

. . . there were three categories of rules which controlled the employment of airpower in the Southeast Asia (SEA) conflict. The *Rules of Engagement* (ROE) were promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sent through channels to the operational commands. Covering all of SEA, these Rules of Engagement defined: geographical limits of SEA, territorial airspace, territorial seas, and international seas and airspace; definitions of friendly forces, hostile forces, hostile acts, hostile aircraft, immediate pursuit, and hostile vessels; rules governing what could be attacked by U.S. aircraft, under what conditions immediate pursuit could be conducted, how

declarations of a "hostile" should be handled, and the conditions of self-defense.

The second set of rules was designated *Operating Restrictions*, which were contained in the CINCPAC Basic Operations Orders. These rules included prohibitions against striking locks, dams, hydropower plants, fishing boats, houseboats, and naval craft in certain areas; prohibitions against strikes in certain defined areas such as the Chinese Communist (ChiCom) buffer zone or the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted areas; conditions under which targets might be struck, such as validation requirements, when FACs were required, distances from motorable roads.

Finally, *Operating Rules* . . . concerned the use of Forward Air Controllers (FACs), the return of ground fire, the use of the AGM-45 (SHRIKE) missile, restrictions against mine-type munitions, and the requirements for navigational position determination.

Although, in theory, these three types of rules were distinct, in practice, they were almost always referred to collectively as "Rules of Engagement."

CHECO REPORT 1969, *supra* note 101, at 5248 (emphasis furnished).

<sup>110</sup>CHECO REPORT 1969, *supra* note 101 at 5249.

<sup>111</sup>See, e.g., CHECO REPORT 1969, *supra* note 101 at 5249 (quoting the

President's statement to newsmen on 5 July 1966 that "[w]e were very careful not to get out of the target area, in order not to affect civilian populations").

<sup>112</sup>See, e.g., J. Terry Emerson, *Making War Without Will: Vietnam Rules of Engagement*, in THE VIETNAM DEBATE: A FRESH LOOK AT THE ARGUMENTS 161, 164 (John N. Moore, ed. 1990).

<sup>113</sup>See W. Hays Parks, *Rolling Thunder and the Law of War*, AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 4, 14 [hereinafter Parks, *Rolling Thunder*] (describing the process by which target lists were forwarded to the Tuesday luncheons at the White House, where in the frequent absence of military advisers, the President and other attendees selected targets).

<sup>114</sup>This was Air Force General Jack Lavelle, Commander of 7th Air Force, who during the last week of March, 1972 "was accused of conducting 28 raids against the [North Vietnam] airfields and radar sites in violation of White House rules and at a time when the Administration was engaged in delicate peace negotiations with Hanoi." DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, PROJECT CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL EVALUATION FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (CHECO) REPORT: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, NOVEMBER 1969-SEPTEMBER 1972 (1973), reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. 5278, 5283 (1985) [hereinafter CHECO REPORT 1973].

<sup>115</sup>See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 5248 (1985) (statement of Sen. Goldwater) ("I do not derogate the principle of civilian control of

the military, but I think it should be recognized that once civilians decide on war, the result of placing military strategy and tactics under the day-to-day direction of unskilled amateurs may be greater sacrifice in blood and the denial of a military victory); Emerson, *supra* note 112; Colonel W. Hays Parks, *No More Vietnams*, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Mar. 91, at 27 [hereinafter Parks, *No More*]; Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15; Parks, *Rolling Thunder*, *supra* note 113.

<sup>116</sup> See Lieutenant Colonel John G. Humphries, *Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement*, AIRPOWER JOURNAL, Fall 1992, at 25, 27; Parks, *No More*, *supra* note 115, at 27.

<sup>117</sup> See BOLGER, *AMERICANS AT WAR*, *supra* note 22, at 169-90; Bunn, *supra* note 15, at 74; Commander Dennis R. Neutze, *The Gulf of Sidra Incident: A Legal Perspective*, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Jan. 1982, at 26.

<sup>118</sup> See O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 70; Bunn, *supra* note 15, at 74.

<sup>119</sup> See O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 70-71 (describing the alarm caused to naval staffs by 1967 sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* by Styx missiles); Bunn, *supra* note 15, at 74; Morris, *supra* note 15, at 27 & n.62. See generally SECRET GERALD A. BROWN & J. PALMER SMITH, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: VITAL LINK OR UNNECESSARY BURDEN, DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER DOCUMENT NO. ADC 029 586 (1982) (charting the early development of seaborne ROE).

<sup>120</sup>This is not to say that seaborne ROE were a British invention. As early as the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, U.S. naval forces operated under strict ROE to ensure that U.S. escort ships for the Cuban Expeditionary Force would not engage Cuban aircraft prematurely. See Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 451-53. However, the evolution of ROE in the British navy undoubtedly had a profound influence on the contemporaneous evolution of ROE occurring in the U.S. Navy. See Roach, *supra* note 3 (frequently and prominently citing to O'Connell for authority); Phillips, *supra* note 15, at 6 (referring to O'Connell's chapter on Rules of Engagement as a "seminal article[]" in the area of ROE); Elective Course SE 211 taught at the U.S. Naval War College on Rules of Engagement: Crisis Management and Conflict Control, Week No. 5 of the Syllabus (1987) (assigning fleet officers taking the course "[t]he ROE chapter of [O'Connell's] classic text") (on file with the CLAMO).

<sup>121</sup>O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 169.

<sup>122</sup>O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 169.

<sup>123</sup>O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 171.

<sup>124</sup>O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 170.

<sup>125</sup>O'Connell provides little background information pertaining to the Malaysian-Indonesian conflict. The historical matters presented in this paragraph follow the information set forth in 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 690 (1969) (article on Malaysia).

<sup>126</sup>As employed here, "interrogate" refers to the hailing and questioning of the encountered vessel via radio transmission. The questions will typically consist of requests for the radio operator to state the vessel's port of origin, flag, registry, international call sign, cargo, last port of call, next port of call, and final destination. *see, e.g.*, Memorandum, Commander, U.S. Surface Warfare Development Group, TACMEMO ZZ00050-1-91, Marine Interdiction Force Procedures, para. 5.3.1 (29 Mar. 1991) (cancelled 29 Mar. 1993).

<sup>127</sup>The traditional legal classification of the world's oceans contained three broad categories: internal waters, territorial seas, and high seas. *See, e.g.*, DEP'T OF NAVY, NAVAL WAR PUBLICATION 9, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, para. 1.1 (July 1987) [hereinafter NWP 9, 1987 EDITION]. Internal waters are those waters

landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. Internal waters consist of lakes, rivers, some bays, harbors, some canals, and lagoons and have the same legal character as the land itself. There is no right of innocent passage in internal waters, and, unless in distress, ships and aircraft may not enter internal waters without the permission of the coastal or island nation.

*Id.*, at para 1.4.1. The territorial sea, the next category of waters moving in a seaward direction, is "a belt of ocean from between 3 to 12 nautical miles in width and subject both to the coastal or island nation's sovereignty and to certain navigational rights reserved to the international community." *Id.* at para.

1.4.2. Beyond territorial seas are the high seas, on which freedoms of navigation are preserved to the international community, *id.* at 1.5, subject to the inherent right of one vessel to defend itself against hostile actions of another. See O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 54.

<sup>128</sup>Under customary international law, ships of all nations enjoy the right of innocent passage, which is the right to pass

through the territorial sea for the purpose of continuous and expeditious traversing of that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to or from internal waters. Innocent passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only insofar as incidental to ordinary navigation or as rendered necessary by force majeure or distress. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal or island nation. Among the military activities considered to be prejudicial to peace, good order, and security, and therefore inconsistent with innocent passage are

1. Any threat or the use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the coastal or island nation;
2. Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
3. The launching, landing, or taking on board of aircraft or any military device;
4. Intelligence collection activities detrimental to the security of that coastal or island nation;
5. The carrying out of research or survey activities.

The coastal or island nation may take affirmative actions in its territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent, including, where necessary, the uses of force.

NWP 9, 1987 EDITION, *supra* note 127, at 2.3.2.1. See generally Lieutenant Commander John W. Rolph, *Freedom of Navigation and the Black Sea Bumping Incident: How "Innocent" Must Innocent Passage Be?*, 135 MIL.L.REV. 137 (1992) (analyzing the right of innocent passage as codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea in the context of a United States-Soviet incident in 1988).

<sup>129</sup>O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 174.

<sup>130</sup>See Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 84.

<sup>131</sup>See Morris, *supra* note 15, at 27-29; see also Bob Woodward, *The Admiral of Washington*, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 1989, at 18:2 (paraphrasing Admiral Crowe's belief that because of the PROE "no longer did the U.S. military man have to be shot at before he could defend himself").

<sup>132</sup>For a more complete discussion of the circumstances surrounding the *Stark* incident, see HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, REPORT ON THE STAFF INVESTIGATION INTO THE IRAQI ATTACK ON THE *USS Stark*, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-14 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT ON *Stark*]; REAR ADMIRAL GRANT SHARP, DEP'T OF NAVY, FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ATTACK ON THE *USS Stark* ON 17 MAY 1987 (1987) (unclassified version); HAYES, *supra* note 15, at 40-44; Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 456-58; Michael Vlahos, *The Stark Report*, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May 1988, at 64-67.

Two of the "commentators" referred to in the text are Bradd Hayes and Scott Sagan. Hayes writes,

That a significant number of naval commanders viewed the rules of engagement in effect at the time of the *Stark*

incident as restrictive and reactive could be seen in their reaction to revision efforts following the incident. Navy officers insisted that in revising the rules of engagement "the main point is to insure that ship captains are authorized to shoot down hostile aircraft." The implication was that they didn't feel they had sufficient authority before the *Stark* attack. As a matter of argument, the authority to shoot down hostile aircraft really didn't change. Navy captains had always had that authority. What changed were the formal criteria for determining whether an aircraft was hostile, the mindset that recognized an increased sense of danger, and the fate of the *Stark*'s commanding officer in the attack's aftermath.

HAYES, *supra* note 15, at 43-44 (quoting John H. Cushman, Jr., *U.S. Expecting to Send Larger Cruises to Gulf*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 31 May 1987, at A6. Sagan writes,

The fact that important changes were made in the ROE for U.S. Persian Gulf forces immediately after the *Stark* incident, however, belies [the official Navy report's] confident assessment that appropriate rules of engagement existed prior to May 17. The existing ROE, coupled with other communications that stressed the importance of

avoiding provocative acts, bear at least a modicum of responsibility for the outcome of this incident.

Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 456-57. Sagan also later writes,

Thus, although the Stark had "technical authority" to shoot down any potentially hostile plane that approached it with apparent hostile intent, the distance set for radio warning contacts, the rules for repeated attempts at warning and identification, and the suggestion to fire warning shots all guided officers toward quite conservative judgments concerning whether or when to attack preemptively.

Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 457 (quoting HOUSE REPORT ON *Stark*, *supra*, at 1).

<sup>133</sup>See Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 456..

<sup>134</sup>Among the measures in the graduated show of force were the following:

Potentially hostile contacts that appear to be approaching within specified distances of U.S. units should be requested to identify themselves and state their intentions . . . Commanders are also directed not to stop if one attempt to attract the attention of an

approaching contact has not elicited a response to their radio warnings. They should take graduated actions in attempting to attract the attention of the approaching contact, including training guns and firing warning shots."

HOUSE REPORT ON *Stark*, *supra* note 132, at 4, quoted in Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 457.

<sup>135</sup>The distance at which commanders were to begin interrogating and warning approaching aircraft, and engaging them if necessary, was set further away in order to prevent successful attacks on U.S. ships by long-range missiles. See Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 458 & n.73.

<sup>136</sup>Secretary of Defense Weinberger gave examples of these hostility criteria in a report to Congress:

Any aircraft or surface ship that maneuvers into a position where it could fire a missile, drop a bomb, or use gunfire on a ship is demonstrating evidence of hostile intent. Also a radar lock-on to a ship from any weapons system fire control radar that can guide missiles or gunfire is demonstrating hostile intent.

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF 17 (Apr. 27, 1988), quoted in Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 458.

<sup>137</sup>See HAYES, *supra* note 15, at 54-56; Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 84; Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 459-61. Primary source materials pertaining to the incident are contained in DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DOWNING OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 ON 3 JULY 1988 (1988) [hereinafter DOD VINCENNES REPORT].

<sup>138</sup>See Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 461.

<sup>139</sup>DOD VINCENNES REPORT, *supra* note 137, at 45, quoted in Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 460.

<sup>140</sup>Firing in national self-defense is a use of force

to protect the larger national interests, such as the territory of the United States, or to defend against attacks on other U.S. forces not under [the decision-maker's] command.

Roach, *supra* note 3, at 49. A situation of purely national--as opposed to unit or individual--self-defense arises during regional or global tensions in which the commander must make the decision

whether to fire despite the fact that his particular unit has neither suffered a hostile act nor witnessed hostile intent.

<sup>141</sup>See, e.g., ROBERT OSGOOD, LIMITED WAR: THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY (1957); RUSSELL F. WIEGLEY, HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY 519 & n.24 (1967).

<sup>142</sup>WIEGLEY, *supra* note 141, at 524.

<sup>143</sup>See ROGER J. SPILLER, COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE, LEAVENWORTH PAPER NO. 3, NOT WAR BUT LIKE WAR: THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON 41-47 (1981).

<sup>144</sup>See *supra* p. 29.

<sup>145</sup>SPILLER, *supra* note 143, at 41.

<sup>146</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd, Commander of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, offered the following assessment of fire discipline during the deployment:

When a youngster lands all prepared and eager to fight and finds himself restricted from firing at a known rebel who he sees periodically fire in his direction and in every instance restrains himself from returning the fire, it is felt that this is outstanding and indicates good small unit discipline.

See JACK SCHULIMSON, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, HISTORICAL REFERENCE

PAMPHLET, MARINES IN LEBANON (1966), at 32, quoted in SPILLER, *supra* note 143, at 41.

<sup>147</sup> See SPILLER, *supra* note 143, at 44-45.

<sup>148</sup>The source for the historical information contained in this paragraph is LAWRENCE A. YATES, COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE, LEAVENWORTH PAPER NUMBER 15, POWER PACK: U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1965-1966 (1988).

<sup>149</sup>*Id.* at 119, 122-24, 140-143 & nn. 29-30, 177-78, synopsis on back cover.

<sup>150</sup>*Id.* at 143.

<sup>151</sup>See *id.* at 142 ("Veterans of the intervention have chosen less charitable words [than 'numerous and complex'] to describe the rules of engagement: 'dumb,' 'crazy,' 'mind-boggling,' 'demoralizing,' 'convoluted,' and 'confusing' are but a sample of the printable ones.").

<sup>152</sup>Many of the messages, directives, orders, and regulations cited in the endnotes to this paragraph contained classified provisions at one time. All matters cited have been downgraded to "unclassified" by appropriate orders of the Secretary of the Army.

<sup>153</sup>Some of those who were troubled by widespread soldiers' reaction against the ROE were senior officers:

Another potentially serious trend reflected in recent reports pertains to disparaging comments concerning restraints on application of firepower. Comments such as "the only good village is a burned village," are indicative of the trend. Here again, renewed command emphasis on troop indoctrination is necessary to insure that newly arrive [sic] personnel in particular are thoroughly conversant with need for minimizing noncombatant battle casualties, and understand the rationale behind current instructions on this subject.

Message, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, MACJ02, subject: Relationship Between U.S. Military and Vietnamese (180107Z Nov 66), *reprinted in III DEP'T OF ARMY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REVIEW OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT: EXHIBITS, BOOK 1--DIRECTIVES 235, 237-38 (1970)* [hereinafter MY LAI INVESTIGATION EXHIBITS]. Historians, see KREPINEVICH, *supra* note 36, at 199, news reporters, see JONATHAN SCHELL, *THE OTHER HALF* 151 (1968), and moral philosophers, see MICHAEL WALZER, *JUST AND UNJUST WARS* 189-90 (1977), were among the others who were alarmed. Professor Walzer, for instance, identified 3 essential restraints in the ROE pertaining to bombardment of villages:

1. A village could not be bombed without warning if American troops had received fire from within it . . . 2.
- Any village known to be hostile could be bombed or

shelled if its inhabitants were warned in advance . . .

3. Once the civilian population had been moved out, the village and surrounding country might be declared a "free fire zone" that could be bombed and shelled at will.

WALZER, *supra*, at 190. Professor Walzer eventually argues against the assumption that anyone still living in a village after this process was a guerrilla. Yet first he asserts that the rules themselves were not obeyed:

In considering these rules, the first thing to note is that they were radically ineffective. "My investigation disclosed," writes [Jonathan Schell], "that the procedures for applying these restraints were modified or twisted or ignored to such an extent that in practice the restraints evaporated entirely . . ." Often, in fact, no warning was given, or the leaflets were of little help to villagers who could not **read**, or the forcible evacuation left large numbers of civilians behind, or no adequate provision was made for the deported families and they drifted back to their homes and farms.

WALZER, *supra*, at 190 (quoting Schell, *supra*, at 151).

<sup>154</sup>I DEP'T OF ARMY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REVIEW OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT: THE REPORT OF THE

INVESTIGATION, 9-1 to 9-22 (1970) [hereinafter MY LAI INVESTIGATION REPORT] (comprising a chapter dedicated to examining "Policy and Directives as to Rules of Engagement and Treatment of Noncombatants" and finding at 9-14 that "[d]ocumentation of [General Westmoreland's] policy and interest in [ROE] was and is plentiful"); LIEUTENANT GENERAL W.R. PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY 230 (1979) [hereinafter PEERS ACCOUNT OF MY LAI INQUIRY] (finding fault not with the written guidance issued at the highest levels but rather with poor training and with "the failure to disseminate division, brigade, and task force policies down to the individual soldier"). *See also Investigation into the My Lai Incident: Hearings Before the House Armed Services Comm.*, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 834 (1970) (Statement of General William C. Westmoreland) ("Because of the constant turnover of personnel in Vietnam, I established a policy in 1966 of frequent review, revision, and republication of the rules of engagement. This was to ensure maximum visibility to all U.S. personnel during their tour of duty, and was done at least once a year.").

<sup>155</sup>Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam, Reg. 612-1, Personnel Processing, para. 3 (8 Jan 1968) [hereinafter USARV Reg. 612-1], reprinted in MY LAI INVESTIGATION EXHIBITS, *supra* note 153, at 301, directed that upon arrival all personnel would receive 7 different information cards. Among these was one entitled "The Enemy in Your Hands," which cautioned that "suspects, civilians, or combat captives, must be protected against violence, insults, curiosity,

and reprisals of any kind." All of the cards are reprinted in MY LAI INVESTIGATION EXHIBITS, *supra* note 153, at 259-68. Distribution of the cards was not restricted to the Army component. USARV Reg. 612-1 implemented Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Directive 612-1, Personnel Processing: Processing of New Arrivals (16 Mar. 1968) [hereinafter MACV Dir. 612-1], *reprinted in* MY LAI INVESTIGATION EXHIBITS, *supra* note 153, at 139, directed distribution of cards to all Americans in the theater.

<sup>156</sup>MACV Dir. 612-1, *supra* note 155, at para. 4b(6) (requiring all officers receive a copy of the card entitled "Guidance for Commanders in Vietnam," which contained the quoted rule at para. 7). The card is reprinted in MY LAI INVESTIGATION EXHIBITS, BOOK 4-- MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS, *supra* note 153, at 14.

<sup>157</sup>See, e.g., Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Directive 525-13, Rules of Engagement for the Employment of Firepower in the Republic of Vietnam (May 1971) [hereinafter MACV Dir. 525-13]; Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Directive 525-18, Combat Operations--Conduct of Artillery/Mortar and Naval Gunfire (21 Jan. 1968) [hereinafter MACV Dir. 525-18]; Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, Order 3040-3, Minimizing Noncombatant Battle Casualties (13 Dec. 1966) [hereinafter III MAF Force Order 3040-3]; Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, Order 3121.5, Standing Operating Procedure for Ground and Air Operations (10 Nov. 1967) [hereinafter III MAF Force

Order 3121.5]; Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force, Order 3330.1, Conduct of Artillery/Mortar and Naval Gunfire (3 Feb. 1967) [hereinafter III MAF Force Order 3330.1]; Headquarters, Americal Division, Reg. 525-4, Combat Operations: Rules of Engagement (16 Mar 1968) [hereinafter Americal Div. Reg. 525-4]; Headquarters, 11th Infantry Brigade, Reg. 525-1, Combat Operations: Rules of Engagement (9 Feb. 1968) [hereinafter 11th Inf. Bde Reg. 525-1].

The consecutively paginated Books 1 and 2 of MY LAI INVESTIGATION EXHIBITS, *supra* note 153, reprint MACV Dir. 525-18 at 135, III MAF Force Order 3040.3 at 475, III MAF Force Order 3121.5 at 479, III MAF Force Order 3330.1 at 489, Americal Div. Reg. 525-4 at 587, and 11th Inf. Bde Reg. 525-1 at 757. MACV Dir. 525-13, Americal Div. Reg. 525-4, and 11th Inf. Bde Reg 525-1 were reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 17,551-58 (1975) at the request of Senator Barry Goldwater.

<sup>158</sup>Message traffic to subordinate headquarters from MACV Headquarters reflected command sensitivity to adverse media reports:

Extensive press coverage of recent combat operations in Vietnam has afforded a fertile field for sensational photographs and war stories. Reports and photographs show flagrant disregard for human life, inhumane treatment, and brutality in handling of detainees and PW. These press stories have served to focus unfavorable world attention on the treatment of detainees and

prisoners of war by both [Vietnamese and American forces]  
. . . Vigorous and immediate command action is essential  
. . . .

Message, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,  
MACJ15, subject: Mistreatment of Detainees and PW (211531A Feb 68).

The resulting thicket of rules and cards did not effectively transmit to the individual soldier what was expected of him. Though they were careful to conclude that a large number of factors contributed to the tragedy at My Lai, the members conducting the official inquiry into the incident observed that

neither units nor individual members of Task Force Barker and the 11th Brigade received the proper training in . . .  
. . the Rules of Engagement. . . . Several of the men testified that they were given MACV's "Nine Rules" and other pocket cards, but . . . they had put the cards in their pockets unread and never had any idea of their contents . . .

PEERS ACCOUNT OF MY LAI INQUIRY, *supra* note 154, at 230.

<sup>159</sup>11th Inf. Bde Reg. 525-1, *supra* note 157, at para. 4a.

<sup>160</sup>MY LAI INVESTIGATION REPORT, *supra* note 154, at 9-7.

<sup>161</sup>See, e.g., Americal Div. Reg. 525-4, *supra* note 157, para 3d (defining a Free Fire Zone (FFZ) as "[a]n area designated by the responsible political authority (District/Province Chief) in which political clearance has been granted for the period specified" but stating that "[m]ilitary clearance and compliance with the established rules of engagement are required").

<sup>162</sup>MY LAI INVESTIGATION REPORT, *supra* note 154, at 9-7.

<sup>163</sup>See, e.g., III MAF Force Order 3121.5, *supra* note 157, at para. 405; III Force Order 3330.1, *supra* note 157, at para 3a. The designation of a geographical zone within which persons, having been duly warned, may be presumed hostile, is no different in concept from the designation of other hostility criteria, such as continued manning of a machine gun position by an unknown crew after due warnings to exit the position with hands up. The hostility criteria form of ROE--Type I ROE as discussed in Section III.A.5 *infra*--has not been renounced. However, future designation of free fire areas or specified strike zones in ROE annexes is improbable because of the notoriety such measures gained among in the news media and in academic circles, see e.g. SCHELL, *supra* note 153; WALZER, *supra* note 153, even if they remain a conceptually plausible way to sort out the hostile intention of an ambiguous force. Cf. FM 101-5-1, *supra* note 3, at 1-29, 1-34, F-1, and G-1 (defining "engagement area" and "free fire area" as "control

measures" commonly employed in the offense and defense against identified enemy forces).

<sup>164</sup>DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 51.

<sup>165</sup>DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 135.

<sup>166</sup>DOD REPORT, *supra* note 1, at 130.

<sup>167</sup>The military undertook other changes in response to the Long Commission findings. Perhaps the most significant was the Program to Combat Terrorism, several aspects of which serve as good models for how the method of imparting ROE to land forces should be changed. See *infra* note 240 and accompanying text. The important point to note here is that the self-defense boilerplate was the only change to ROE drafting widely adopted by ground units in the aftermath of the Beirut tragedy.

<sup>168</sup>See *supra* notes 130-131 and accompanying text; Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 86 ("The PROE endeavor to expand peacetime ROE to all sea, air, and land forces: success with the latter remains limited." ).

<sup>169</sup>See, e.g., Lawrence A. Yates, *Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause--Before and After*, MILITARY REVIEW, Oct. 1991, at 59, 64, 68, 69-70 [hereinafter Yates, *Joint Task Force Panama*]; Interview with Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, Historian, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College (Mar. 22, 1994) [hereinafter

Yates Interview] (discussing numerous interviews, conducted by Dr. Yates, of participants in operations in Panama); Morris, *supra* note 15, at 146-67. Unless otherwise noted, this two paragraph synopsis of ROE matters in Panama draws from Yates' article and interviews and from Morris' manuscript.

<sup>170</sup>See, e.g., Memorandum, Commander, Joint Task Force Panama, JTF-PM CO, to All Subordinate Commanders, subject: Weapons Safety (19 Jan. 1990), reprinted *infra* note 200.

<sup>171</sup>See Yates, *Joint Task Force Panama*, *supra* note 169, at 64.

<sup>172</sup>See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, Unnumbered Record of Trial 118 (Hdqtrs, Fort Bragg 31 Aug. 1990) (opening statement of defense counsel). The *Bryan* case is discussed more fully at *infra* notes 220-221 and accompanying text.

Occasions that might have required less than deadly force proved particularly challenging to infantry soldiers because "the specific rules of engagement changed from day to day and from location to location" and because training rules of engagement "are normally very vague . . . and nobody sees much reason to emphasize those, which is a mistake." See Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Lynn D. Moore, Record of Article 32(b) Investigation, 7 May 1990, at 10, 12, *Bryan*. One brigade commander observed that "given the realities of the crisis, he had come to rely more on his staff judge advocate than his operations officer and that he would gladly have traded one of his rifle companies for a [military police]

company 'well trained in peacetime ROE.'" Yates, *Joint Task Force Panama*, *supra* note 169, at 68.

The difficulties of reorienting a force trained in WROE to the conditions prevailing in Panama were clearest to small unit leaders. The executive officer of a rifle company observed that

[w]hen threatening situations arose, we handled them as well as possible in accordance with the rules of engagement in effect at the time. Problems arose when we suddenly had to change roles. For the most part we were infantrymen, trained primarily "to close with and destroy the enemy." Then suddenly we were expected to act as diplomats and policemen. Behavior deemed meritorious under one set of rules could be construed as unacceptable under another set. It's not difficult to understand how a soldier can become confused when he is praised for an act in one instance but is then reprimanded for a similar act in another. This is especially true in an environment where hesitation or a lapse in judgment could very well kill you or your fellow soldiers. The result was often frustration, tension, and ambivalence that further complicated an already confusing state of affairs.

See CLARENCE E. BRIGGS, III, *OPERATION JUST CAUSE, PANAMA DECEMBER 1989: A SOLDIER'S EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT* 4 (1990). Yet rules that were very clear

on their face sometimes oversimplified the nature of the decision whether to shoot. The same infantry company, given the mission of restoring law and order along the western edge of the City of Colon after the start of Just Cause, received the following instructions:

1. Shoot all armed civilians
2. Looters, if armed, will be killed.
3. Unarmed looters will be dealt with as follows:
  - a. Fire a warning shot over their head.
  - b. Fire a shot near the person(s).
  - c. Shoot to wound.

*Id.* at 77. Apparently, none of the soldiers receiving these ROE killed any civilians carrying weapons for purposes of self-protection.

<sup>173</sup> See *infra* notes 295, 313, 325, and accompanying text.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. International Law Note, "Land Forces" Rules of Engagement Symposium: The CLAMO Revises the Peacetime Rules of Engagement, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1993, at 48 (mentioning an informal poll of staff judge advocates attending optional ROE seminars held during the annual Worldwide Staff Judge Advocates' Conference, noting that "a liberal estimate" of those who had previously worked with the JCS PROE was one-third of the attendees, and describing the process underway to improve lack of familiarity with the JCS PROE).

<sup>175</sup>See Daniel P. Bolger, *The Ghosts of Omdurman*, PARAMETERS, Autumn 1991, at 33, 31 (arguing that "[l]ow intensity conflict receives its grudging due and no more" even as tomorrow's problems call for the Army to prepare to fight "the savage wars of peace").

<sup>176</sup>DESERT STORM ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT, *supra* note 54, at Operational Law-2 & 3 (22 Apr. 1992).

<sup>177</sup>Bolger, *supra* note 175, at 39.

<sup>178</sup> See, e.g., Colonel Christopher C. Shoemaker, Major Thomas P. Odom & William R. Hawkins, *Commentary & Reply*, PARAMETERS, Spring 1992, at 101, 102, 105-07; Harry G. Summers, *Powell Echoes Grant in Focusing Military*, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at 78; Sean D. Naylor, *Will Peacekeepers Become 'Flabby Do-Gooders'?* ARMY TIMES, Oct. 11, 1993, at 15; Lieutenant Colonel James A. Baker, *Peace Missions Dull the Army's Combat Edge*, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 6, 1993.

<sup>179</sup>See generally Major Daniel P. Bolger, *Contingency Warfare: Training Mindset for the Future*, ARMY TRAINER, Fall 1993, at 26, 28 ("We must train in ways that accustom us to these patterns of contingency warfare."); Yates Interview, *supra* note 169 ("Most traditionalists have yet to realize that U.S. officers and soldiers must be prepared to enter a crisis like Panama with a mindset at odds with much of what they have been taught about war.").

<sup>180</sup>See *supra* note 146. OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-92 describes one of the practical purposes of ROE as follows:

ROE protect the commander by providing guidance assuring that subordinates comply with the law of war and national policy. For example, the commander may issue ROE that reinforce the law of war specifically prohibiting destruction of religious or cultural property. In the area of national policy, ROE can limit such items as the use of chemical weapons, riot control agents, and herbicides. The inclusion or restrictions on these agents in an OPLAN insulates, to the extent possible, the commander from subordinates who may violate national policy out of ignorance.

<sup>181</sup>Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

<sup>182</sup>See, e.g., VIII UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Case No. 47, Trial of William List and Others, at 58-59 (1948) ("Fighting is legitimate only for the combatant personnel of a country. It is only this group that is entitled to treatment as prisoners of war and incurs no liability beyond detention after capture or surrender.").

<sup>183</sup>Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Operations Plan for Restore Hope, Annex N, at para. 3(b)(1) (1993).

<sup>184</sup>Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, Standing ROE For OPLAN/OPORD Annexes, at para 2a (1991).

<sup>185</sup>Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment, Tactical Standing Operating Procedure, Appendix 4 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex H (Civil-Military Affairs), at para. 1a (1992).

<sup>186</sup>Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division, Operations Plan 8-89, Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations), para. 3a, 3b (1989).

<sup>187</sup>The inconsistency of texts between higher and lower headquarters is at least as problematic as that across units. Note that such variety is implied by the Unit D formulation. The unified command level's standing ROE are the PROE, which distinguish between hostile act and hostile intent. See *supra* notes 90-92 and accompanying text. Yet Unit D chooses to incorporate hostile intent into hostile act. Again, there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach. Clear indications of hostile intent can sometimes be equated with hostile acts, as O'Connell observed. See O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 171; *supra* note 92. Still, inconsistency impairs understanding, a truth well-understood by drafting experts. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING 168 (1981).

<sup>188</sup>Of course this analysis assumes that individuals have respect for the limits imposed by the rules. See generally Edwin J. DeLattre,

*Police Discretion and the Limits of Law Enforcement*, THE WORLD & I, January 1989, at 563, 573 (noting in the context of discussing police observance of rules that "endless proliferation of laws, regulations, and policies can reduce respect for limits; when the lists become so long that no one could reasonably believe that he really knows them with any thoroughness, people are as likely to sneer at the whole business as to try to identify the fundamentals").

<sup>189</sup> See U.S. ARMY, TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT HANDBOOK 87042L-CTH, COMMANDERS' TOE HANDBOOK, HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY BRIGADE (15 May 1990); U.S. ARMY, TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT HANDBOOK 87102L-CTH, TOE HANDBOOK, HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, HEAVY SEPARATE BRIGADE (5 Aug. 1991); U.S. ARMY, TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT HANDBOOK 57004L-CTH, HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY AIRBORNE DIVISION/BRIGADE AND INFANTRY BATTALION (10 Jan. 1992).

<sup>190</sup>The features of the legislative model--a purely theoretical construct--are illuminated by the contrast drawn here between ship captains, aircraft pilots, and high level commanders on the one hand, and individual riflemen on the other. However, one should not infer that only individual riflemen may be forced into firing decisions without interpretive guidance. One experienced commentator has perceptively observed that

it is unlikely that there will be a Navy judge advocate at a level lower than the Battle Group (rather than on the bridge of any ship); for example, there are a number of frigate commanders who have operated independently and had to make decisions in fast-moving scenarios that are not unlike those a rifleman may face. A naval vessel may have capabilities for distinguishing a *bandit* from a *bogey*, or gaining indications and warnings of hostile intent, or better access to communication with higher authority, but these do not necessarily make the decision to shoot in self-defense any easier. Even if a potentially unfriendly naval vessel or aircraft is manifesting hostile intent, the finger on the missile-launch button is controlled by the shooter's intent, which may be based upon the briefing he received before he launched. This is no different from the individual soldier facing a potentially unfriendly rifleman pointing his rifle at our soldier. We have no way of getting inside the shooter's head in either case.

Memorandum, W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, International and Operational Law Division, Dep't of Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General, to author, subject: Comments on Draft Thesis, at 10 (25 Mar. 1994) (also noting that "[l]ike the frigate commander, a pilot may have better access to additional

information and command guidance, but often there are times when that is not the case") (in possession of the author).

Nor should one identify in the contrast drawn here a suggestion that commanders, staff officers, ship captains, or pilots lack concern for individual soldiers. The compassion for soldiers is clearly evident whenever these professionals in arms undertake military operations. As this paper has repeatedly emphasized, the present method of imparting ROE is suboptimal because of *systemic* factors rather than particular errors. This is precisely why there are no quick or simplistic answers to the challenge of improving upon the present method.

<sup>191</sup>Of course, education and experience are no guarantee that a decision-maker will be able to arrive at the desired response. Those who adopt the focus, common to Navy circles, that ROE training is for officers and commanders, see Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 444, readily acknowledge that bad outcomes can occur even when these decision-makers are doing the interpreting. See *id.* at 462 ("Finally, if unclear or contradictory ROE are issued to military forces, faulty signaling, undesired vulnerabilities, and inadvertent escalation might occur.").

<sup>192</sup>In land forces, shortfalls in education and experience combine with organizational characteristics and limited armament to doom the legislative approach to ROE. As one judge advocate assigned to advise an Army Corps on operational law describes the environment,

[u]nlike other components of the services, the majority of ground operations are highly decentralized and executed at the platoon and squad level. The commanders of these forces are lieutenants and sergeants not ship captains. The individual soldier's primary weapon has a maximum effective range of only 460 meters. Therefore his or her opportunity to react to hostile acts or hostile intent is much more reduced in time and distance than his fellow comrade in arms. . . . The problem in designing ROE for ground forces is "to translate the president's decisions and guidance into operational plans and specific orders that go through the military chain of command eventually to 38-year-old battalion commanders, to 28-year-old company commanders, to 23-year-old platoon leaders, to 19-year-old privates."

Major Scott R. Morris, Rules of Engagement: Its Origin, Practical Use, Doctrinal Integration, and Theoretical Concept 4-5 (1993) (unpublished early draft of paper cited *supra* note 15, on file with the CLAMO) (quoting Albert C. Pierce, *Crisis Management in the White House and the Pentagon*, in RAND CORPORATION, MANAGING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CRISES: A CONFERENCE REPORT NO. R-4038-CC at 34 (C. Preston Niblack, ed. 1991)).

<sup>193</sup>MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, United States, pt. IV, ¶ 16c(1) (1984).

<sup>194</sup>United States v. Wysong, 9 C.M.A. 249, 251, 26 C.M.R. 29, 31 (1958).

<sup>195</sup>United States v. Nation, 9 C.M.A. 724, 726, 26 C.M.R. 504, 506 (1958). Note that together the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines--subordinate doctrines to criminal due process and free expression respectively--comprise a substantial body of court-made law devoted exclusively to defects than can arise when laws are created and interpreted. These doctrines record, in case after case, the potential problems outlined in parts III.C.1 & 2 immediately above.

<sup>196</sup>MCM, *supra* note 193, pt. IV, ¶ 14c(2)(a), 16c(1)(c).

<sup>197</sup>Alternatively, the prosecution could proceed under the theory that the accused received and had knowledge of a rule of engagement within a lawful order--other than a general order--and that he then violated the order by defying the rule. See MCM, *supra* note 193, pt. IV, ¶ 16b(2). Still another alternative theory of prosecution is Article 90, which proscribes willful disobedience of a superior commissioned officer. See MCM, *supra* note 193, pt. IV, ¶ 14b(2). Yet the orders issued in these alternative theories of prosecution must be "lawful" in all of the ways in which general orders must be lawful; hence, such orders are no more readily enforceable than general orders.

<sup>198</sup>34 M.J. 825 (A.C.M.R. 1992).

<sup>199</sup> 33 M.J. 739 (A.C.M.R. 1991). *Finsel* and *McMonagle* are two of only four reported judicial opinions that have made reference to the term "rules of engagement," a fact that is consistent with the relatively recent development of ROE. See discussion *supra* part III.B.3. The other cases are *United States v. McGhee*, 36 C.M.R. 785 (N.C.M.R. 1966) and *United States v. Calley*, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R. 1973), both of which arose in the context of Vietnam.

<sup>200</sup>The order, issued by Major General Carmen J. Cavezza, the commander of Joint Task Force Panama and Division Commander of the 7th Infantry Division, read as follows:

19 January 1990

JTF-PM CO (340d)

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS

SUBJECT: Weapons Safety

1. Recent accidental discharges of weapons, one of which resulted in a soldier's death, makes it imperative for me to establish the following guidelines:

a. No one is authorized to maintain a clip in their pistol, a magazine in their rifle (M-16 or AR 203), or a belt of ammunition linked to the feed tray of a M-240 SAW, M-60 MG, or Cal. 50 MG, unless so directed by a commander at the colonel level or higher.

b. Clips will be placed in pistols, magazines will be placed in rifles, and ammunition belts attached to

feed trays only when required by operational necessity, e.g., the knowledge that criminal or enemy contact is probable.

c. Under no circumstances will U.S. Army forces be authorized to chamber a round of ammunition unless enemy and/or criminal contact is imminent. Even then, the weapon will remain on safe until visual sighting of the target has been made.

d. Only commanders in the rank of colonel can authorize fragmentation grenades to be carried, and then operational necessity must clearly warrant the carrying and use of those indiscriminate weapons. All fragmentation grenades will be turned in to the ASP and drawn only when colonel-level commanders so direct.

2. These drastic measures are being taken to ensure that we safeguard lives, both U.S. and Panamanian. Our casualties during the last two weeks have all been self-inflicted. This must stop!

3. Commanders at every level must take immediate action to disseminate these guidelines. My intent is simple. I want no one killed or wounded as the result of an accidental discharge of a weapon. I expect everyone's full support.

/S/

*Finsel*, 33 M.J. at 743 (Appendix). This order provides a useful illustration of Type V ROE (Arming Orders), see part III.A.5. *supra*, which in this operation served the purely military purpose--at least officially--of promoting safety and avoiding accidental harming of friendly forces. Some question whether rules delivered in a memorandum on safety can accurately be termed "ROE." See, e.g., Roach, *supra* note 3, at 52 ("[ROE] should not cover safety-related restrictions."); but see Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 86 (arguing, in response to Roach, that "such a limited view of ROE is not consistent with their proper use at all levels"). The court in *Finsel* recognized the functional character of the memorandum as ROE. See 33 M.J. at 741 n.3 ("The task force commander had previously published a letter which, in effect, modified the rules of engagement. The letter forbade the chambering of ammunition and the firing of weapons except under specific limited conditions.").

<sup>201</sup>See *Yates, Joint Task Force Panama*, *supra* note 169, at 71.

<sup>202</sup>*McMonagle*, 34 M.J. at 856.

<sup>203</sup>*McMonagle*, 34 M.J. at 856.

<sup>204</sup>*Finsel*, 33 M.J. at 741.

<sup>205</sup>*McMonagle*, 34 M.J. at 864 (affirming violation of article 92(1) as lesser included offense of Article 90); *Finsel*, 33 M.J. at 740-41.

<sup>206</sup> [T]he rules of engagement imposed by a commander are guidelines pertaining to firing of weapons. Those rules generally are aimed at preventing needless casualties and unnecessary destruction. Even if the rules of engagement are violated, however, the lawfulness of the killing resulting from the firing will be determined by the UCMJ and the law of war. Thus, even though a particular shooting may violate a command-imposed rule of engagement, *and thus be subject to punishment under the UCMJ*, the killing resulting from that shooting may nevertheless be lawful.

*McMonagle*, 34 M.J. at 870 (Johnston, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

<sup>207</sup> *McMonagle*, 34 M.J. at 856, 865; *Finsel*, 33 M.J. at 740.

<sup>208</sup> *McMonagle*, 34 M.J. at 856, 865.

<sup>209</sup> *McMonagle*, 34 M.J. at 856; *Finsel*, 33 M.J. at 741.

<sup>210</sup> 34 M.J. at 857. The court expressly rejected the accused's claim that he was mistakenly firing at an enemy combatant, *see* 34 M.J. at 864, a claim that if true would have made the accused innocent of murder as well as of one violation of the ROE.

<sup>211</sup>A "malum in se" is

[a] wrong in itself; an act or case involving illegality from the very nature of the transaction, upon principles of natural, moral, and public law. An act is said to be *malum in se* when it is inherently and essentially evil, that is, immoral in its nature and injurious in its consequences, without any regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the state.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted) (italics in original). "Mala in se" is the plural form of this term. *Id.* at 861.

<sup>212</sup>No. 583 84 2098/2889 (I Marine Expeditionary Force, 6 Apr 1993).

<sup>213</sup>On February 2, 1993, Marine Corps Gunnery Sergeant Harry N. Conde discharged a canister of buck shot toward two Somali youths, injuring them, after one had grabbed his sunglasses. Soldiers received the following ROE on a card:

JTF FOR SOMALIA RELIEF OPERATION  
GROUND FORCES RULES OF ENGAGEMENT  
NOTHING IN THESE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO  
TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT

- A. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE TO DEFEND YOURSELF AGAINST ATTACKS OR THREATS OF ATTACK.
- B. HOSTILE FIRE MAY BE RETURNED EFFECTIVELY AND PROMPTLY TO STOP A HOSTILE ACT.
- C. WHEN U.S. FORCES ARE ATTACKED BY UNARMED HOSTILE ELEMENTS, MOBS, AND/OR RIOTERS, U.S. FORCES SHOULD USE THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND PROPORTIONAL TO THE THREAT.
- D. YOU MAY NOT SEIZE THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR MISSION.
- E. DETENTION OF CIVILIANS IS AUTHORIZED FOR SECURITY REASONS OR IN SELF-DEFENSE.

REMEMBER

- 1. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AT WAR.
- 2. TREAT ALL PERSONS WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT.
- 3. USE MINIMUM FORCE TO CARRY OUT MISSION.
- 4. ALWAYS BE PREPARED TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE.

Headquarters, Joint Task Force Somalia, SJA Ser #1 (2 Dec. 1992) reprinted in Exhibit 26 to Article 32(b) Investigating Officer's Report, *Conde*. There is some question whether all Marines understood these ROE, see, e.g., Sworn Statement of Sergeant Charles M. Schuster (2 Feb. 1993), reprinted in Exhibit 25 to Article 32(b) Investigating Officer's Report, *Conde* (remarking in spite of paragraph A of the ROE card, that "I have been told we are not to fire at the civilians unless we're fired on first; but these teens did not fire on us"); nevertheless, the panel rejected

Conde's claim of self-defense. According to observers of the trial, see Interview with Captain Clark R. Fleming, U.S. Marine Corps, Trial Counsel of Record, in Charlottesville, Va. (Oct. 20, 1993), one compelling piece of evidence was Conde's statement after the shooting that "[a]t least those fuckers have a Hell of a headache." Testimony of Lance Corporal Chad B. Rivet, Article 32(b) Investigating Officer's Report at 84 (Mar. 4, 1993), *Conde*. Gunnery Sergeant Conde was found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon. See Appellate Exhibit XIX, *Conde*.

In addition to the assault charge, Conde had initially been charged with a violation of a general order prohibiting the retention of a captured weapon for personal use. Yet although the M79 grenade launcher was indeed a weapon that had been captured, the convening authority dismissed the latter charge upon recommendation of the Article 32(b) Investigating Officer, who reported that Conde's chain of command had officially reissued the weapon to Conde. See Addendum to Article 32(b) Investigating Officer's Report, para. 1 (10 Mar. 1993), *Conde*. Conde's sentence for the assault conviction was to forfeit \$1706 and to be reduced one grade. See Appellate Exhibit XX, *Conde*.

<sup>214</sup> See Lorenz, *supra* note 41, at 33. Another shooting incident involving Marines driving through crowded Mogadishu offers an interesting contrast to *Conde*. On February 4, 1993, Sergeant Walter A. Johnson was the right rear passenger in a 1 1/4 ton utility truck, the second vehicle in a two vehicle convoy. He and

the other Marines in the convoy had recently received situation reports highlighting grenades thrown at coalition patrols in Mogadishu as well as adults handing grenades to children and persuading them to use them against coalition forces. The rules of engagement were the same as those in the *Conde* case. As the convoy made its way through a market street, a crowd of Somalis surrounded the two vehicles, though all of the civilians were kept several feet away from the vehicle by the stern looks, verbal warnings, and vigilance of the well-armed Marines. Then the convoy stopped. A large cargo truck blocked the road.

Suddenly, a boy carrying what appeared to be a small box in one hand, ignored the warnings, and ran up behind the vehicle. Security of the rear of the vehicle was Sergeant Johnson's responsibility. As the boy approached, Sergeant Johnson asked the other Marine in the rear of the vehicle to "[l]ook at this weird guy" and then a moment later yelled "[w]hat the \_\_\_\_ does this kid have in his hand?" Only after the boy had continued to ignore warnings and then had placed his arm in the back of the truck--but out of Sergeant Johnson's reach--did Sergeant Johnson fire his weapon at the boy. Despite Sergeant Johnson's extraordinary efforts to collect the fallen boy from the hostile crowd and the Marines' swiftness in getting to the nearest hospital, the boy died.

All of the witnesses supported Sergeant Johnson's account of the incident, though the small box was not recovered. The Article 32 Investigating Officer concluded that Sergeant Johnson had acted

appropriately, and the convening authority dismissed all charges. See generally *United States v. Johnson*, No. 458 27 1616 (I Marine Expeditionary Force, 16 Mar. 1993) (Report of Article 32(b) Investigating Officer) (copy on file with the CLAMO).

<sup>215</sup>The author's firm opinion--based on interviews with participants as well as all investigation reports and records of trial available to him--is that justice was served in every case.

<sup>216</sup>See, e.g., Dworken, *supra* note 15, at 15 ("The command did not issue any clarifications about the cases, so soldiers naturally assumed the worst and in some cases were hesitant to use deadly force when they had every right to."); Richburg, *supra* note 48 ("'We're out here getting shot at, and now they want to prosecute us," said one Marine rooftop sniper from Florida when he heard the news of the pretrial hearings [of Conde and Johnson]."); Adams, *supra* note 57, at 22 (questioning the *Conde* conviction). Soldiers in Panama in 1988 and 1989 expressed similar concerns about being tried for firing their weapons, even if in self-defense. See Yates Interview, *supra* note 169, at IV-29.

<sup>217</sup>See *supra* notes 39-48 and accompanying text.

<sup>218</sup>Letter from Colonel Wade H. McManus, Jr., Commander, Division Support Command, to Major General Guy A. J. LaBoa, subject: Specialist James D. Mowris (28 Sept. 1993), reprinted in Record of Trial, Volume I, *Mowris*.

<sup>219</sup>See Dworken, *supra* note 15, at 15 (commenting on cases arising in Marine Corps units).

<sup>220</sup>See United States v. Bryan, Unnumbered Record of Trial (Hdqtrs, Fort Bragg 31 Aug. 1990). The record of trial reveals that without the testimony of First Lieutenant (1LT) Brandon B. Thomas, the prosecution would have had little evidence on which to proceed. According to 1LT Thomas, the accused--the senior noncommissioned officer for an infantry company--had no justification for shooting the near-lifeless body of a Panamanian prisoner.

On December 23, three days after Operation Just Cause had begun, First Sergeant (1SG) Roberto E. Bryan and other infantry soldiers and military policemen manned the traffic control point at Madden Dam. In the early afternoon a small truck carrying five or six Panamanian men pulled up to the search point and stopped. The ensuing inspection of the vehicle disclosed equipment that revealed the men to be members of the Panamanian Defense Force, which at this time remained loyal to Manuel Noriega. As American soldiers moved to handcuff the Panamanians, one of the men removed a grenade from his pants, pulled the pin, and rolled it. The grenade exploded, injuring several Americans with shrapnel and triggering a barrage of rifle fire from the Americans.

Upon hearing the rifle shots, 1LT Thomas drove toward the traffic control point and arrived within minutes. After identifying a wounded Panamanian among the dead bodies of the other Panamanians, 1LT Thomas dragged the wounded Panamanian to a safe

place by the side of the road. A few minutes later, according to 1LT Thomas, the soldier guarding the wounded Panamanian remarked to 1SG Bryan "this one's alive, he's almost dead though." Then, according to 1LT Thomas, 1SG Bryan walked to within ten feet of the Panamanian and fired five or six aimed rounds into the body, which was face down and far away from any potential weapons. The soldier who had been guarding the body, Private Scott A. Bowland, steadfastly maintained that the prisoner on the ground was moving, raising his buttocks, and that the prisoner--who had not been searched--could have been reaching for a grenade. After hearing this and other evidence contradicting 1LT Thomas' account, a court-martial panel acquitted 1SG Bryan of murder.

<sup>221</sup>The Article 32 Investigating Officer in *Bryan* described the difficulty of gathering evidence in terms that would appear to apply to any deployment against hostile forces:

The investigation into the charges against 1SG Bryan was made difficult by . . .

a. The lack of physical evidence. The alleged victims were never identified. They did not or could not be interviewed or present a complaint in the case of the aggravated assaults . . . No body or autopsy report could be produced in the case of the premeditated murder charge . . .

b. The reliance on testimony only. The testimony received from the 18 witnesses called before the Article 32b investigation was conflicting and confusing. Many of the witnesses contradicted each other concerning the timing of events, the level of threat present at any particular time, and the actions taken and why. . . .

See Investigating Officer's Report, Narrative, para. 1 (18 May 1990), *Bryan*.

<sup>222</sup> See, e.g., KREPINEVICH, *supra* note 36, at 199.

<sup>223</sup> See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (noting that "[t]his Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society" because "it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise").

<sup>224</sup> See *infra* part III.C.5.

<sup>225</sup> See, e.g., Major Robert S. Trout, *Dysfunctional Doctrine: The Marine Corps and FMFM 1, Warfighting*, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Oct. 1993, at 33, 34.

<sup>226</sup> See, e.g., HERBERT, *supra* note 9, at 3 ("Doctrine is an approved, shared idea about the conduct of warfare that undergirds an army's planning, organization, training, leadership style, tactics, weapons, and equipment.") (emphasis added).

<sup>227</sup>See FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at v (noting that a keystone manual "furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, material acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training").

<sup>228</sup>FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 2-3.

<sup>229</sup>FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 2-4.

<sup>230</sup>FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-4.

<sup>231</sup>FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-4.

<sup>232</sup> Properly written ROE are clear and tailored to the situation. ROE may change over the duration of a campaign. A force-projection army tends to face a wide array of ROE. For example, ROE during Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort were widely diverse; within each operation, the ROE were different and changed over time.

FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 2-4.

<sup>233</sup> For instance, the manual containing doctrine for legal operations addresses the topic of ROE in the following manner:

[Judge Advocates] [a]ssist in the preparation of and review of rules of engagement (ROE). ROEs must be

consistent with the operations plan; higher headquarters ROEs; national policy; and domestic, international, and applicable foreign law. Some operations may require sets of ROEs. Different missions and theaters of operations will require tailored ROEs.

DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS 33 (3 Sept. 1991); cf. *id.* at 17 ("Before deployment, JAGC personnel . . . review rules of engagement (ROE); provide required training on the law of war and ROEs. . ."). See also DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-20, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT 1-9, 4-2, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-7, App. F (5 Dec. 1990); Dep't of Army, Field Manual 100-19, Assistance to Civil Authorities, App. C (1993) (Initial Draft); Dep't of Army, Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, 5-54 to 5-64 & Appendix C (1 Oct. 1993) (draft) [hereinafter Draft FM 100-23].

<sup>234</sup>See International Law Note, *supra* note 174, at 48; Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 86 ("The PROE endeavor to expand peacetime ROE to all sea, air, and land forces: success with the latter remains limited.").

<sup>235</sup>See *supra* part III.C.1.

<sup>236</sup>See *supra* part III.A.5.

<sup>237</sup>The format prescribed by the CJCS for ROE issued by the combatant commands, see JOPES FORMATS, *supra* note 66, at III-205 to III-206, is

generally not used in the plans and orders of subordinate commands. See generally Bloodworth, *supra* note 15, at 4-5 (describing the unsystematic manner in which ROE annexes to operations plans are sometimes prepared).

<sup>238</sup>See FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 2-0 (dividing the range of military operations between "war" and "operations other than war").

<sup>239</sup>See AR 350-216, *supra* note 82, at para. 6c (further reinforcing this view by requiring that within two weeks after arrival in a theater of operations all soldiers receive instruction on the rules of engagement "tailored to the particular environment and type of warfare being experienced"); cf. O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 56 (outlining a theory of graduated force to undergird rules of engagement, a theory which "excludes the relevance of the traditional boundary between peace and war, upon which, of course, traditional international law is postulated"); KREPINEVICH, *supra* note 36, at 37-52 (criticizing Army doctrine's continued treatment of counterinsurgency merely as a "contingency" during the Vietnam conflict); Yates, *Joint Task Force Panama*, *supra* note 169, at 67 (describing a partial noncombatant evacuation operation in Panama during 1989, in which "'doctrine' was being made on the spot"); Bolger, *supra* note 179, at 28 (asserting that "[t]he contingency battlefield should be as familiar to us as Fulda Gap was" and that "we must know the likely threats as well as we once understood the

composition and disposition of the Third Shock Army").

<sup>240</sup>See DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 525-13, THE ARMY COMBATTING TERRORISM PROGRAM, para. 3-7 (27 Jul. 1992) [hereinafter AR 525-13] (directing implementation of security measures in a random fashion in order to frustrate surveillance attempts and introduce uncertainty into the planning of terrorist groups); DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-37, TERRORISM COUNTERACTION (24 Jul. 1987); DEP'T OF ARMY, TRAINING CIRCULAR 19-16, COUNTERING TERRORISM ON U.S. ARMY INSTALLATIONS 5-8 (25 Apr. 1983); see generally DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 530-1, OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC), para. 1-5c (1 May 1991) (emphasizing removal of "arbitrary programmatic constraints" and creating "a concern with indicators and critical information as opposed to almost exclusive concern with classified information").

<sup>241</sup>A portion of *FM 100-5, Operations* not dealing with ROE describes the environment well: "Loneliness and fear on the battlefield increase the fog of war. They can be overcome by effective training, unit cohesion, and a sense of leadership so imbued in the members of a unit that each soldier, in turn, is prepared to step forward and give direction toward mission accomplishment." FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 14-2.

<sup>242</sup>One Army commentator traces the lack of training to regulatory requirements:

A review of [AR 350-216's] requirements reveals a major

weakness. The bifurcated system of training leads to breakdowns in its implementation. The formal instruction is being done. It is part of the soldier's formal military education. It is easily checked. The calibre of the instruction can be monitored by the commander and the staff judge advocate. But the soldier's actual understanding of the law of war, or lack thereof, is not so easily checked. The soldier's appreciation of his or her responsibilities under the law of war can only be realistically checked by followup training. Yet the regulation offers no guidance on how to conduct any such training.

A further deficiency arises from the fact that the judge advocate is mentioned only in connection with the formal instruction. Thus an impression is created that the judge advocate has no role in the training process beyond delivering a formal lecture. This often leads to the judge advocate delivering a "canned" lecture to a unit and then ceasing any further involvement in the training of that unit.

Elliott, *supra* note 4, at 12. In 1986, the Army replaced AR 350-216 with Chapter 14 of AR 350-41. See *supra* note 82. Far from addressing the deficiencies that contributed to "canned" lectures, the new regulation provides even sketchier guidance. See AR 350-41, *supra* note 82 (consisting of 5 short paragraphs filling one-half of

a page).

<sup>243</sup>According to Army training doctrine, one of nine principles of training is to "use performance-oriented training." The principle is grounded in the view that "[s]oldiers learn best by doing, using a hands-on approach." DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-100, TRAINING THE FORCE 1-4 (15 Nov. 1988) [hereinafter FM 25-100].

<sup>244</sup>Army training doctrine distinguishes between "individual" tasks--ones performed by the individual soldier--and "collective" tasks--ones performed by crews, sections, squads or larger units. Although a unit's proficiency ultimately depends on its performance of collective "mission essential" tasks, a critical challenge for trainers is "to understand the responsibility for and the linkage between the collective mission essential tasks and the individual tasks which support them." FM 25-100, *supra* note 243, at 1-7 to 1-8.

<sup>245</sup>See *supra* note 47.

<sup>246</sup>See COMMON TASKS MANUAL, *supra* note 79, at 5 ("Show the soldier how to do the task to standard. . .").

<sup>247</sup>The "conditions" pertinent here are that the soldier will be armed with a loaded M16A1 or M16A2 rifle, and that the rifle has malfunctioned and stopped firing. COMMON TASKS MANUAL, *supra* note 79, at 152 (Task 071-311-2029).

- <sup>248</sup> S - Slap upward on the magazine to make sure it is properly seated.
- P - Pull the charging handle all the way back.
- O - Observe the ejection of the case or cartridge.  
Look into the chamber and check for obstructions.
- R - Release the charging handle to feed a new round in the chamber.
- T - Tap the forward assist.
- S - Shoot.

COMMON TASKS MANUAL, *supra* note 79, at 153.

<sup>249</sup> See DEP'T OF ARMY, SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATION NO. 21-II-MQS, MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS II: MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS FOR LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS 3-86 (31 Jan. 1991) (Task 04-3303.02-0014, Prepare Platoon or Company Combat Orders) (describing the factors of "mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available").

<sup>250</sup> CANDACE S. BOS & SHARON VAUGHN, STRATEGIES FOR TEACHING STUDENTS WITH LEARNING AND BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS 56 (1991).

<sup>251</sup> *Id.* at 44. Unlike cognitive theories, operant or behavioral learning theories--which form the other major branch of learning theories--focus on "identifying observable behaviors and manipulating antecedents and consequences of these behaviors to change behavior." *Id.* at 26. The useful caricature of operant theory is that it "is not concerned with what you think or tell

yourself during the learning process." *Id.* Although training strategies must incorporate the lessons of both major branches, the clear relevance of intellectual functioning to conforming one's actions to ROE explains the emphasis in this paper upon the cognitive branch.

<sup>252</sup> *Id.* at 44 (citing Earl B. Hunt, *Verbal Ability*, in HUMAN ABILITIES: AN INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH 63-100 (Robert J. Sternberg, ed. 1985); ULRIC NEISSER, COGNITION AND REALITY: PRINCIPLES AND IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (1976); H. Lee Swanson, *Information Processing Theory and Learning Disabilities: An Overview*, J. OF LEARNING DISABILITIES, Mar. 1987, at 1, 3-7.

<sup>253</sup> *Id.* at 56.

<sup>254</sup> G.A. Miller, *The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information*, PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 63, 81-97 (1956).

<sup>255</sup> See BOS & VAUGHN, *supra* note 250, at 52.

<sup>256</sup> BOS & VAUGHN, *supra* note 250, at 52 (citing ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, *SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND UNDERSTANDING* (1977)). "Schemas" is the plural form of the word "schema." An alternative plural form is "schemata."

<sup>257</sup> See BOS & VAUGHN, *supra* note 250, at 52 (citing SCHANK & ABELSON, *supra* note 256; David E. Rumelhart, *Schemata: The Building Blocks*

*of Cognition*, in THEORETICAL MODELS AND PROCESSES OF READING 33-58 (Harry Singer & Robert B. Ruddell, eds., 3rd ed. 1980); R.J. Spiro, *Constructive Processes in Prose Comprehension and Recall*, in THEORETICAL ISSUES IN READING COMPREHENSION 245-76 (R.J. Spiro et al. eds., 1980); W.R. BREWER & GLENN V. NAKAMURA, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF READING, TECH. REP. 325, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF SCHEMAS (1984)).

<sup>258</sup>BOS & VAUGHN, *supra* note 250, at 56; see also BRUCE JOYCE & MARSHA WEIL, MODELS OF TEACHING 94, 97 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing teaching models designed to improve memorizing skills). Because it sets individual soldier training within a system that reinforces that training through crew and team drills, unit exercises, and elaborate feedback mechanisms, the Army approach also incorporates insights from training models developed specifically for military purposes. See, e.g., Robert M. Gagne, *Military Training and Principles of Learning*, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 17 (1962) (arguing that the simplified stimulus-response-reinforcement exercises of the operant conditioning labs are inadequate to permit design of training for more complex behavior); KARL U. SMITH & MARGARET F. SMITH, CYBERNETIC PRINCIPLES OF LEARNING AND EDUCATIONAL DESIGN (1966) (modeling the human as a self-correcting information-processing system).

<sup>259</sup>The process of "assimilation" is the incorporation of new experience, whereas "accommodation" is changing one's cognitive structure to fit the new experiences that occur. See JOYCE & WEIL,

at 107 (summarizing a distinction made in JEAN PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (1952)).

<sup>260</sup>Jerrold M. Post, *The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers*, in AVOIDING WAR: PROBLEMS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 471, 475 (Alexander L. George, ed. 1991) (citing IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS--CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977) and IRVING L. JANIS, CRUCIAL DECISIONS (1989)). The "scenario fulfillment" phenomenon to which the crew of the *Vincennes* fell prey, see *supra* note 139 and accompanying text, arose from impairment of cognitive functioning under stress. See Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 460. The individual sees what his schemata have prepared him to see. Inconsistent data is simply ignored. *Id.* at 80 (citing sources).

<sup>261</sup>See, e.g., Post, *supra* note 260, at 491; HAYES, *supra* note 15, at 59.

<sup>262</sup>A widely used taxonomy in the field of education provides a helpful framework with which to view the legislative model. Educators employing the taxonomy regard the "cognitive domain" as consisting of six categories: (1) knowledge; (2) comprehension, (3) application, (4) analysis, (5) synthesis, and (6) evaluation. See generally TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: HANDBOOK I, COGNITIVE DOMAIN (B. S. Bloom et al. eds., 1956) (describing the cognitive categories in detail and presenting illustrative objectives for each). The lowest level of learning is knowledge, which the

taxonomy defines as the remembering of previously learned material. See NORMAN E. GRONLUND, HOW TO WRITE AND USE INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES 32 (4th ed. 1991). The highest level is evaluation, which is the making of judgments based on certain criteria. See *id.* Each of the levels consists of skills that build upon the lower levels. See *id.* at 30. Thus, comprehension--defined as "the ability to grasp the meaning of material"--presumes knowledge. *Id.* Application--"the ability to use learned material in new and concrete situations"--presumes comprehension and knowledge. *Id.* Analysis--"the ability to break down material into its component parts so that its organization structure may be understood"--presumes application, comprehension, and knowledge. *Id.* Synthesis--"the ability to put parts together to form a new whole"--presumes analysis, application, comprehension, and knowledge. *Id.* The problem with the legislative model of imparting ROE, within this taxonomy, is that it assumes soldiers will be able to make judgments concerning use of force (evaluation) before rules have been identified and entered into memory (knowledge), understood (comprehension), related to new situations (application), distinguished from other situations (analysis), or combined with other cognitive tasks (synthesis). Stated figuratively, the legislative model assumes soldiers will be able to run before they can crawl.

<sup>263</sup>See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at 3 ("The Operational Law Handbook has become the hornbook for deploying Judge Advocates."),

H-92 to H-106 (addressing rules of engagement).

<sup>264</sup> See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-92 ("ROE define the mission by limiting the use of force in such a way that it will be used only in a manner consistent with the overall military objective."); *id.* at H-94 ("The key to success in drafting ROE is familiarity with the commander's concept of the mission."); accord, e.g., Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 88 (recommending that those preparing ROE should first ask "[w]hat is my mission?").

<sup>265</sup> See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-94; accord, e.g., Roach, *supra* note 3, at ("When developing specific operations, planners should anticipate what additional ROE will be needed in the event of changed circumstances, particularly if they run into increasingly tense or hostile situations--and then ask for revised or additional ROE ahead of time, on a contingency basis.").

<sup>266</sup> OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-92 to H-106; accord, e.g., Phillips, *supra* note 15, at 25 (stating the ROE "are designed to be part of operations plans and orders" and that "[t]he procedural aspects involved in ROE are drafting, reviewing, approving, modifying, and ultimately applying them").

<sup>267</sup> See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-95 & n.1; accord, e.g., Roach, *supra* note 3, at 49, 53-54.

<sup>268</sup> OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-93.

<sup>269</sup>See OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-92 to H-106 (recommending that drafters "[s]eparate ROE by job description," providing a summary of PROE, and then reprinting 12 different samples from various units and missions); *accord*, e.g., Phillips, *supra* note 15, at 25 ("While the role for [each level of the chain of command will vary], each level should play a part in the production of ROE to develop a more realistic set of rules.").

<sup>270</sup>Two commentators suggest an analogy between training military officers and training policemen, asserting that ROE must be written so that decision-makers may employ individual judgment. See Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 444; Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 86. Still, aside from a comment by one that the ROE must therefore be "written in a flexible manner," Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 444, neither commentator provides specific guidance on whether and how rules might contribute to the process of forming judgment, and if so, what sorts of rules these might be.

<sup>271</sup>See Major Joseph P. Nizolak, Jr., *ROE Dissemination: A Tough Nut to Crack!*, FIELD ARTILLERY, Apr. 1992, at 35-36.

<sup>272</sup>See Captain Kevin Dougherty, *Tactical Rules of Engagement*, ARMY TRAINER, Spring 1992, at 10-11. Both of these ground soldiers will talk at cross-purposes with the ship captain who regards ROE solely as instructions pertaining to use of force in national self-defense. See Roach, *supra* note 3, at 49.

<sup>273</sup>See *supra* Figure 4a, note 73, and accompanying text.

<sup>274</sup>Another interesting distinction that proves ultimately unworkable as the basis for a new vocabulary is that between "strategic-political ROE," "operational ROE," and "tactical ROE," a tripartite scheme favored by one recent commentator. See Morris, *supra* note 15, at 85-92 (eventually acknowledging that "[e]ven within the JCS ROE [part of the strategic-political ROE] there are tactical restraints"). Perhaps because distinctions based on levels of authority do not translate into discernible differences in textual language, a similar tripartite scheme during the Vietnam war was routinely ignored in military parlance. See *supra* note 109.

Still another distinction with little use for land forces beyond the classroom is that between "command by negation" provisions and "positive command" provisions. See Alexander L. George, *Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations*, 26 SURVIVAL 223, 227 (1984); HAYES, *supra* note 15, at 5; Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 444. Command by negation involves permissive orders that allow a wide range of action unless countermanded by higher authority. Positive command involves restrictive orders that detail actions which can be taken only when authorized by higher authority. Ship captains and senior ground commanders do well to know that functional Type VI rules often take the logical structure of positive command (e.g., no use of chemical weapons without approval of the National Command Authority); however, accomplishment of most missions will require a combination

of permissive orders and specific countermands. As a result, to know that this regime can formally be labeled "command by negation" is far less useful than to know the substance of the specific countermands.

<sup>275</sup>See part III.A.5 *supra* and Appendix A.

<sup>276</sup>See *supra* notes 103-105 and accompanying text.

<sup>277</sup>See *infra* notes 331-333 and accompanying text (endorsing the recent recommendation by a jointly staffed conference to change the name *Peacetime ROE* to *Standing ROE*).

<sup>278</sup>See General Gordon R. Sullivan, *Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism*, PARAMETERS, Summer 1993, at 2-15.

<sup>279</sup>See *supra* part III.C.

<sup>280</sup>Cf. O'CONNELL, *supra* note 15, at 179 ("While detailed rules of engagement cannot easily be promulgated to cover every type of hypothetical situation, it is possible to envisage general rules which can be applied to any one of three broad situations, namely low tension, high tension, and hostilities.").

<sup>281</sup>FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-4, quoted *supra* in text accompanying note 230.

<sup>282</sup>FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-4, quoted *supra* in text accompanying note 231.

<sup>283</sup>FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 2-4, quoted *supra* in note 232.

<sup>284</sup>See *supra* parts III.A.5 and IV.A.1.

<sup>285</sup>See, e.g., S.L.A. MARSHALL, THE SOLDIER'S LOAD AND THE MOBILITY OF A NATION 23-36 (1950).

<sup>286</sup>Despite the inevitable differences in training terminology and practices that result from their distinct missions, compare 10 U.S.C. §3062(b) (1993) (stating that the Army "shall be organized trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land) with 10 U.S.C. § 5063(a) (1993) (stating that the Marine Corps "shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign"), the Army leader quickly finds a close replica within the Marine Corps for almost every aspect of training. For instance, the discussions *infra* of individual and collective Army tasks (parts V.A and V.E) could apply without change to the Marine Corps, see, e.g., DEP'T OF NAVY, FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL, FMFM 1, WARFIGHTING 47-48 (6 Mar. 1989), while the discussion of Army Combat Training Centers (part V.E) could apply with only slight change to the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms,

California. *See, e.g.*, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION, U.S. MARINES AT TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA 72-83 (1989).

<sup>287</sup> See COMMON TASKS MANUAL, *supra* note 79.

<sup>288</sup> See, *e.g.*, JOYCE & WEIL, *supra* note 258, at 100. Other examples in which Army training employs key words may be found in COMMON TASKS MANUAL, *supra* note 73, at 14 (recommending the letters of "SALUTE" to assist soldiers in recalling what information to report upon sighting the enemy) and in DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-8, THE INFANTRY PLATOON AND SQUAD (INFANTRY, AIRBORNE, AIR ASSAULT, RANGER) N-1 to N-2 (31 Dec. 1980) [hereinafter FM 7-8] (recommending the "five 'S's'" to assist soldiers in remembering how to handle prisoners of war upon capture).

<sup>289</sup>The platoon trains for circumstances involving captives under a simple set of rules that ensures compliance with international law while protecting the legitimate interests of the Army in obtaining intelligence and in shielding its forces from harm. The rules are known to soldiers as "the five 'S's':"

1. *Search PWs as soon as you capture them. Take their weapons and papers, except identification papers. Give a written receipt for any personal property and documents taken. Tag documents and personal property so that you know which PW had them. Have one man guard while another searches. When searching, do not get between the PW and*

the guard. To search a PW, have him spread-eagle against a tree or wall, or on the ground in a pushup position with the knees on the ground. Search the PW and all his gear and clothing.

2. *Segregate PWs* into groups: officers, NCOs, enlisted men, civilians, males, females, and political figures.

This keeps the leaders from promoting escape efforts.

Keep groups segregated as they move to the rear.

3. *Silence PWs*. Do not let them talk to each other.

This keeps them from planning escape and from cautioning each other on security. Report anything a PW says to you or tries to say to another PW.

4. *Speed PWs* to the rear. Platoons turn PWs over to the company, where they are assembled and moved to the rear for questioning by the S2.

5. *Safeguard PWs* when you take them to the rear; make sure they arrive safely. Watch out for escape attempts.

Do not let them bunch up, spread too far out, or start diversions (fist fights, etc.). These create a chance for escape. At the same time, do not let anyone abuse them.

FM 7-8, *supra* note 288, at N-1 to N-2. Soldiers following these rules protect all captives as if they were prisoners of war, despite the fact that international law reserves this most protected status to individuals meeting criteria specified in

Article 4 of Geneva Convention III, *supra* note 4. Cf. Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Dep't of State, to Richard L. Thornburgh, U.S. Attorney General (Jan. 31, 1990) (copy on file with the CLAMO) (explaining that "[p]risoner of war status is generally sought by captured individuals because persons entitled to such status may not be prosecuted for legitimate acts of war," and reporting that on December 20, 1989 the Departments of State and Defense had elected to extend protections of the status to members of the Panamanian Defense Force "even if they might not be entitled to these protections under the terms of Article 4 of Geneva Convention III").

Soldiers can easily remember and apply the five "S's." See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, Unnumbered Record of Trial (Hdqtrs, Fort Bragg 31 Aug. 1990) (page 48 of initial testimony by Captain Jon W. Campbell before Article 32 Investigation on 7 May 1990) (responding to question about Panamanian prisoners that soldiers were "[t]o handle with the 5 "S's": search, segregate, safeguard, speed, silence"). Tribunals convened further "to the rear" under Article V of Geneva Convention III are in a better position than front-line soldiers to apply the sometimes fine factual and legal distinctions over prisoner status. See, e.g., Memorandum, Commander, 101st Airborne Div. (Air Assault), AFZB-JA, subject: Article 5 Tribunal Standard Operating Procedure (12 Feb. 1992) (providing for status determinations at division level and assigning a legal adviser to review all determinations not to bestow prisoner of war status).

<sup>290</sup>One reasonably expects that an 18-year-old under stress might interpret "necessity" to mean, literally, "anything needed to help me accomplish my mission faster and easier." Such literal--and legally unjustifiable--interpretations of "necessity" in a military context are well-documented. See, e.g., *The Hostage Case (United States v. List)*, XI Trials of War Criminals 1252-54 (1948); WALZER, *supra* note 153, at 144; WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, *The Meaning of Military Necessity in International Law*, in I YEARBOOK OF WORLD POLITY 109 (William V. O'Brien ed., 1957).

<sup>291</sup>Note that paragraph 1 of the Training Information Outline, *see infra* Appendix B, requires that soldiers "[f]ollow all lawful orders of your chain of command regarding use of force." Cf. Headquarters, British Army, Instructions By the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland, para. 1 (Nov. 1971) (copy on file with the CLAMO) ("When troops are operating collectively soldiers will only open fire when ordered to do so by the commander on the spot.").

<sup>292</sup>Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 86.

<sup>293</sup>See, e.g., U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL, INSTRUCTORS' NOTES: JUDGMENTAL FIREARMS TRAINING--SHOOT/DON'T SHOOT (1993) (providing introductory notes for 36 scenarios designed to be replayed on interactive video laser disc); Metro-Dade Police Dep't, Doral Station Field Training Unit, Use of Force/Levels of Resistance Matrix (July 1990) (outlining standards on which to base training); *see also* COMMISSION ON

ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, STANDARDS MANUAL OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY ACCREDITATION PROGRAM, standards 1.3.1 to 1.3.4, 1.3.7, 1.3.9, 1.3.13 (1991).

<sup>294</sup>See *supra* note 82.

<sup>295</sup>See Arnold & Stahl, *supra* note 41, at 24 (a commander's view of ROE management in Somalia); Interview with Lieutenant Colonel John M. Smith, Staff Judge Advocate of the 10th Mountain Div. (Light), in Charlottesville, Va. (Oct. 5, 1993) (describing use of scenarios in training in Somalia); Interview with Captain Karen V. Fair, Former Command Judge Advocate, Joint Task Force Support Command and subsequently United Nations Logistics Support Command, Somalia, in Charlottesville, Va. (Mar. 22, 1994) (describing use of scenarios in Somalia); Sharp Interview, *supra* note 75 (describing use of scenarios in Somalia); Interview with Major Richard M. Whitaker, Former Trial Counsel for 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), in Charlottesville, Va. (Feb. 18, 1994) (describing use of scenario training in Saudi Arabia in 1990). See also Information Paper, Staff Judge Advocate, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), AFZA-JA, subject: Rules of Engagement (20 Sept. 1993) [hereinafter Information Paper] (copy on file with the CLAMO) (enclosing 13 scenarios); Memorandum, Acting Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Armored Division, AETV-THH, to Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Europe & Seventh Army, subject: Lessons Learned from CMTTC--Peace Implementation Operations (28 June 1993) [hereinafter

Memorandum on Peace Implementation Training] (copy on file with the CLAMO) (enclosing 7 scenarios designed to improve understanding of ROE in a hypothetical "peace implementation" mission in Bosnia).

<sup>296</sup>See JOYCE & WEIL, *supra* note 258, at 379 (describing the stage of training at which individuals transfer newly learned skills to more realistic conditions).

<sup>297</sup>See *supra* note 248.

<sup>298</sup>This mindset need not incorporate an understanding of such rarefied distinctions as that between "peacekeeping" and "peace enforcement." See generally *An Agenda For Peace--Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General*, U.N.G.A., 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A 47/277 (1992) (discussing the distinction at length and calling upon member states of the United Nations to assume a permanent legal obligation to make forces and assistance available to the Security Counsel). Although senior officers and judge advocates must understand this distinction, see FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-7 (contrasting the two types of operations as a matter of Army doctrine), soldiers need merely know whether and how the distinction changes the RAMP. Peacekeeping operations, because they presume that antagonistic parties have consented to the presence of U.S. personnel as impartial observers, rarely require leaders to identify hostile forces or specify hostile criteria (Type I) and frequently require them to prescribe scales of force

(Type II) that stress reporting and even withdrawal in lieu of opening fire. Peace enforcement operations, because they involve the restoration of peace between hostile factions that may not have consented to intervention, will frequently require leaders to identify hostility criteria and dispense with measures short of deadly force. Soldiers can learn these differences without getting a brief on the contents and terminology of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's report.

<sup>299</sup>Standing operating procedures (SOPs) are standing orders that "prescribe routine methods to be followed in operations." FM 101-5, STAFF OPERATIONS, *supra* note 11, at 7-2. Doctrine prescribes no rigid format for SOPs, but their doctrinally stated purpose suggests that SOPs could serve as antidotes to the legislative model. FM 101-5, *Staff Operations* elaborates the purpose of an SOP:

[a]n SOP lists procedures that are unique to the organization and is used habitually for accomplishing routine or recurring actions or matters. It facilitates and expedites operations by reducing the number, length, and frequency of other types of orders; by simplifying the preparation and the transmission of other orders; by simplifying training; by promoting understanding and teamwork among the commander, staff, and troops; by advising new arrivals or newly attached units of

procedures followed in the organization; and by reducing confusion and errors.

FM 101-5, STAFF OPERATIONS, *supra* note 11, at 7-3 (emphasis added).

<sup>300</sup>See Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Operations Plan for Operation General Tosta, Appendix 1 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (1986) (establishing a system of three sets of ROE--"Green," "Amber," and "Red"--based on three levels of threat to personnel participating in a training exercise in Honduras); *supra* note 21 (discussing the four alert conditions used in Beirut). Although innovative and commendable in their own right, these forerunners to the ROE alert conditions detailed at Appendix D were fated to fall out of use "because they lacked a stable, baseline set of soldier ROE to which they could attach." Interview with Major Paul DeAgostino, Operational Law Attorney for 101st Airborne Div. (Air Assault) from 1990-91, in Charlottesville, Va. (Feb. 18, 1994). The ROECONs at Appendix D borrow heavily from the 101st Airborne Division system, as well as from AR 525-13, *supra* note 240, at para. 3-6 & App. B and from Nizolak, *supra* note 271, at 35-36 (devising an effective shorthand for Type VI ROE).

<sup>301</sup>See DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 190-14, CARRYING OF FIREARMS AND USE OF FORCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY DUTIES, para. 1-5e (12 Mar. 1993) ("Provisions of this regulation do not apply to [Army] personnel engaged in military operations and subject to authorized rules of

engagement . . . ."); DEP'T OF ARMY, SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATION NO. STP-19-95B1-SM, SOLDIERS' MANUAL, MOS95B, MILITARY POLICE, SKILL LEVEL 1, 2-353 (stating tasks, conditions, and standards for evaluating use of force by police on patrol).

<sup>302</sup>See MARINE BATTLE SKILLS HANDBOOK, *supra* note 80, at 1-9-1 to 1-9-13 (describing duties and organization of the interior guard, including eleven general orders, challenging procedures, and rules for the application of deadly force); DWORKEN, *supra* 15, at 16 (noting occasional confusion by soldiers and Marines over whether to apply the ROE or overlapping manuals and regulations).

<sup>303</sup>See, e.g., U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS & SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL, TEXT E709, ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD 15 (1989).

<sup>304</sup>DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 570-2, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS CRITERIA, para. 10-8 (13 Aug. 1993).

<sup>305</sup>DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 25-101, BATTLE FOCUSED TRAINING 1-8 (16 Apr. 1990) [hereinafter FM 25-101].

<sup>306</sup>*Id.* at i (organizing the manual around the training of a hypothetical battalion task force).

<sup>307</sup>Under Army training doctrine, a mission essential task is "a collective task in which an organization must be proficient to accomplish an appropriate portion of its wartime mission." See FM 25-100, *supra* note 243, at Glossary-5. The METL is a compilation of

such tasks on which a unit focuses training, given that "Army organizations cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every possible training task." *Id.* at 2-1. In a process termed "METL Development," a commander analyzes "war plans" (technically including contingency plans for operations other than war as well as wartime operations plans) and "external directives" (mission training plans (MTPs) published by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), mobilization plans, etc.) to reduce the set of all potential training tasks to a manageable number which, if performed to standard, will permit the unit to accomplish its missions. See *id.* at 2-1 to 213. Examples of mission essential tasks for a light infantry battalion might be "Assault an Objective," see DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, ARTEP 7-20-MTP, MISSION TRAINING PLAN FOR THE INFANTRY BATTALION, Task No. 7-1-1008, at 5-8 (27 Dec. 1988) [hereinafter ARTEP 7-20-MTP], and "Occupy Assembly Area." *Id.*, Task No. 7-1-1001, at 5-8.

<sup>308</sup>Cf. AR 350-41, *supra* note 82, at para. 14-4 (stating that commanders should ensure law of war training "[i]s designed, where appropriate, around current missions and contingency plans (including anticipated geographic areas of deployment or rules of engagement)").

<sup>309</sup> JOPES FORMATS, *supra* note 66.

<sup>310</sup>FM 101-5, STAFF OPERATIONS, *supra* note 11, at 7-5, G-1 to G-157. As a technical matter, the *Joint Operations Planning and Execution*

*System (JOPES)* requires only commanders submitting operations plans (OPLANS) for review directly to the CJCS (e.g., a CINC of a unified command) to prepare those OPLANS in JOPES format. See JOPES FORMATS, *supra* note 66, at I-1. However, "[t]o facilitate communications concerning operation planning," see *id.*, all levels of command prepare OPLANS according to some format. In the Army, this is usually a format standardized by the immediate higher headquarters in general conformance with Appendix G of *FM 101-5, Staff Operations*. The recommendation here is that division commanders should issue OPLANS with ROE annexes in the format specified in Appendix E to this paper (essentially the JOPES format with minor changes to ensure accurate cross-referencing to the remainder of the OPLAN), even though *FM 101-5, Staff Operations* does not specify any particular format for the ROE annex and even though CJCS imposes no requirement that lower levels of command follow JOPES format.

<sup>311</sup>Many portions of an OPLAN other than the ROE annex qualify as directives which delineate "circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and or continue combat engagement." These other forces thus fit the JCS definition of "ROE," the breadth of which is also discussed *supra* page 69 as well as at notes 3, 68, and accompanying text. Indeed, because of the hitherto ill-defined contours of the ROE annex, it is not unusual for Type VI ROE to appear, for instance, in paragraph 3 of the main OPLAN under scheme of fires, see *FM 101-5, STAFF OPERATIONS*, *supra* note

11, at G-15, and in the fire support annex, *see id.* at G-39, as well as in the ROE annex. Similarly, Type VII ROE might appear both in the army aviation annex, *see id.* at G-28, and in the ROE annex, while Type VIII ROE might appear in paragraph 3 of the main OPLAN under both scheme of maneuver and coordinating instructions, *see id.* at G-15, in the airspace management annex, *see id.* at G-26, as well as in the ROE annex. There are many other similar possibilities for such overlap.

The best way to ensure this overlap creates minimum confusion is for drafters of these different portions of the plan to compare their texts before the final document is issued to subordinate units. See Bloodworth, *supra* note 15, at 16-20 (recommending a drafting methodology for division staffs); *see also* U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS COMMAND, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, BOSNIA PREDEPLOYMENT: INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT, Ch. VI (July 1993) [hereinafter BOSNIA PREDEPLOYMENT REPORT] (copy on file with the CLAMO) ("[Department of the Army] should doctrinalize how the ROE drafting and staffing process should be accomplished. The recommended solution is that operational planners should have the primary responsibility, with support from the SJA/Legal Adviser. Staff officers drafting the ROE should be organized as an ROE Working Group."). Also, the ROE annex should be understood to have the dual purposes of *supplementing RAMP and ROECONs and summarizing--with a comprehensive list of cross-references--all rules of Types I to X that appear implicitly or explicitly elsewhere in the OPLAN.* *See Parks, Righting, supra* note 15, at 87 ("While it may be viewed as

academically incorrect by some, integration of [fire control measures] into ROE pragmatically permits ROE to be the single reference point for fire control measures."); Morris, *supra* note 13, at 65 (proposing that "ROE should be the single reference point for the command to find all control restrictions in effect"). See also OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at H-94 ("Particular attention should be paid to the control measures and coordinating instructions in [the OPLAN] annexes. ROE should supplement and explain these control measures."). But cf. *id.* at H-94 ("Phase lines, control points, and other tactical control measures should not be contained in the ROE."); Roach, *supra* note 3, at 52 (stating that ROE "should not cover safety-related restrictions" and that they "should not set forth service doctrine, tactics or procedures, for example, relating to airspace management").

<sup>312</sup>One of the operations other than war cited in note 16, *supra*, a NEO

relocate[s] threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or host nation. These operations may involve U.S. citizens whose lives are in danger but could include selected host nation citizens or third country nationals. NEOs occur in a peaceful, orderly fashion or may require force.

See FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-4 to 13-5. See generally DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 3025.14, PROTECTION AND EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIZENS AND DESIGNATED ALIENS IN DANGER AREAS ABROAD (Nov. 5, 1990) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 3025.14] (defining evacuation for all services and setting general policy); U.S. MARINE CORPS, FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL 8-1, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, ch. 7 (13 Aug. 1974) (describing evacuation operations); Major Steven F. Day, *Legal Considerations in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, XL NAV. L. REV. 45, 59-60 (1992) (providing general description of likely ROE in a NEO).

<sup>313</sup>Nothing in RAMP is inconsistent with what the law requires of soldiers in domestic civil disturbance operations; however, two factors might cause senior leaders to impose strict Type V ROE: first, extreme aversion to the prospect of American troops opening fire on American citizens; second, likely participation in the operation of reserve and national guard troops whose level of training might not ensure appropriate use of force under standing RAMP rules. During military operations in Los Angeles in May of 1992, a joint task force composed of California National Guard as well as active duty Army and Marine Corps units operated under the arming orders detailed at Appendix A, Type V. See International Law Note, *Civil Disturbance Rules of Engagement: Joint Task Force Los Angeles*, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1992, at 30; Interview with Major Brad Page, Operational Law Attorney to Joint Task Force Los Angeles, in Charlottesville, Va. (Feb. 19, 1994). In addition to the arming orders, the ROE for the operation included Type II and Type III

rules consistent with RAMP except that warning shots were disallowed as part of the scale of force. *Id.* Leaders could train and then disseminate similar civil disturbance ROE by reminding soldiers of their obligation under RAMP to obey orders of the chain of command and by modifying the "M-Measure your force" rule to exclude warning shots.

<sup>314</sup>See, e.g., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CIVIL DISTURBANCE PLAN, Annex C, Appendix 1, para. F(1)(F) (15 Feb. 1991) (describing preference for "baseball" grenades of riot control agents (RCA) over bulk-type dispersers in cases in which RCA is necessary to control the disturbance). A soldier trained on RAMP can easily incorporate use of such grenades at the appropriate point in the scale of force specified under a supplemented "M-Measure your force" rule, while units trained to understand ROECONS could readily comprehend a decision to retain RCA approval authority at JTF command level.

<sup>315</sup>A "fragmentary" order (FRAGO), which consists of a brief oral or written message, gives an extract of a more detailed order or changes a previous order. See FM 101-5, STAFF OPERATIONS, *supra* note 11, at 7-2. Of course, a solid base of training in the default rules contained in RAMP and ROECONS is a prerequisite for soldiers to understand FRAGOs. See, e.g., DWORKEN, *supra* note 15, at 19-20 (describing the potential for confusion created by a FRAGO which authorized Army soldiers to use deadly force if necessary to prevent theft of weapons and night vision goggles). But see

Interview with Lieutenant Colonel John M. Smith, *supra* note 295 (describing how scenario training dispelled confusion by clarifying that soldiers were first to use lesser means of force). Effective training on scenarios reinforcing the "M-Measure your force" and "P-Protect with deadly force" rules of RAMP could similarly help prevent FRAGOs from creating confusion. Better still, in addition to a solid base of training in RAMP, the FRAGO itself could be phrased as a supplement to the "P-Protect" rule, thus further reinforcing the soldiers' schema.

<sup>316</sup>This operational security measure would be analogous to the provision for random measures at AR 525-13, *supra* note 240, at para. 3-7. Somewhat unfortunately, the cited paragraph creates the acronym "RAMP" to denote "Random Antiterrorism Measures Program." Because the sequence of rules keyed to "RAMP" in Appendix B of this paper must be preserved to reinforce a single, carefully designed schema, and because combined use of the acronym could create confusion, this paper recommends that the "Random Antiterrorism Measures Program" be renamed to "Implementation of Random Antiterrorism Measures." This alternative title could be abbreviated "IRAM" without any loss of meaning or convenience.

<sup>317</sup>The experience of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1981 illustrates the sort of situation in which a commander may need to create uncertainty in the minds of potential hostile forces by supplementing the soldiers' RAMP. The mission of

UNIFIL was "to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces [from areas occupied by Israel following the 1978 invasion of Lebanon to stem Palestinian infiltrations], restore international peace and security, and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area." S.C. Res. 425, U.N. SCOR, 2074th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (1978). UNIFIL forces included troops from Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, France, Italy, Sweden, and Nepal. See William Claiborne & Jonathan C. Randal, *U.N. Peacekeepers: Caught in Middle of Lebanon's Battleground*, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 17, 1981, at A8. The United Nations ROE included a scale of force and challenging procedure, similar to that in the baseline "M-Measure" rule of RAMP. One observer noted the dangers posed by ROE that are too predictable:

UNIFIL's rules of engagement require a challenge and then a warning shot before a soldier may fire for effect, and then without intent to kill. Both sides [Palestinian guerrillas as well as Lebanese allies of both Palestinian and Israeli forces] have taken advantage of this directed timeliness to humiliate U.N. soldiers and officers by hijacking vehicles and forcing them to return to their units on foot, sometimes without shoes and shirts.

*Id.* An American land force commander facing a similar situation could supplement the "M" rule by, for instance, directing that

warning shots will not be fired as part of the progression of measures a soldier will take when facing potentially hostile forces. Supplements of this kind--if their timing and contents were classified--could create uncertainty for terrorists or harassing forces without sacrificing disciplined operations.

<sup>318</sup>Specifically, if the battalion is, say, light infantry, new items should appear in the T&EOs for at least six battalion tasks in which appropriate use of force under RAMP and ROECONs is particularly important:

Perform Rear Operations	Task No. 7-1-1020
Occupy Assembly Area	Task No. 7-1-1001
Perform Tactical Road March	Task No. 7-1-1002
Consolidate	Task No. 7-1-1027
Establish Lodgement	Task No. 7-1-1033
Perform Stay-Behind Operations	Task No. 7-1-1035

See ARTEP 7-20-MTP, *supra* note 307, at 5-54, 5-8, 5-11, 5-69, 5-97, 5-104. Some T&EOs, such as that for "Perform Rear Operations" already evaluate ROE as a staff planning function. See *id.* at 5-55, para. 2d ("Battalion commander and staff plan for rear battle tasks. Plan contains . . . [r]equirements for training rules of engagement, recognizing allied units, and enforcing civilian control policies.") and as a coordination function, see *id.*, para. 3d ("Battalion prepares and coordinates for rear battle tasks . . .

. [r]outes, boundaries, convoy schedules, identification procedures, frequencies, call signs, obstacles, rules of engagement, and other information are exchanged."). RAMP and ROECONS provide standards against which the unit and individual soldiers could be evaluated directly on decisions to use force.

The T&EOs developed by units themselves--because of the absence of centrally published MTP guidance--should likewise include evaluation of RAMP and ROECONS. See, e.g., Bolger, *supra* note 179, at 28, 31-32 (recommending battalions be trained in evacuation operations, despite lack of formal T&EO, and noting that although "extracting hostages is a [Special Operations Forces] task," nevertheless, "securing and removing potential hostages" often falls to conventional Army units").

<sup>319</sup>See DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, ARTEP 100-2, DIVISION COMMAND GROUP AND STAFF (15 Jun. 1978).

<sup>320</sup>Because Army training doctrine requires commanders to assess training by separately examining each "Battlefield Operating System" (BOS), ROE should be formally integrated into this analytical framework, which includes seven functions: intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and command. See FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 2-12 to 2-15 (describing BOS); FM 25-101, *supra* note 305, at F-3 (depicting how a commander assesses unit training by determining the proficiency of each system's performance of a task before

arriving at an overall assessment of proficiency). Given the close relationship between ROE and the exercise of command, the intuitive BOS function is "command." *But see Arnold & Stahl, supra* note 41, at 14 (describing the addition of a "force protection" operating system, which "included a constant review of the rules of engagement and the building of limited infrastructure in the theater where no infrastructure existed for the support of our soldiers").

<sup>321</sup>See *supra* note 307.

<sup>322</sup>Under Army training doctrine, a "battle task" is a task "which must be accomplished by a subordinate organization if the next higher organization is to accomplish a mission essential task." FM 25-100, *supra* note 243, at Glossary-3.

<sup>323</sup>See FM 25-101, *supra* note 305, at A-9, A-19, A-26, A-33 (providing sample training memoranda issued by division, brigade, and battalion commanders and listing areas of emphasis).

<sup>324</sup>See *id.* at B-5 (describing the role of leader books in training).

<sup>325</sup>See *id.* at C-1 to C-14 (describing the role of FTXs, CPXs, STXs, and other exercises in training). Combat Training Centers have a special role in Army training doctrine. The four centers are the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), centered in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The CTCs are designed to provide

the active and reserve forces with hands-on training in a stressful, near-combat environment. The training is designed to exercise all or portions of the unit's METL. The centers provide realistic integration and portrayal of the joint and combined aspects of war; they train units in [doctrine] to MTP standards. Further, the CTCs focus on those soldier tasks and leadership skills that contribute directly to the success or failure of collective tasks and unit missions.

*Id.* at D-12. While acknowledging the desirability of a standardized individual common task on use of force, observers familiar with training at CMTC and JRTC note that some scenario-based training is already being used in exercises at these centers. See Memorandum on Peace Implementation Training, *supra* note 295, at para. 7 ("Some battalions effectively employed 'ROE rehearsals' in their company and platoon level OPORDER briefs--the deployed JA monitored much of this training. These 'rehearsals' consisted of factual situations or vignettes anticipated from the specific operation."); BOSNIA PREDEPLOYMENT REPORT, *supra* note 311, at Ch. VI (July 1993) ("The interactive scenarios used at CMTC provide the realistic, integrated training required for the implementation of

ROE."); Interview with Captain Kyle Smith, Former Command Judge Advocate to JRTC, in Charlottesville, Va. (Feb. 20, 1994).

<sup>326</sup>Figure 9 depicts the relationship between the triangular structure of ROE recommended in this paper (RAMP, ROECONS and ROE Annexes) and the process by which a commander selects and then trains particular collective and individual tasks.

<sup>327</sup>See FM 25-101, at E-1 to E-5 (describing the role of TADSS in Army training doctrine).

<sup>328</sup>For instance, Firearms Training Systems, Inc., of Norcross, Georgia produces the program for military police discussed *supra* note 293 and accompanying text.

<sup>329</sup>See Interview with Sergeant Sean P. Hayes, Director, Doral Station Field Training Unit, Metro-Dade Police Dep't. (Nov. 1, 1993) (describing use of programs similar to that used by the military police in addition to "role-playing" scenarios involving live actors).

One explanation for the prevalence of innovative training techniques in domestic police forces is the risk of civil liability to which police departments and municipalities are exposed under federal civil rights laws. Although in the aftermath of the trials of police involved in the beating of Rodney King most Americans are familiar with the potential for federal prosecutions against police based on excessive use of force, a lesser known fact is that

municipalities can be liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if an inadequate police training program is linked to the excessive use of force by an individual police officer. See *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). See generally *Zuchel v. City and County of Denver*, 997 F.2d. 730, 739 (10th Cir., 1993) (describing testimony of Mr. James J. Fyfe, an expert on training police to use force appropriately, and noting the inadequacies of Denver's training against Mr. Fyfe's standards); *JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE* 183-84 (1993) (describing ambitious research and training based on guidelines prescribed by experienced street cops). Although the substantive standards on the use of force for domestic police officers are shaped by distinct influences such as the enormous body of law surrounding use of deadly force against fleeing felons, see e.g., *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and although important contrasts between military soldiers and policemen will persist, see *supra* page 83, the parallels are strong enough to merit cross-fertilization of training techniques. See Parks, *Righting*, *supra* note 15, at 86, quoted in note 292, *supra* (making the analogy); Sagan, *supra* note 15, at 443-44 (making the analogy).

<sup>330</sup>The next edition of *FM 101-5, Staff Operations*, *supra* note 11, should include--in its collection of sample annexes--the sample ROE annex at Appendix E of this paper. Also, the Army should educate leaders at all levels in the historical importance of particular ROE case studies included in the training circular recommended in

part V.B *supra*. This process would conform to that part of Army training doctrine known as "leader development." See FM 25-101, *supra* note 305, at 1-13.

<sup>331</sup>This was one of the recommendations that grew out of the Army's symposium--from the 11th to the 15th of October 1993--held to develop input into the ongoing review of the JCS *PROE*. See International Law Note, *supra* note 174, at 49.

<sup>332</sup>See *id.* (noting that symposium participants, which included 18 senior officers and judge advocates, "decided to keep the JCS Standing ROE at the general level, and to leave the mission-specific ("down in the weeds") ROE to corps, divisions, and lower level units").

<sup>333</sup>See generally Memorandum, Major Marc L. Warren to Director of the Academic Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, subject: JCS Rules of Engagement (ROE) Conference--After Action Report (22 Feb. 1994) (recording unclassified summaries of the recommendations of the conference held at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, from 26 through 28 January 1994) (also noting that all services concurred in recommending the change in name from *Peacetime ROE* to *Standing ROE*).

<sup>334</sup>See, e.g., sources cited in note 178 *supra*. Echoes of this view in portions of official doctrine are muted but distinct. See FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-8 ("The Army organizes, trains,

and equips to fight and win the nation's wars. This remains its primary mission. The leadership, organization, equipment, discipline, and skills gained in training for war are also of use to the government in operations other than war."); Draft FM 100-23, *supra* note 233, at F-3 ("The entire chain of command must develop a different mind set [for peace operations] than for warfighting. A force involved in peacekeeping quickly loses its fighting edge and is usually not suited for transition to peace enforcement operations."). But see FM 100-5, OPERATIONS, *supra* note 9, at 13-2 (acknowledging that the "operations other than war environment is a complex one that will require disciplined, versatile Army forces to respond to different situations, including transitioning rapidly from operations other than war to wartime operations"); Draft FM 100-23, *supra* note 233, at F-4 ("Many of the skills that enable a unit to accomplish its primary [wartime] mission are applicable in peace operations."); Army Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, "Strawman" Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Enforcement, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, Joint/Combined Interagency Operations II-9 to II-10 (21 Dec. 1992).

<sup>335</sup>See, e.g., Arnold & Stahl, *supra* note 41, at 22 (recommending that "predeployment training should include situational training exercises focusing on rules of engagement for all forces to be deployed") (emphasis added). One of the most important benefits of scenario-based training on RAMP in the normal training cycle is that commanders will have less need to resort to Type V ROE (arming

orders), which create the risk that because the soldier is carrying an unloaded weapon, he will be unable to defend himself even in cases where he has no mental reservations or "mind-set" problems about firing.

<sup>336</sup>"Ramp," when used as a verb, can mean "to rise or fall to a higher or lower level." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philip B. Gove ed., 1969) (4th verb definition). When used as a noun, it can denote a sloping walk "leading from one level to another." *Id.* (3rd noun definition). In the process of assisting soldiers to "develop adequate schemas," see *supra* note 258 and accompanying text, these widely understood connotations of "RAMP" can help impart the versatile mind set required to achieve both initiative and restraint. See generally JOYCE & WEIL, *supra* note 258, at 99-100 (discussing the value of associations and images in memory).

<sup>337</sup>This is not to imply criticism of commanders or judge advocates, many of whom have been working heroically to create order out of chaos and to ensure that soldiers on the ground receive clear and simple guidance. As discussed in part III *supra*, the legislative model has persisted because it permits commanders to create different rules in different circumstances. There are important contrasts between a peacekeeping mission, which stresses observing and reporting by forces carrying a limited arsenal, and an evacuation mission, which may require anticipatory use of force by

a fully armed joint task force within limits carefully drawn by diplomats. Inevitably, the ROE will need to reflect these differences in mission.

The challenge is to create a system for imparting ROE that allows for adaptation to different circumstances while standardizing the basic rules and features that can apply even to vastly different military missions. The desired balance is not unlike that which one commentator attributes to German tactical doctrine during World War I:

The German doctrine achieved the balance between the demands of precision for unity of effort and the demands of flexibility for decentralized application. With clearly stated principles, the doctrine provided thorough, consistent guidance for the training, equipping, and organizing of the army. However, this consistency was not rigid, for in its battlefield application, the doctrine provided sufficient flexibility to accommodate the demands of local conditions and the judgment of several commanders.

TIMOTHY T. LUPFER, COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE, LEAVENWORTH PAPER NO. 4, THE DYNAMICS OF DOCTRINE: THE CHANGES IN GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 55 (1981).

<sup>338</sup>See note 320, *supra*.

<sup>339</sup> See note 248 *supra*.

<sup>340</sup> See, e.g., Memorandum, Mr. Marrock Goulding, Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping, United Nations, New York, to Force Commander, United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), Zagreb, Croatia, subject: United Nations Rules of Engagement: Statements to the Media (20 Jan. 1993) (strongly disagreeing with 15 January 1993 statement by former U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick in the *International Herald Tribune* that "returning fire is not permitted under UN rules of engagement except to save your own life"); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Empowering the United Nations*, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter, 1992-93, at 89, 91 ("Existing rules of engagement allow [U.N. soldiers to open fire] if armed persons attempt by force to prevent them from carrying out their orders."); DWORKEN, *supra* note 15, at ("Most militaries from smaller countries do not place as much emphasis--or thought--on ROE as the United States does, and are therefore willing to defer to the United States on this matter."). But cf. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: A MANDATE FOR CHANGE 17-18 (1993) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT ON REFORM OF PEACEKEEPING] (commenting that "different nationalities interpret differently self-defense" and noting recent examples in which Canadian, British, Spanish, as well as U.S. commanders in U.N. operations have taken "muscular" views of ROE); JOINT PUB. 3-0, *supra* note 16, 27, at VI-6 ("Complete consensus or standardization of ROE may not be achievable because of individual national values and

operational employment concepts."). The proposal of this paper is not that the military forces of other nations in a coalition use RAMP and ROECONS, but rather that these devices form a stable medium by which U.S. forces receive and communicate the ROE agreed upon between coalition partners.

No such stable medium for communicating ROE exists within U.N. institutions or practices. One recent study of U.N. field missions included that

[r]ules of engagement are unclear both to the peacekeepers and the local people. The ambiguity of the situations most peacekeepers find themselves in civil conflicts [sic] results in different peacekeepers interpreting differently their rules of engagement. The effect of widely differing interpretations weakens support for the overall mission.

STAFF REPORT ON REFORM OF PEACEKEEPING, *supra*, at 19. Thus, RAMP and ROECONS would displace no pre-ordained system. Nor could they possibly increase the potential for different interpretations between nations.

<sup>341</sup>See International Law Note, *supra* note 174, at 49 (summarizing different orientations of the services with the observation that "[t]he Navy and Air Force 'man their equipment;' the Army 'equips its men.'").

<sup>342</sup>See JOINT PUB. 3-0, *supra* note 16, 27, at V-1 to V-16 (describing "Operations Other Than War" with frequent verbatim passages from FM 100-5, *Operations*, which predated its publication by about two months).

<sup>343</sup>Figure 10 depicts parts II through V of this paper within the circular chart introduced at Figure 1 *supra*.

<sup>344</sup>See Winter, *supra* note 17, at 21-24.

<sup>345</sup>See Schachter, *supra* note 21, at 6, quoted in Winter, *supra* note 17, at 26.

<sup>346</sup>See Winter, *supra* note 17, at 31-32.

<sup>347</sup>See Winter, *supra* note 17, at 29-30.

<sup>348</sup>Today the term is formally identified with an Army program designed to ensure that judge advocates are "aggressive and innovative in disseminating information to soldiers and their families that is responsive to potential legal problems and issues," DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-3, THE ARMY LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, para. 3-3b (30 Sept. 1992) (tasking supervising attorneys to ensure that preventive law services "are provided by attorneys performing legal assistance duties, as well as by others under their supervision) (emphasis added), but the term was being applied to international law attorneys more than a decade ago. See, e.g.,

William H. Parks, *The Law of War Adviser*, 31 JAG J. 1, 19 (1980) [hereinafter Parks, *Law of War Adviser*].

<sup>349</sup>See, e.g., OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at 7-8 (describing the operational lawyer's functions); *Operational Law (OPLAW)--A Concept Comes of Age*, ARMY LAW., July 1987, at 9 (tracing the genesis of OPLAW to U.S. Military activities in Grenada); Steven Keeva, *Lawyers in the War Room*, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 52, 55-56 (charting the development of operational law). The counselor role presumes a post-legal realist view of the law and is therefore relatively modern. See, e.g., Tipson, *supra* note 11, at 569. However, well before the coining of the term "OPLAW," military attorneys practicing international law identified the importance of the counselor role. See, e.g., James A. Burger, *International Law--The Role of the Legal Adviser, and Law of War Instruction*, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1978, at 22, 24; Elliott, *supra* note 4, at 18; Parks, *Law of War Adviser*, *supra* note 348, at 18-24.

<sup>350</sup>Preparedness to answer such questions implies that the judge advocate will know basic characteristics of U.S. and common foreign-made weapons, such as maximum effective range, rate of fire, kill radius, etc. and that he or she will be able to estimate distances with some accuracy. The attorney who does not know that a well-aimed infantry assault rifle can easily kill a target at 300 meters is ill-prepared to advise a soldier as to whether the aiming of such a rifle constitutes "hostile intent." Fortunately,

excellent training publications and materials on these subjects are available. See, e.g., OP. LAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 15, at Mc-5 to Mc-7; U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS AND SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL, TEXT E614, SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT (1989); U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, FORCES/CAPABILITIES HANDBOOK, VOLUME II, WEAPONS SYSTEMS (1988).

# FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TYPE	PURPOSE	EXAMPLE	RISKS	REFERENCES
<b>TYPE I HOSTILITY CRITERIA</b>	Provide those making decisions whether to fire with a set of objective factors to assist in determining whether a potential assailant exhibits hostile intent and thus clarify whether shots can be fired before receiving fire.	"Hostile intent of opposing forces can be determined by unit leaders or individual soldiers if their leaders are not present. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against U.S. Forces or other persons in those areas under the control of U.S. Forces. Factors you may consider include: (a) weapons: are they present? what types? (b) size of opposing force (c) If weapons are present, the manner in which they are being displayed; that is, are they being aimed? Are the weapons part of a firing position? (d) how did the opposing force respond to U.S. Forces? (e) how does the opposing force act toward unarmed civilians? (f) other aggressive actions." Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Operations Plan for Restore Hope, Annex N, at para. 3b(c)(1) (1993).	Restraint may suffer if soldiers regard as a checklist which enables automatic decision to fire.	See, e.g., Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment, Operations Plan for TF 6-502 Deployment to Macedonia para. 5 (1993) (ROE Card); S.L.D.P. O'Connell, <u>The Influence of the Law on Sea Power</u> 62 (1975) (suggesting that ROE might authorize a "hostile" designation "when the potential attacker's radar guidance system has 'locked on' to target, supposing that the missile is 'beam-riding'"); George Burn, <u>International Law and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?</u> Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, at 69, 75 (stating that "ROE may provide detailed criteria for an on-scene commander's decision whether an attack on his unit is so imminent as to justify shooting first in self-defense").
<b>TYPE II SCALE OF FORCE/ CHALLENGE PROCEDURE</b>	Specify a graduated show of force that ground troops must use in ambiguous situations before resorting to deadly force. Include such measure as giving a verbal warning, using a riot stick, perhaps firing a warning shot, or firing a shot intended to wound. May place limits on the pursuit of an attacker.	"Patrols may use deadly force if fired upon or if they encounter opposing forces which evidence a hostile intent. Nondeadly force should be used if the security of U.S. Forces is not compromised by doing so. A graduated show of force includes: (a) an order to disband or disperse; (b) show of force/threat of force by U.S. Forces that is greater than the force threatened by the opposing force; (c) warning shots aimed to prevent harm to either innocent civilians or nondeadly force; (d) other means of nondeadly force; (e) if this show of force does not cause the opposing force to abandon its hostile intent, consider if deadly force is appropriate." Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Operations Plan for Restore Hope, Annex N at para. 3c(3) (1993).	Initiative may suffer if soldiers feel the need to progress sequentially through the measures on the scale.	See, e.g., Department of Defense, Civil Disturbance Plan: Garden Plot, Appendix 1 (Alen Orden) to Annex C (Concept of the Operation), at para. F1(V)(C)9 (15 Feb. 1993); S.I. Marine Corps Institute, Marine Battle Skills Training Handbook, Book 1: EVT-GSGT, General Military Subchapter at 1-9-11 (1993) (describing the "escalation of force"); Dept'l of Army, Regulation 180-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, para. 3-29 (12 Mar. 1988) (describing gradations of force).
<b>TYPE III PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AND FOREIGN NATIONALS</b>	Detail what and whom may be defended with force aside from the lives of United States soldiers and citizens; may include measures to be taken to prevent crimes in progress or the fleeing of criminals. May place limits on pursuit of attacker.	"You may use force in self defense in response to attacks or threats of imminent attack against US or host nation forces, citizens, property, or commercial assets." Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Operation Desert Shield (1990) (soldier card).	Restraint may suffer if soldiers view as license to resort directly to deadly force in protection of threatened object or person.	See, e.g., Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Operations Plan for Restore Hope, Annex N at para. 3c(3) (1993) ("Patrols are authorized to protect relief supplies, U.S. Forces, and other persons in those areas under the control of U.S. Forces."); S.I. Memorandum, Mr. Matrook Goudium, Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping, United Nations, New York to Force Commander, United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR), Zagreb, Croatia, subject: United Nations Rules of Engagement: Statements to the Media (20 Jan. 1993) ("For a soldier, self defence) always includes defending his comrades and any persons entrusted in his care, as well as defending his post, convoy, vehicle, or rifle.");

# FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

**TYPE**      **PURPOSE**      **EXAMPLE**      **RISKS**      **REFERENCES**

## TYPE IV WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS/ ALERT CONDITIONS

Announce, for air defense assets, a posture for resolving doubts over whether to engage. Announce, for units observing alert conditions, a series of measures designed to adjust unit readiness for attack to the level of the perceived threat. The measures may include same or all of the other functional types of rules.

"The Task Force Commander will order into effect Rules of Engagement based upon the following three levels of threat to exercise personnel: (1) ROE GREEN... when no credible threat of attack against US or host country personnel or facilities exists. . . . (2) ROE AMBER [upon a determination that a credible threat to US forces within the country of [host nation] exists . . . (3) ROE RED [upon actual attack of US forces [or as otherwise deemed appropriate by the Commander . . . Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, Operations Plan for Operation General Tosta, Appendix 1 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (1985) (listing specific measures for each status at separate tabs).

## TYPE V ARMING ORDERS

Dictate which soldiers in the force are armed and which have live ammunition. Specify which precise orders given by whom will permit the loading and charging of firearms.

AO	Rifle	Bayonet	Ammunition Control Mag/Chamber
1	Sling	Scabbard In Pouch/	OIC/ NCOIC
		Empty	OIC/ NCOIC
2	Port	Scabbard In Pouch/	OIC/ NCOIC
		Empty	OIC/ NCOIC
3	Sling	Fixed In Pouch/	OIC/ NCOIC
		Empty	OIC/ NCOIC
4	Port	Fixed In Pouch/	OIC/ NCOIC
		Empty	OIC/ NCOIC
5	Port	Fixed In Weapon/	OIC/ NCOIC
		Empty	OIC/ NCOIC
6	Port	Fixed In Weapon/ Locked/LD	OIC

Headquarters, Joint Task Force Los Angeles, Operations Plan for Civil Disturbance Operation, para. C (2 May 1992) (scabard status omitted).

## TYPE VI APPROVAL TO USE WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Approving Commander	RCA	Demo	PA	UA	FASCAM
JCS					
CINCPAC					
JTF	X				
Corps					X
Div			X		
Bde				X	
Bn			X		
Co					

Headquarters, 25th Inf. Div. (Light), Operations Order 91-1, Rules of Engagement (5 Mar 1991) (certain weapons systems omitted).

See, e.g., Dept of Army, Field Manual 44-3, Air Defense Artillery Employment...Chubatral/Yucatan (15 June 1984) (describing weapons control statuses—"weapons free," "weapon tight," "weapons hold"); cl. Dep't of Army, Regulation 525-13, The Army Combating Terrorism Program, para. 3-6 & Appendix B (establishing "THREATCON" system); Daniel P. Bolger, Americans At War 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace (1986) (describing alert conditions used by Marines in Beirut in 1983); D.P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power 178 (1975) ("while detailed rules of engagement cannot easily be promulgated to cover every type of situation, it is possible to envisage general rules which can be applied to any one of three broad situations, namely low tension, high tension, and hostility.");

See, e.g., Memorandum, Commander, Joint Task Force Panama, JTF-PM CO, subject: Weapons Safety (19 Jan. 1990); Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Operations Plan for Operation General Tosta, Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C (Rules of Engagement) (1986) (stating that personnel other than military police will "retain loaded magazines in their ammunition pouches, pouches will be on stand, chambers will be empty"); cl. Dep't of Army, Regulation 180-14, Careless of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, para. 2-7 (12 Mar. 1983) (prohibiting certain persons from carrying firearms); Headquarters, United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), Zagreb, Croatia, Force Commander Directive 01/92, Rules of Engagement (19 July 1993) (classified "UN RESTRICTED").

See, e.g., Headquarters, Joint Task Force South, Operations Order 90-2, ROE Card, para. F ("all civilians are in the area, do not use artillery, mortars, armed helicopters, AC 130, tube or rocket launched weapons, or M-19 main guns against known or suspected targets without the permission of a ground maneuver Commander LTC or higher (for any of these weapons).")


# FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TYPE	PURPOSE	EXAMPLE	RISKS	REFERENCES
<b>TYPE VII EYES ON TARGET</b>	Require that the object of fire be observed by one or more human or electronic means.	"Surface Weapons. This subparagraph applies to the conduct of fire in both low and mid intensity combat operations to include the employment of indirect and direct fire surface weapons and naval gunfire. . . Every effort will be made to observe fires regardless of the target location." Headquarters, I (US) Corps, Operations Plan 5-86 (Celtic Cross IV), Annex T, para. 3b (1986).	Initiative may suffer if redundant eyes on target are required.	See, e.g., Headquarters, Americal Division, Reg. 525-4, Combat Operations; Rules of Engagement, para. 3g, 5b (16 Mar. 1986) (defining "observed fire" as [e]mployment of fire support under the direct observation and control of an artillery forward/air observer, FAC, or other competent individual," and detailing circumstances in which indirect fire must be observed); Cf. W. Hays Parks, <i>Blaithna: The Rules of Engagement</i> , U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1986, 83, 89 (reporting that in the 1986 U.S. air strike against Libya, all target acquisition systems of the F-111F aircraft had to be operable in order to bomb).
<b>TYPE VIII TERRITORIAL OR GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS</b>	Create geographic zones or areas into which forces may not fire. May designate a territorial-boundary, beyond which forces may neither fire nor enter except perhaps in hot pursuit of an attacking force. Include tactical control measures that coordinate fire and maneuver by means of graphic illustrations on operations map overlays, such as coordinated fire lines, axes of advance, and direction of attack.	"You are not permitted to enter the land, sea, or airspace of other countries--besides the host nation." Headquarters, XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Operation Desert Shield, para. C (1990).	Units may be unable to defend themselves adequately if entering area is only way to suppress continued attack.	See, e.g., Dept'l of Army, <i>Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols</i> (21 Oct. 1985) (defining "tactical control measures," "coordinated fire lines," "axes of advance," and "direction of attack."); Headquarters, Americal Division, Reg. 525-4, Combat Operations; Rules of Engagement, paras. 3c-e (16 Mar. 1986) (defining specified strike zones, fire fire zones, and no fire zones)..
<b>TYPE IX RESTRICTIONS ON MANPOWER</b>	Prescribe numbers and types of soldiers to be committed to a theater or area of operations. Perhaps prohibit use of U.S. manpower in politically or diplomatically sensitive personnel assignments requiring allied Manning.	"[The U.S. Army armed UH-1 (Iroquois) Helicopter], when employed on combat support missions, will be U.S. marked and manned with a combined U.S. and Vietnamese crew." Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Directive No. 62 (24 Nov. 1962).	Positions may be manned for other than purposes of military effectiveness.	See, e.g., Major General S.L. Arnold & Major David T. Stahl, <i>A Power Protection Army In Operations Other Than War Parameters</i> , Winter 1993-94, at 4, 11 (discussing force caps).

# FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TYPE	PURPOSE	EXAMPLE	RISKS	REFERENCES
<b>TYPE X RESTRICTIONS ON POINT TARGETS AND MEANS OF WARFARE</b>	Prohibit targeting of certain individuals or facilities. May restate basic rules of the Law of War for situations in which a hostile force is identified and prolong armed conflict ensues.	"Hospitals, Churches, Shrines, Schools, Museums, and any other historical or cultural site will not be engaged except in self defense." Headquarters, Joint Task Force South, Operations Order 90-2, ROE Card, para. L.	Restating the Law of War clutter the message on mission specific rules.	See generally, Dept of Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (16 July 1986) (C1, 15 July 1976) (detailing numerous restrictions contained in pertinent conventions).

LOCATION OF FUNCTIONAL TYPES WITHIN THE INSTRUMENTS RECOMMENDED IN THIS PAPER:



**USE FORCE APPROPRIATELY**  
181-906-1506

**CONDITIONS**

Given a noncombat but potentially hostile situation in which your unit is deployed to promote stability, provide humane assistance to distressed areas, assist civil authorities, or protect United States interests.

**STANDARDS**

1. Defend yourself and members of your unit with initiative.
2. Apply all levels of force only when necessary.
3. Apply an amount of force proportionate to each threat encountered.
4. Transition appropriately to a combat situation when ordered to do so by your chain of command.

**TRAINING AND EVALUATION**

**Training Information Outline**

1. Follow all lawful orders of your chain of command regarding use of force. Follow the four standing rules stated in the next paragraph in the absence of more specific guidance. The four rules interlock; do not apply one rule to the exclusion of the others. Your chain of command may supplement one or more of these rules to permit accomplishment of a mission. In such a case, these rules should guide your judgment only to the extent that they do not conflict with the instructions of your chain of command.
2. When facing a potential threat, exercise initiative as well as restraint. Any weapons fire must be disciplined and aimed, while also effective in achieving self-defense. When encountering a potential threat, remember R-A-M-P. That key word will help you respond in a way that protects lives, supports the mission, and complies with the law.

**R**eturn fire with aimed fire. Return force with force.  
You always have the right to repel hostile acts with necessary force.

**A**nticipate attack. Use force first if, but only if, you see clear indicators of hostile intent.

**M**easure the amount of force that you use, if time and circumstances permit. Use only the amount of force

necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission.

**P**rotect with deadly force only human life, and property designated by your commander. Stop short of deadly force when protecting other property.

3. "R-Return Fire" means that if you have been fired upon or otherwise attacked, you may do what you must in order to protect yourself. This is the core of the right to self-defense, which is never denied.

4. "A-Anticipate Attack" means that self-defense is not limited to returning fire. Soldiers do not have to take the first shot before using force to protect themselves and other lives.

a. When soldiers initiate the use of force to defend themselves they use what is known as "anticipatory" or "preemptive" force. During noncombat operations, unless ordered otherwise, you must use anticipatory or preemptive force only when you face an imminent threat of attack and can identify or describe to yourself certain clear indicators of hostile intent.

b. Determine whether someone's intentions are hostile by considering the same factors you use when reporting enemy information to your leader under the SALUTE format (CT 071-331-0803).

Size -	How many individuals are you facing?
Activity -	What is he doing? Pointing a weapon?
Location -	Is he within small arms range? In a prepared firing position? Has he entered a restricted area?
Unit -	Is he wearing a uniform? Part of an organized armed force?
Time -	How soon before he is upon you?
Equipment -	Is he armed? With what? What is the range and lethality of his weapon?

c. Do not base anticipatory force on a mere hunch that the person is hostile. On the other hand, if your commander informs you that a particular fighting force has been designated by higher headquarters as "hostile," or as "the enemy," you may shoot that force or its equipment upon sight without identifying indicators of hostile intent.

5. "M-Measure Your Force" means that if you have a moment to choose your method, you must do so.

a. As a soldier--a professional in the use of force--you are expected to adjust the intensity, magnitude, and duration of your force to fit the scale of threat that you face. Excessive force endangers innocent lives and hinders mission

accomplishment.

b. If possible, apply a graduated escalation of force, particularly when facing civilian crowds that appear to be unarmed, but also unfriendly. In handling potentially hostile situations, use one or more of the actions in V-E-W-P-R-I-K:

Verbal warning.	Tell person(s), in their language, to disperse, stay away, or halt.
Exhibit weapon.	Show your weapon or use some other display that you have superior force at your disposal.
Warning shot.	Shoot a warning shot, if authorized.
Pepper spray.	Spray cayenne pepper spray, if authorized and available and the individual is close enough.
Riot stick.	Strike with riot stick, if authorized and available and if the individual is close enough. Poke fleshy parts of the body first, arms and legs next, and, if necessary, escalate to striking the head.
Injure with fire.	Shoot to wound.
Kill with fire.	Shoot to kill.

6. "P-Protect With Deadly Force" means that you must defend more than your own personal safety, but it also means you may use deadly force only in limited circumstances. Your commander may designate that certain sensitive or mission-essential facilities be protected with deadly force. On other occasions, your commander may designate that no property receive this maximum level of protection. This might be the case when your unit is operating in a host nation the laws of which restrict the use of deadly force only to protect life.

7. These four rules operate as an up-ramp when conditions grow more hostile and the situation develops into combat.

a. R-A-M-P states the rules by which you increase your level of force to meet the threat.

b. R-A-M-P also guides your use of force in many situations during war. During war, you attack combat targets according to the Law of War (CT 181-906-1505) whether or not you are in imminent danger from the enemy; however, R-A-M-P remains your guide on the use of force when dealing with civilians and prisoners.

8. These rules operate as a down-ramp when combat conditions cool down into an operation other than war and use of force must become more restrained.

9. Your commander will be complying with rules of engagement

from higher headquarters. These rules of engagement will be in the form of ROE Conditions (ROECONs) and ROE Annexes to operations orders. These rules of engagement may impact on the way individual soldiers use force. If so, your commander will translate guidance to you in terms of "R-A-M-P," and will "walk you up" each of the RAMP rules to clarify how to use force appropriately in the situations you will face.

#### Evaluation Preparation

**Setup:** Soldiers should be individually tested for this task. The evaluator briefs the soldier on the simulated noncombat situation, providing information on the mission, the potential threat, the soldier's location in relation to other troops in the unit, and the terrain. The soldier is then questioned as to his recognition and actions on the performance measures. The most realistic training of this task is to include rules of engagement and use of force problems in Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP) and field training exercises (FTX). The problems should require skill level 1 soldier recognition and action.

**Brief Soldier:** Tell the soldier that he or she is deployed in a simulated noncombat but potentially hostile environment. The soldier may be on guard duty, riding in a convoy, or walking to his cot from the mess tent. The soldier may be confronted with a variety of threats from armed and unarmed individuals and vehicles. The soldier will be asked to describe what actions he or she should take. If available, use TC 27-10-4, Selected Problems in Rules of Engagement, to create scenarios for the soldier. At some point, modify the soldier's R-A-M-P such that an identified enemy force has been designated a "hostile force" by higher headquarters. Enemy soldiers may appear on the battlefield, surrender, or be sick or wounded. If available, use TC 27-10-1, Selected Problems in the Law of War, to create wartime scenarios for the soldier. The soldier will be asked to describe what actions he or she should take.

**Evaluation Guide:** 181-906-1506

#### USE FORCE APPROPRIATELY

Performance Measures	Results	
1. Returns fire from a hostile force with aimed fire.	P	F
2. Identifies clear demonstrations of hostile intent using the SALUTE factors. Anticipates attack by firing first.	P	F

3. Identifies situation where hostile intent is unclear using the SALUTE factors. Holds fire while maintaining or seeking a secure position. P F
4. Responds with measured force when confronted with a potentially hostile force. Uses the scale of V-E-W-P-R-I-K measures. P F
5. Omits lower level V-E-W-P-R-I-K measures if the threat quickly grows deadly (i.e., civilian pulls grenade out from underneath clothing and prepares to throw). P F
6. Declines to use deadly force when piece of property is snatched (i.e., sunglasses). P F
7. Uses deadly force, if indicated, to protect comrades and persons under U.S. control. P F
8. Uses deadly force, if indicated, to protect key property designated by commander (i.e., U.S. aircraft). P F
9. When told that a force has been designated a "hostile force," fires aimed shots at members of hostile force whether or not they show hostile intent. P F
10. When told that a force has been designated a "hostile force," continues to use "RAMP" when encountering civilians, prisoners, and casualties. P F
11. When told that attacks of a particular kind have been reported against U.S. or P F

coalition forces in the area (e.g., hand grenades delivered by civilians, car bomb attacks, molotov cocktails), considers these potential threats when looking for indicators of hostile intent.

12. Seeks clarification in terms of RAMP when given instructions on use of force that do not fit the RAMP format.

P F

#### **Feedback**

Score the soldier GO if all steps are passed. Score the soldier NO-GO if any steps are failed. If the soldier scores NO-GO, show what was done wrong and how to do it correctly.

#### **References**

TC 27-10-4

**CASE STUDY 1**  
**RETURNING FIRE**  
**DEFENDING AGAINST HOSTILE ACTS**

**SITUATION:** A soldier is walking from the mess facility to his sleeping tent after the dinner meal. His route takes him near the perimeter of his Brigade Support Area, which is marked by single-strand concertina wire and a protective berm of earth. The soldier's unit is deployed on the outskirts of the capital city in a small island country. Two days ago the U.S. Ambassador determined that American citizens present in the country were in danger due to political instability. At the request of the Ambassador and the invitation of the prime minister of the country, the President ordered military forces to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation. In twelve hours, the soldier's company will deploy by helicopter to a marshalling area in the interior of the country to collect Americans residing there. His immediate mission is to rest up for the hard work ahead. He is armed with an M-16A2 rifle. In accordance with his commander's orders, the rifle is not loaded, but the soldier's ammunition pouches contain four magazines full of ammunition. The commander has ordered that the standing "R-A-M-P" rules of force are in effect. Thus far the presence of American military forces in the country has resulted in no hostile response by any of the police forces supporting an anti-American political faction. Although the soldier is walking alone, there are several fellow soldiers within fifty meters of him. Because the engineer platoon has not yet completed building the protective berm, there are numerous areas along the perimeter that provide no cover from potential small arms fire.

**EVENT:** As the soldier passes near the perimeter, he looks to the left and sees a sniper about 150 meters away aiming a weapon toward him. The sniper fires, and a round hits the earth a few feet away. The sniper is visible, only partially obscured by vegetation, and is about 100 meters from three civilian women who were talking to each other when the first shot came. The sniper is taking aim again at the soldier or at one of the other Americans in the area.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** The key rule here is to RETURN FIRE with aimed fire. The standing R-A-M-P rules allow soldiers to defend themselves against attacks. Here, the sniper clearly attacked the soldier and U.S. forces by firing a deadly weapon. The soldier can return fire with aimed shots to defend himself and his unit, while reporting the incident to his chain of command so that other measures can be taken to eliminate the threat. Each of the other R-A-M-P rules would support a decision by the soldier to return fire. If soldiers see clear indicators of hostile intent, they may ANTICIPATE ATTACK and use force first; this rule was immediately satisfied when the sniper committed a

hostile act (and thus showed hostile intent) by attacking the security guards with aimed fire. No analysis of the S-A-L-U-T-E factors is necessary to determine hostile intent. Soldiers must MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat, if time and circumstances permit. Under these circumstances, aimed shots fired back at a sniper constitute force that is properly adjusted in magnitude, intensity, and duration to the threat. Given the closeness of innocent civilians, the soldier's commander would violate this rule if, for instance, he requested indirect mortar fire in the vicinity of the sniper. Again, because the soldier already has used deadly force, no progression through a scale of force (verbal warning, warning shot, etc.) is necessary. The rule permitting soldiers to PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE supports a decision to fire because the lives of U.S. soldiers are in the direct line of the sniper's fire.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To find cover and concealment, place a magazine into the rifle, chamber a round, and fire aimed shots at the sniper.

**REFERENCES:** SMCT 181-906-1506; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 200-202 (1988).

**CASE STUDY 2**  
**ANTICIPATING ATTACK**  
**RESPONDING WITH FORCE TO A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF HOSTILE INTENT**

**SITUATION:** A soldier stands guard in the early morning at a post outside his battalion compound. The compound is set in a series of buildings near a large airport. His unit's mission is to maintain peace in the capital city of a country where instability and civil war threaten U.S. interests. The soldier's mission is to safeguard the perimeter of the compound, where nearly 300 soldiers are now sleeping. The soldier is armed with his M-16A2 rifle. In accordance with his guard instructions, the rifle is not loaded, but one of the soldier's ammunition pouches contains a magazine with 10 rounds of ammunition. The commander has ordered that the standing "R-A-M-P" rules of force are in effect. Six months ago, a terrorist killed 17 U.S. citizens and destroyed the U.S. embassy in the city by driving a truck loaded with explosives into the building. The area surrounding the compound contains individuals bearing small arms as well as rival factions armed with mortars and machine guns. In recent days, U.S. soldiers have been occasional targets of these weapons, though higher headquarters has not officially designated any forces as hostile. There is a parking lot outside the concertina wire marking the perimeter of the compound. This lot is in the soldier's sector of responsibility. Another soldier mans a post along the same portion of the perimeter 150 meters from you.

**EVENT:** Suddenly, a yellow truck that has circled the empty lot twice gathers speed, crashes through the concertina wire barrier, and barrels toward the main building of the compound. Within seconds it will be at the main building.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** The key rule here is to ANTICIPATE ATTACK on the main building. Even when only the standing R-A-M-P rules are in effect, soldiers can fire their weapons before receiving fire, if they see clear indicators of hostile intent. Here the soldier can conclude that the truck driver's intentions are hostile because the S-A-L-U-T-E factors support that conclusion. Note the driver's activity (he has crashed a concertina barrier after circling the lot and gathering speed), the location (within a restricted compound), the time factor (only seconds before the truck reaches hundreds of U.S. soldiers), and equipment (a truck bombing recently occurred nearby). Each of the other R-A-M-P rules supports a decision to fire at the truck driver. Soldiers can RETURN FIRE with fire, and respond to hostile acts with necessary force. They must MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat, if time and circumstances permit. Under these circumstances, aimed shots at the truck driver are the correct measure of force to protect lives and accomplish the mission. Given the lack of time available, the soldier should not attempt lesser measures along the graduated scale of force

(verbal warning, etc.). Finally, the soldier can fire his rifle, the only lethal weapon available, because soldiers can PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To place the magazine into the weapon, chamber a round, and fire at the driver of the truck.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** This problem is patterned after a terrorist attack that claimed the lives of 241 marines in Beirut, Lebanon on 23 October 1983. The Department of Defense Commission that investigated the incident concluded that several factors detracted from the security posture of U.S. forces on that date. One factor was a "mind-set" encouraged by the rules of engagement. The rules, as disseminated by the chain of command, left marines with doubts about whether they could initiate fire under extremely threatening circumstance, such as those described above.

**REFERENCES:** SMCT 181-906-1506; DEPT. OF DEFENSE, REP'T OF THE COMM'N ON THE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TERRORIST ACT 67-103 (1983); DANIEL P. BOLGER, AMERICANS AT WAR: 1975-1986, AN ERA OF VIOLENT PEACE 242-254 (1988).

**CASE STUDY 3  
MEASURING FORCE  
USING FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION**

**SITUATION:** A platoon has formed a hasty perimeter in a small village. The platoon leader is talking with one of the villagers through an interpreter. U.S. forces are deployed in a flat, hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been frustrating these efforts for months and have even fired upon U.S. soldiers several times over the past few days. The mission of the platoon is to search the village and seize weapons and munitions that were sighted there the night before, when a firefight among rival bands had taken place. If necessary, the platoon also has the mission of disarming members of any of the bands found in the village. The platoon has completed a sweep of the village and has found a few small arms and live mortar rounds, but no armed individuals or bands. The soldiers of the platoon bear M-16A2 rifles, which are locked and loaded. The commander has ordered that the standing "R-A-M-P" rules of force are in effect.

**EVENT:** Two unarmed men in white shirts suddenly dash through an alley in the village. The platoon leader orders several soldiers to chase after the men to determine whether they know anything about the firefight the night before. One soldier chases one of the men into an area outside the village. The soldier notices movement in a bush about 25 meters away and then sees the white shirt of a man running away from him and from the remainder of the American platoon.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** The key rule here is to MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat. Under the standing R-A-M-P rules, a soldier must use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission. The force used must fit the scale of the threat in magnitude, intensity, and duration. If possible, soldiers apply a graduated escalation of force when facing civilians who are unarmed, but also confrontational and unfriendly. Here, the civilian man is unarmed and running away. The man poses no immediate threat to the safety of the soldier or his American comrades. No use of force is appropriate. Nor do the other R-A-M-P rules support the use of force. Soldiers may RETURN FIRE with fire, but the man has fired no shots. Soldiers may ANTICIPATE ATTACK and fire first if they see clear indicators of hostile intent, but here, none of the S-A-L-U-T-E factors indicate hostile intent. Soldiers must PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE, but no lives are endangered by this fleeing unarmed man.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To continue chasing the man but to refrain

from firing the rifle.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** This problem is roughly patterned after an incident that occurred in Somalia in February 1993. In circumstances similar to these, an American soldier shot and killed an unarmed Somali man. A panel of officers and enlisted men, after hearing numerous witnesses and examining ballistic and medical evidence, determined that the soldier had used excessive force, despite the soldier's claim that he had fired a "warning shot in the dirt" to the left of the fleeing man. The panel also found fault with the chain of command for not ensuring that the soldiers understood the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement were similar to R-A-M-P in that they allowed for warning shots, but only if appropriate as part of a graduated show of force against a threatening element. The soldier's Division Commander set aside his conviction for negligent homicide.

**REFERENCES:** SMCT 181-906-1506; United States v. Mowris, (Headquarters, Fort Carson & 4th Inf. Div. 1 Jul 1993).

**CASE STUDY 4**  
**PROTECTING PROPERTY**  
**APPROPRIATE USE OF DEADLY FORCE**

**SITUATION:** A soldier sits on the passenger side in the front of a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). He and the driver are in the first vehicle of a two-vehicle convoy in the center of a city. As the vehicles move through the city, they pass many civilian men, women, and children. U.S. forces are deployed in a flat, hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been frustrating these efforts for months and have even fired upon U.S. soldiers several times over the past few days. Civilians frequently taunt coalition soldiers and attempt to steal items from passing vehicles. The immediate mission of the convoy is to link up with the remainder of the soldier's company. The soldier is armed with an M-79 grenade launcher that is loaded with a canister. The commander has ordered that the standing "R-A-M-P" rules of force are in effect.

**EVENT:** As the vehicle rounds a bend, an unarmed boy puts his hand through the window, pushes back the soldier's head, and removes an expensive pair of prescription sunglasses. The vehicle moves forward, and the youth slips back into a crowd.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** The key rule here is to PROTECT WITH DEADLY FORCE ONLY HUMAN LIFE AND PROPERTY DESIGNATED BY YOUR COMMANDER. Under the standing R-A-M-P rules, a soldier must stop short of deadly force when protecting other property. Here, the property stolen by the youth is not the sort of sensitive or mission-essential equipment that commanders must sometimes protect with deadly force. None of the other R-A-M-P rules supports the use of deadly force in this situation. Soldiers may RETURN FIRE with fire, but the youth has fired no shots. Soldiers may ANTICIPATE ATTACK and fire first if they see clear indicators of hostile intent, but here, none of the S-A-L-U-T-E factors indicate hostile intent. Soldiers must MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat, if time and circumstances permit. The force used must fit the scale of the threat in magnitude, intensity, and duration. If possible, soldiers apply a graduated escalation of force when facing civilians who are unarmed, but also confrontational and unfriendly. Here, the youth has used some force and has committed an aggressive act; however, the youth also is unarmed and has moved away from the departing vehicle. The youth poses no immediate threat to the safety of the soldier or his comrades. The soldier may shout verbal warnings in the native tongue to bystanders to disperse, stay away, or halt. He may visibly display his weapon to indicate available force. He may use pepper spray or some other irritant,

if available, to ward off those who may reach toward a vehicle. He may use a riot stick or some other implement to ward off or even strike persistent individuals in nonvital regions. But he may not use deadly force under these circumstances when the standing R-A-M-P rules are in effect.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To refrain from firing the M-79, while maintaining alertness for others who attempt to steal from the vehicle. Upon returning to the base camp the soldier should ask the chain of command how to file a claim for the lost glasses.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** This problem is roughly patterned after an incident that occurred in Somalia in February 1993. In circumstances similar to these, an American marine leaned out the window of the vehicle and discharged his M-79 over and behind his right shoulder. Fragments from the canister wounded two Somali boys. One of the boys had been standing nearby sipping grapefruit juice. A panel of officers and enlisted men, after hearing numerous witnesses and examining all available evidence, determined that the marine had used excessive force.

**REFERENCES:** SMCT 181-906-1506; United States v. Conde, (First Marine Expeditionary Force, 6 Apr. 1993).

**CASE STUDY 5**  
**ANTICIPATING ATTACK**  
**RESPONDING TO UNCLEAR INDICATORS OF HOSTILE INTENT**

**SITUATION:** A soldier quickly exits a UH-60 Blackhawk aircraft as soon as it touches down. The helicopter landing zone is on a military installation in a country that has long been allied with the United States. Recently, however, that country has been ruled by a military dictator whose methods have grown increasingly corrupt and repressive. The military installation houses American military families--routinely stationed in the country as part of an ongoing training and regional security mission--as well as soldiers of the allied nation. The soldier's unit is deployed to the country with the mission of enforcing America's rights under a treaty that the military dictator has openly begun to repudiate. On this evening, the soldier's battalion has the mission of conducting a show of force at the military installation to demonstrate American resolve to defend its interests under the treaty. The soldier and the remainder of his squad, all running from the helicopter toward a woodline with full combat equipment and wearing skin camouflage, have the mission to provide security around part of the helicopter landing zone. The soldier carries an M203 grenade launcher, the rifle portion of which is locked and loaded with 5.56mm ammunition. The soldier has several grenade rounds in the outside pockets of his rucksack. The terrain is mostly jungle, with occasional grassy clearings. The buildings of the military installation's residential area are several hundred meters away. An infantry company of the country's defense forces, still loyal to the dictator, occupy the military installation. The commander has ordered that the standing "R-A-M-P" rules of force are in effect, but has emphasized that the host country's defense forces will feel threatened by the show of force and may reflexively aim weapons toward American soldiers. During similar shows of force in recent days, defense forces in other parts of the country have held their fire after initially training their weapons on American forces. Also, intelligence reports maintain that the military dictator does not seek hostilities with American forces at this time. Accordingly, the commander has supplemented the "A" of "R-A-M-P" with the guidance that if a member of the defense forces aims a weapon at U.S. forces, then without more, that act is not to be interpreted as a clear indicator of hostile intent. Higher headquarters has not officially designated as hostile any forces, to include the host country's defense forces.

**EVENT:** As the soldier rushes toward the woodline, he sees a member of the host country's defense force 50 meters away. The member of the defense force is peering at the soldier and his fellow American soldiers from behind a machine gun that is mounted on a tripod in a prepared position.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** The key rule here is ANTICIPATE ATTACK, which means that the soldier may use force first if, but only if, he sees clear indicators of hostile intent. The R-A-M-P rules, as supplemented by the commander, permit the soldier to fire his weapons before receiving fire, but only if he can identify clear, objective indicators of hostile intent. Here the soldier cannot conclude that the machine gunner's intentions are hostile. The S-A-L-U-T-E factors do not provide a clear picture of the machine gunner's intentions: *size* (thus far only a single machine gunner is visible), *activity* (presently aiming a weapon but holding fire from a stationary position as American's conduct an air assault), *location* (within range of all weapons systems), *time* (capable of opening fire without delay, and of receiving prompt assistance from host country defense forces), and *equipment* (a machine gun in a prepared position with an unknown amount of ammunition). Moreover, the commander has emphasized that the aiming of a weapon is not a clear indicator of hostile intent, under the circumstances. Each of the other R-A-M-P rules would support a decision to refrain from firing at or launching a grenade at the machine gunner. Soldiers can RETURN FIRE with fire, and respond to hostile acts with necessary force. Certainly, if the machine gunner fires a single shot toward American forces, the soldier can return fire. Soldiers must MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat, if time and circumstances permit. Under these circumstances, some demonstration of available force may ultimately be necessary to persuade the machine gunner to stand down from his ready position, but for the moment, the soldier can perform the immediate task of reaching the woodline and taking up a position on his squad's perimeter without using any force against the machine gunner. His chain of command can then determine the appropriate measure of force to use. If the situation develops to where the soldier must PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE, he may do so, but right now, only protective measures well short of deadly force are appropriate.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To dive onto the ground and use individual movement techniques (high crawl, low crawl, rush) to reach the woodline. The soldier should remain as covered and concealed from the machine gunner as possible, while reporting the location of the position to the chain of command.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** This mission was part of a show of force that U.S. Marines conducted during June of 1989 at Fort Amador, Panama. The operation was Nimrod Dancer. Rather than an air assault, the Marines conducted an amphibious landing at the installation. The natural response of the Panamanian Defense Forces to the landing was to turn their weapons in the direction of the landing Marines. Because the Marines did not open fire, the show of force occurred without incident or casualties, and the United States retained the moral high ground in the tense

confrontation with Manuel Noriega. The confrontation became an armed conflict six months later, on terms favorable to the United States, in Operation Just Cause.

REFERENCES: SMCT 181-906-1506; Interview with Lawrence A. Yates, Historian, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College (Mar. 22, 1994) (discussing interviews with JTF-Panama commander and staff, with the Marine Force commander under JTF-Panama, and with a Marine staff officer at SOUTHCOM, June 1989, December 1898).

**CASE STUDY 6**  
**MEASURING FORCE**  
**USING FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION**

**SITUATION:** A soldier is in a convoy of five Army vehicles as it winds its way down a narrow road through a thick jungle. The road is in a country that has long been allied with the United States. Recently, however, that country has been ruled by a military dictator whose methods have grown increasingly corrupt and repressive. American units are routinely stationed in the country as part of an ongoing training and regional security mission, but the Army unit manning the convoy is currently deployed to the country with the mission of enforcing America's rights under a treaty that the military dictator has openly begun to repudiate. Specifically, the defense forces of the country--still loyal to the military dictator--have been denying freedom of movement along the road to convoys of U.S. vehicles. On this afternoon, the convoy has the mission of traveling the length of the road without being escorted by the host nation's defense forces. The Army captain and the thirty soldiers under his command in the vehicles are carrying full combat equipment and wearing skin camouflage. The battalion commander has ordered that the standing "R-A-M-P" rules of force are in effect, but has provided the following two pieces of supplemental guidance. First, the host country's defense forces will feel threatened by the armed convoy and may reflexively aim weapons toward American soldiers. During similar shows of force in recent days, defense forces in other parts of the country have held their fire after initially training their weapons on American forces. Also, intelligence reports maintain that the military dictator does not seek hostilities with American forces at this time, and higher headquarters has not officially designated as hostile any forces, to include the host country's defense forces. Accordingly, the battalion commander has supplemented the "A" of "R-A-M-P" with the guidance that if a member of the defense forces aims a weapon at U.S. forces, then without more, that act is not to be interpreted as a clear indicator of hostile intent. Second, the battalion commander has supplemented the "M" of "R-A-M-P" with the guidance that the convoy commander will take a specific series of escalating measures and give specific orders to soldiers if the host nation defense forces block the convoy's movement.

**EVENT:** As the convoy rounds a bend, it encounters a roadblock. Five armed members of the host country's defense forces man the roadblock and motion the convoy to halt. As the vehicles stop, the soldier notices several other members of the defense forces in prone positions, aiming weapons at the convoy.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** One key rule here is ANTICIPATE ATTACK, which means that the soldier may use force first if, but only if, he

sees clear indicators of hostile intent. The R-A-M-P rules, as supplemented by the commander, permit the soldier to fire his weapons before receiving fire, but only if he can identify clear, objective indicators of hostile intent. Here the soldier cannot conclude that the defense force intentions are hostile. The S-A-L-U-T-E factors do not provide a clear picture of their intentions: *size* (squad-size element is typical for manning a roadblocks), *activity* (presently aiming weapons but holding fire from stationary positions as Americans approach in a convoy), *location* (within range of all weapons systems), *time* (capable of opening fire without delay), and *equipment* (small arms, with an unknown amount of ammunition). Moreover, the commander has emphasized that the aiming of a weapon is not a clear indicator of hostile intent, under the circumstances. The other key rule here is to MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat. Under the standing R-A-M-P rules, a soldier must use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission. The force used must fit the scale of the threat in magnitude, intensity, and duration. If possible, soldiers apply a graduated escalation of force when facing potentially hostile elements. Here, the captain commanding the American convoy has specific orders on what measures will be used in the escalation of force. For instance, he might read aloud to the host nation defense forces from an index card containing the article of the treaty authorizing freedom of movement for U.S. forces. If the forces do not let the convoy pass, he may give sequential orders for troops to dismount the vehicles, lock and load weapons, and fix bayonets. No independent use of force by the soldier is appropriate. Nor do the other two R-A-M-P rules support the use of force. Soldiers may RETURN FIRE with fire, but the forces have fired no shots. If the situation develops to where the soldier must PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE, he may do so, but right now, only protective measures in accordance with the convoy commander's orders are appropriate.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To refrain from firing and to follow the orders of the convoy commander.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** This problem is adapted from armed convoy missions conducted by elements of the U.S. Army 7th Infantry Division (Light) during May of 1989 in Panama. The missions were part of Operation Nimrod Dancer. The natural response of Panamanian Defense Forces to the armed convoys was to turn their weapons in the direction of American soldiers. Because Americans did not open fire, the convoys reached their destinations without incident or casualties, and the United States retained the moral high ground in the tense confrontation with Manuel Noriega. The confrontation became an armed conflict seven months later, on terms favorable to the United States, in Operation Just Cause.

**REFERENCES:** SMCT 181-906-1506; Interview with Lawrence A. Yates, Historian, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College (Mar. 22, 1994) (discussing interviews with a 7th Infantry Division (Light) brigade commander, June, September 1989, an unclassified briefing at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 28, 1989, interviews with JTF-Panama commander and staff, May-June 1989, and declassified operations order for first convoy, May 21, 1989).

**CASE STUDY 7**  
**PROTECTING SELF AND FELLOW SOLDIERS**  
**APPROPRIATE USE OF DEADLY FORCE**

**SITUATION:** A soldier sits on the passenger side in the rear of a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). He and the driver are in the second vehicle of a two-vehicle convoy in the center of a city. As the vehicles move through the city, they pass many civilian men, women, and children. U.S. forces are deployed in a flat, hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been frustrating these efforts for months and have even fired upon U.S. soldiers several times over the past few days. Civilians frequently taunt coalition soldiers and attempt to steal items from passing vehicles. The immediate mission of the convoy is to shuttle a military staff officer to a point outside the city. The soldier is armed with an M-16A2 rifle with a magazine in the well, a round chambered, and selector switch on safe. The commander has ordered that the standing "R-A-M-P" rules of force are in effect, but has provided one piece of supplemental guidance. Recent situation reports state that a coalition patrol was the target of a grenade thrown by someone dressed in local garb. Also, adults have been seen handing grenades to children and persuading them to use them against coalition forces. Accordingly, the commander has supplemented the "A" of "R-A-M-P" with the guidance that Somalis bearing grenade-sized items and ignoring warnings to stay away should be considered to have hostile intentions.

**EVENT:** As the convoy makes its way through a market street, a crowd of townspeople surrounds the two vehicles. Nevertheless, all of the townspeople are staying several feet away from the vehicle because of the stern looks, verbal warnings, and vigilance of the soldier and his well-armed comrades. Then the convoy stops because a large cargo truck up ahead has stopped in the road. Suddenly, a boy, carrying what appears to be a small box in one hand, ignores the warnings, and runs up behind the vehicle. He places his hand inside the rear cargo area of the HMMWV as the soldier continues to warn him to stay away.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** The key rules here are to ANTICIPATE ATTACK and to PROTECT HUMAN LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE. The R-A-M-P rules, as supplemented by the commander, permit the soldier to fire his weapon before receiving fire if he can identify clear indicators of hostile intent. Here, the soldier can conclude that the boy's intentions are hostile and can ANTICIPATE ATTACK. The S-A-L-U-T-E factors support this conclusion. Note the boy's activity (he has ignored verbal warnings, has run up to the vehicle, and placed his arm in the rear of the vehicle), the location (the boy is within the kill radius of a grenade from the

soldier and his comrades, but out of arm's reach), the time factor (only split seconds before the boy could pull the pin of a grenade and drop it), and equipment (a box of hand grenade size). A finding of hostile intent is further supported by the recent situation reports concerning hand grenades and the commander's R-A-M-P supplement. Because the lives of everyone on the vehicle are in danger, the soldier can PROTECT HUMAN LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE. Each of the other two R-A-M-P rules supports a decision to fire the rifle. Soldiers can RETURN FIRE with aimed fire, and respond to hostile acts with necessary force. They must MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat, if time and circumstances permit. Under these circumstances, an aimed shot at the boy is the correct measure of force, given that lesser V-E-W-P-R-I-K measures have not turned the boy back or are impracticable.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To fire an aimed shot at the boy.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** This problem is patterned after an incident in Somalia on 4 February 1993. The Marine Corps sergeant who shot and killed a Somali boy carrying a box did so only after the boy had ignored warnings and had placed his hand inside the stopped HMMWV. Despite the sergeant's courageous actions in collecting the fallen boy from the hostile crowd and the Marines' swiftness in getting to the nearest hospital, the boy died. All of the witnesses supported the sergeant's account of the incident, though the small box was not recovered. The incident was tragic, but after an investigation, the sergeant was deemed to have acted appropriately in firing on the boy.

**REFERENCES:** United States v. Johnson, No. 458 27 1616 (I Marine Expeditionary Force, 16 Mar. 1993) (Report of Article 32(b) Investigating Officer).

**CASE STUDY 8**  
**MEASURING FORCE AND PROTECTING PROPERTY**  
**USING FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION**

**SITUATION:** It is nighttime, and a soldier guards a portion of the perimeter of a company-sized base camp. Behind him, about 50 soldiers are sleeping and small amounts of fuel, supplies, weapons, and equipment are stored, and several vehicles are parked. U.S. forces are deployed in a flat, hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been frustrating these efforts for months and have even fired upon U.S. soldiers several times over the past few days. Local townspeople test the perimeter nightly in attempts to steal food or equipment. The soldier's mission is to prevent intrusions into the basecamp and safeguard his fellow soldiers and unit property. The soldier is armed with an M-16A2 rifle. He has a magazine of ammunition in the well, but no round is chambered, and the selector switch is on safe. The commander has ordered that the standing "R-A-M-P" rules of force are in effect with one piece of supplemental guidance. He has supplemented the "P-PROTECT" rule with the guidance that soldiers may use the entire scale of force, including, if necessary, aimed shots to kill, to protect the following property: any CEOI's and Vinson security or keying hardware.

**EVENT:** About thirty meters to the soldier's left an unarmed local boy scurries beneath the concertina wire into the cantonment area and runs to a parked vehicle. There he quickly grabs a magazine of M-16A2 ammunition left in a footwell by a negligent soldier and runs back to the wire.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** The key rule here is to MEASURE THE AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat. Under the standing R-A-M-P rules, a soldier must use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission. The force used must fit the scale of the threat in magnitude, intensity, and duration. If possible, soldiers apply a graduated escalation of force when facing civilians who are unarmed, but who also are confrontational and unfriendly. Here, the boy is unarmed and is running away. He poses no immediate threat to the safety of the soldier or his American comrades, and although he is stealing U.S. property, it is not one of the types of property the commander has designated to be protected with deadly force. Unless the soldier can get close enough to the boy to stop him by grabbing hold of him, use of force is not appropriate. Nor do the other R-A-M-P rules support the use of force. Soldiers may RETURN FIRE with fire, but the man has fired no shots. Soldiers may ANTICIPATE ATTACK and fire first if they see clear indicators of hostile intent, but here, none of the S-A-L-U-T-E factors

indicate hostile intent. Soldiers must PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE, but no lives are endangered by this fleeing boy.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To chase the boy but to refrain from firing the rifle. Report the incident to the chain of command as soon as possible.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** This problem is patterned after numerous incidents that occurred in Somalia in 1993, when local civilians entered U.S. base camps and stole various items. Although aggressive in safeguarding their supplies and equipment, soldiers time and again showed appropriate restraint in situations such as this one.

**REFERENCES:** SMCT 181-906-1506; Colonel Gilbert S. Harper, *Operations Other Than War: Leading Soldiers in Operation Restore Hope*, MILITARY REV., Sept. 1993, at 78.

**CASE STUDY 9**  
**ANTICIPATING ATTACK**  
**USING FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION**

**SITUATION:** A company-sized convoy of light infantry, mounted on High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), moves along a city street. U.S. forces are deployed in a flat, hot, dry, famine-stricken country as part of a multinational coalition force. The mission of the coalition is to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. Armed bands have been frustrating these efforts for months, and about 1 hour ago, U.S. Special Operations forces conducted a raid to seize two lieutenants of the most powerful local bandit. During the raid, two UH-60 helicopters were shot down by bandits armed with RPG-7 rocket propelled grenades. About 90 U.S. soldiers are pinned down at the first crash site by hundreds of bandits armed with AK-47 assault rifles and RPG-7s. At least two Americans are dead and more than twenty are injured. Casualties among the bandits are much higher. The mission of the company is to reach the pinned down soldiers at the crash site, reinforce them, and help evacuate all forces and wounded to a secure area. When the company left its position at a nearby airfield ten minutes ago, the standing R-A-M-P rules were in effect, but five minutes ago several vehicles in the convoy were ambushed by organized bands firing AK-47s. U.S. forces returned fire and continued. The commander has just supplemented R-A-M-P with the order to ANTICIPATE ATTACK along the route by firing at armed local persons who appear near the road.

**EVENT:** As his vehicle rounds a bend, a soldier in a HMMWV near the back of the convoy notices three men with rifles peering at the front of the convoy from behind a wall and talking among themselves. The men begin to raise the weapons to their shoulders.

**CONSIDERATIONS:** The key rule here is to ANTICIPATE ATTACK on the convoy. Under the R-A-M-P rules, as supplemented by the commander, soldiers can fire their weapons before receiving fire, if they see clear indicators of hostile intent. Here the soldier can conclude that the intentions of the three men are hostile because of their size (small but organized, similar to ambushing bands), activity (they are hiding behind a wall and raising their weapons), the location (near the road being traveled by the convoy), the time factor (only minutes after other vehicles in the quick reaction force have been ambushed with rifle fire), and equipment (AK-47s). Each of the other R-A-M-P rules supports the soldier's decision to fire at the men. Soldiers can RETURN FIRE with fire, and respond to hostile acts with necessary force. Although it is not clear that these particular men fired on the convoy earlier, what the soldier observes is consistent with a continued attack on the U.S. convoy. Soldiers must MEASURE THE

AMOUNT OF FORCE to fit the level of the threat, if time and circumstances permit. Under these circumstances, aimed shots at the men are the correct measure of force to protect lives and accomplish the mission. Given the lack of time available, the soldier should not attempt lesser measures along the graduated scale of force (verbal warning, etc.). Finally, the soldier can fire his rifle, the only lethal weapon available, because soldiers can PROTECT LIFE WITH DEADLY FORCE.

**SUGGESTED RESPONSE:** To fire at the men and alert the remainder of the convoy.

**HISTORICAL NOTE:** This problem is roughly patterned after an incident that occurred in Somalia on October 4, 1993. Although conducting a humanitarian assistance mission, U.S. forces found themselves in a fierce firefight with Somali bandits. The company was part of a Quick Reaction Force ordered to reinforce Special Operations soldiers who were pinned down in a different part of Mogadishu. Shortly after leaving Mogadishu International Airport in the late afternoon, the company was ambushed. Soldiers and Somalis fired thousands of rounds of ammunition and fired hundreds of grenades before In circumstances similar to these, an American soldier shot and killed an unarmed Somali man. A panel of officers and enlisted men, after hearing numerous witnesses and examining ballistic and medical evidence, determined that the soldier had used excessive force, despite the soldier's claim that he had fired a "warning shot in the dirt" to the left of the fleeing man. The panel also found fault with the chain of command for not ensuring that the soldiers understood the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement were similar to R-A-M-P in that they allowed for warning shots, but only if appropriate as part of a graduated show of force against a threatening element.

**REFERENCES:** SMCT 181-906-1506; Rick Atkinson, *Night of a Thousand Casualties: Battle Triggered the U.S. Decision to Withdraw From Somalia*, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 31, 1994, at A1.

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO 55th INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT) TACTICAL STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE (TACSOP) (U)  
THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ALERT CONDITIONS (ROECONS) SYSTEM

- (U) REFERENCES:
- a. (U) STP 21-1-SMCT, Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks - Skill Level 1 (26 July 1996)
    - (1) (U) Task 181-906-1506--Use Force Appropriately
    - (2) (U) Task 181-906-1505--Conduct Operations According to the Law of War
    - (3) (U) Task 071-331-0801--Use Challenge and Password
    - (4) (U) Task 071-331-0803--Report Enemy Information
  - b. (U) TC 27-10-4, Selected Problems in Rules of Engagement (26 July 1996).
  - c. (U) TC 27-10-1, Selected Problems in the Law of War (26 June 1979).
  - d. (U) FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (18 July 1956) (C1, 15 July 1976).
  - e. (U) FM 100-5, Operations (26 July 1996) (pages 2-3 to 2-4, describing "Disciplined Operations").
  - f. (U) FM 27-100, Legal Operations (26 July 1996) (chapter 6, discussing rules of engagement).
  - g. (U) FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad (31 Dec. 1980) (Appendix N- Prisoners and Captured Documents).

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish a system by which the Commander of a task force organized from this Division can quickly and clearly convey to subordinate units a desired posture regarding use of force.
2. (U) STRUCTURE OF ROE. Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives that delineate the circumstances under which a unit or soldier will initiate or continue combat engagement with other

forces encountered. As such, they include the many specific types of rules and measures described in references e and f. The most important ROE are contained in the RAMP rules (see reference a(1)) to which soldiers regularly train, in the ROE conditions (ROECONs) periodically announced by the Task Force Commander, and in the ROE annexes appended to operations plans and orders. The individual soldier's RAMP, as supplemented by the ROECONs system, is the baseline for the development of ROE annexes.

3. (U) OBJECTIVES.

- a. (U) This triangular ROE structure (RAMP, ROECONs, ROE Annexes) has three objectives:
  1. (U) Soldiers and units will employ an appropriate mix of initiative and restraint during operations other than war;
  2. (U) Soldiers and units will make a rapid transition to combat operations upon identification of a hostile force;
  3. (U) Soldiers and units will operate aggressively and with discipline during combat operations.
- b. (U) A task force can accomplish these objectives only if the commander conveys clear instructions on use of force. The commander conveys clear instructions by transmitting rules to soldiers in terms of RAMP, by transmitting recurring instructions to subordinate unit leaders in terms of ROECONs, and by ensuring that mission-specific instructions in ROE annexes follow a format that builds upon these two mechanisms.

4. CONCEPT.

- a. (U) The Task Force Commander will order into effect one of the ROECONs specified in the Tab to Appendix. There are three "default" ROECONs:
  1. (U) ROECON GREEN. Applies when there is no discernable threat of hostile activity. This condition places the force in a routine security posture. Due to the nature of the immediate mission (typically a training exercise or staging operations conducted in a stable host nation), such a posture will involve minimal arming, and protection only of the force and of key facilities. The commander may order into effect certain rules or measures from a higher ROECON to

create deterrence or to respond to incomplete intelligence received. Soldiers generally operate under the standing RAMP rules.

2. (U) ROECON AMBER. Applies when there is a discernible threat of hostile activity, but not a threat justifying ROECON RED. Although intelligence may indicate additional hostility criteria to supplement the "A" rule of the soldiers' RAMP, ROECON AMBER generally does not apply to situations in which higher headquarters have formally identified a hostile force. ROECON AMBER provides for arming of additional key U.S. personnel, establishment of roadblocks or barriers on high speed approaches into U.S. positions, security patrols, other measures to enhance perimeter security, and increased availability of ordinance. The commander may order into effect certain rules or measures from a higher ROECON to create deterrence or to respond to incomplete intelligence received.
  3. (U) ROECON RED. Applies when there is an actual attack upon U.S. forces, there exists a threat of imminent attack, or there has been a formal identification of a hostile force in theatre by higher headquarters. ROECON RED directs the force to continue the protection measures detailed in the lower ROECONs, while arming all personnel and lowering levels of approval authority on certain weapons systems. Leaders supplement the soldiers' RAMP by providing specific hostility criteria or by identifying the hostile force designated by higher headquarters to assist in implementing the "A-Anticipate" rule.
- b. (U) Brigade, battalion, and separate company commanders may find it necessary to add or delete measures in effect for a particular ROECON status in order to meet the unique requirements of a tactical setting. A written set of rules cannot be provided that will apply to every situation. Except for the measures which establish levels of approval authority (Measures 8, 48, and 56) the decision on the ROECON in effect and on whether specific rules or measures will be added to or deleted from a ROECON will be at the discretion of the senior tactical commander present. This commander will consider the mission and the situation in making the ROECON determination, and will notify higher headquarters as soon as possible if the

ROECON deemed appropriate differs from that ordered by the Commander, 55th Infantry Division (Light).

6. (U) UNIT SELF-DEFENSE. Under all ROECON statuses, the commander retains the inherent right and responsibility to defend his unit. The standing RAMP rules that define a soldier's authority to defend himself also apply to the actions that a commander takes in unit self-defense.

7. (U) OPERATIONS SECURITY. Consistent with Annex L (Operations Security) to this TACSOP, the ROECON in effect (GREEN, AMBER, RED) will be classified at least SECRET. The commander will order random measures into effect as necessary to create uncertainty in the minds of potential terrorists or other hostile forces planning attacks on U.S. forces.

TAB TO APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO 55th INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT)  
TACTICAL STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE (TACSTOP) (U)  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ALERT CONDITIONS (ROECONS)

ROECON GREEN MEASURES

*Measure 1.* Inform all task force personnel that the standing RAMP rules are in effect. See reference a(1) to this Appendix. Conduct sustainment training in RAMP on 5 to 7 scenarios from reference b to this Appendix that most closely match the situation facing the task force. Supplement the "P" rule by designating the following property to be protected with the entire scale of force, including, if necessary, aimed shots to kill:

- a. Papers or other recorded information stored within the Special Compartmentalized Intelligence Facility (SCIF) at the main command post.
- b. Any U.S. aircraft.
- c. Vinson security and keying hardware.
- d. CEOI's.
- e. Spare.
- f. Spare.
- g. Spare.

*Measure 2.* Issue live ammunition only to the following personnel:

- a. The Command Group (task force Commander, Assistant Division Commanders or Executive Officer as applicable, Aides), G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3: 9mm M9 semiautomatic pistol. Loaded magazines will be kept in ammunition pouches, weapons will be on safe, chambers will be empty.
- b. Military Police Detachment, including CID agents: 9mm M9 semiautomatic pistol, .45 caliber pistol, .38 caliber pistol, 5.56mm M16A2 ball, 7.62mm NATO Ball-Tracer MLB 1-4, depending on issued weapon. Each MP vehicle

equipped with an M-60 MG will carry 1 ammunition can (200 rounds) per MG. Each MG will be carried inside the vehicle, and will not be mounted on the pintle unless the gunner intends to shoot. Ammunition will be sealed within complete metal ammunition cans, and bandoliers will not be mounted on the MG unless the gunner intends to shoot.

Individuals bearing pistols and rifles will carry loaded magazines in ammunition pouches. Weapons will be on safe, and chambers will be empty.

c. Aviators on flight status: 9mm M9 semiautomatic pistol, .45 caliber pistol, .38 caliber pistol, depending on issued weapon. Loaded magazines will be kept in survival vests, along with pistols; weapons will be on safe, and chambers will be empty.

d. Crew chief for aircraft fitted with M-60D MG: 7.62mm NATO Ball-Tracer MLB 1-4. Each aircraft equipped with an M-60 MG will carry 1 ammunition can (200 rounds) per MG. Each MG on such aircraft will be carried inside the aircraft, but will not be mounted on the pintle unless the gunner intends to shoot. Ammunition will be sealed within complete metal ammunition cans, and bandoliers will not be mounted on the MG unless the gunner intends to shoot.

e. Spare.

f. Spare.

**Measure 3.** Store all unissued ammunition in a secure storage facility, under the supervision of the G-4/S-4, within a barrier of protective wire and berms, and under guard of the military police detachment.

**Measure 4.** Establish a restricted area of at least 50 meters in width (approximate hand grenade range) around any U.S. facility or aircraft. If resources permit, create an obstacle along the outside boundary of the restricted area with single strand concertina wire. Post signs in English and in the host nation language warning that entry into the restricted area is prohibited.

- Measure 5.* Establish a physical barrier consisting of at least triple-strand concertina wire with berms around the task force Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and SCIF in accordance with the Tab (Command Post configuration overlay) to Appendix 3 (Command Posts) to Annex C (Operations) to this TACSOP. Place this area under guard of the military police detachment.
- Measure 6.* Minimize the number of access points for vehicles and personnel, consistent with the requirement to maintain a flow of traffic permitting accomplishment of daily missions.
- Measure 7.* Remind soldiers that although they must remain vigilant at all times for suspicious or hostile activity in accordance with the "A" rule in RAMP, the following activities are not authorized.
- a. Unboxing or preparing LAW's, hand grenades, M-203 grenades, or M18A1 Claymore mines.
  - b. Emplacement, computation of firing data, or preparation of ammunition for mortars or artillery.
  - c. Establishment of roadblocks, barriers, bunkers, or fighting positions, other than the traffic control points and dismount points associated with measures 3, 4, and 5.
  - d. Establishment of LP/OP's.
  - e. Patrolling, other than convoy escort by aircraft or Military Police vehicles.
  - f. Preparation or emplacement of antitank weapons (DRAGON, TOW).
  - g. Arming of helicopter gunships (20mm, 30mm, FFAR, TOW, or Hellfire).
  - h. Confiscating weapons in possession of non-task force members, unless proper action under RAMP requires confiscation.
  - i. Spare.
  - j. Spare.

**Measure 8.** Comply with the matrix at Figure A, which details what level commander must approve use of a particular weapons system or other listed action.

APPROVING COMMANDER	SMALL ARMS	MINES	DEMO- LITIONS	MORTAR	AVIATION		ARTILLERY		AIR DEFENSE	CAS	GUIDED MUNITIONS	FASCAM	NGF	RCA	DESIGNATE HOSTILE FORCE	ELECTRONIC JAMMING	SPARE	SPARE
				PA	UA	PA	UA	PA										
SPARE																		
DIV OR HIGHER		X	X	X	X	X	X	1	1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
BRIGADE																		
BATTALION																		
COMPANY																		
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
																	S	T

**NOTE:**  
1. LEBO FASCAM AND COPPERHEAD

**LEGEND:** PA=Populated Area    CAS=Close Air Support    RCA=Riot Control Agent  
UA=Unpopulated Area    NGF=Naval Gunfire

**Figure A**

**Measure 9.** Establish liaison with local police, intelligence, and security agencies as well as coalition forces to monitor the threat to task force personnel and facilities. Notify these agencies and forces concerning the ROECON AMBER measures that, if implemented, could impact on their operations.

**Measure 10.** Keep all personnel on recall time limits to unit areas that are no longer than those for the Division Ready Force 1 in the 55th Infantry Division Readiness SOP (RSOP).

**Measure 11.** Place quick reaction forces on two hour recall.

**Measure 12.** Permit physical training (running) by task force personnel around task force compounds, restricted areas, and command posts.

- Measure 13.* Any fire by Task Force personnel will be observed by one or more human or electronic "eyes." Observed fire includes shots aimed by a soldier using any direct fire weapon system, indirect fire called for by a forward observer with eyes on target, indirect counterbattery fire directed by Q36 or Q37 radar, helicopter gunship fire directed either by a pilot with eyes on the target or by a forward air controller (FAC) with eyes on target. This measure is not an independent source of authority to fire. RAMP must be observed, and use of particular weapons systems must comply with measure 8.
- Measure 14.* Spare.
- Measure 15.* Spare.
- Measure 16.* Spare.
- Measure 17.* Spare.
- Measure 18.* Spare.
- Measure 19.* Spare.
- Measure 20.* Spare.
- Measure 21.* Spare.
- Measure 22.* Spare.
- Measure 23.* Spare.
- Measure 24.* Spare.
- Measure 25.* Spare.

#### ROECON AMBER MEASURES

- Measure 26.* Inform soldiers of any hostility criteria arising out of the discernible threat activity. "Walk soldiers up" the RAMP factors, showing how intelligence pertaining to the threat (e.g., potential grenade or car bomb attack) supplements the "A-Anticipate Attack" rule. Conduct sustainment training in RAMP on at least five scenarios that most closely match the new

situation.

- Measure 27.** Issue each member of the task force his or her basic load of small arms ammunition.
- Measure 28.** Issue air defense missiles to gunners. Weapons control status is (weapons hold/weapons tight/weapons free) (select one depending on situation).
- Measure 29.** Issue all other items of ammunition (hand grenades, M-203 grenades, M18A1 claymore mines, LAWs, AT4s, DRAGON rounds, etc.) to the Military Police Detachment Commander or Infantry unit commanders for integration into the ground defensive plan.
- Measure 30.** Mount M-60 machine guns on Military Police and scout platoon vehicles, and on aircraft pintles.
- Measure 31.** Direct that all personnel on perimeter security and guards at entrance points to task force compounds, restricted areas, and command posts will have magazines in their weapons, with chambers empty, and selector switches on safe. Machine gunners on perimeter security or at guard posts will have a bandolier of ammunition attached to the feed tray; weapons will be on safe; bolts will be forward.
- Measure 32.** Direct that all other personnel will retain magazines loaded in ammunition pouches with the remainder of the basic load stored in ruck sacks per unit SOPs. Weapons will be on safe, chambers will be empty.
- Measure 33.** Increase the restricted area around Task force facilities to not less than 300 meters (the approximate range of light rockets).
- Measure 34.** Create roadblocks and other barriers (chicanes, speed bumps, etc.) to block high speed avenues of approach into task force positions.
- Measure 35.** Visually inspect the interior of 1 in 5 civilian vehicles (selected at random) entering task force compounds, restricted areas, and command posts, as well as the exterior of the suitcases, briefcases, packages, and other containers in these vehicles. Conduct detailed vehicle inspections (trunk,

undercarriage, glove boxes, etc.) of 1 in 15 civilian vehicles entering task force compounds, restricted areas, or command posts.

- Measure 36.** Inform soldiers that the unboxing and preparing of LAWs, AT4s, hand grenades, or M18A1 mines are unauthorized, and that except for the arming detailed in Measures 3d and 48, helicopter gunships are not to be armed.
- Measure 37.** Emplace indirect fire weapons (mortar and artillery). Lay these weapons for direction and compute firing data for likely avenues of approach, landmarks, dead space, and final protective lines (FPLs). Ammunition will be removed from wooden containers, but will not be removed from fiber containers. Charges will not be cut. Communications with forward observers (FOs) will be established, and fire direction nets will be monitored by the fire support element in the (TOC).
- Measure 38.** Prepare bunkers and fighting positions as necessary.
- Measure 39.** Establish LP/OP's as necessary to provide early warning of attack or infiltration.
- Measure 40.** Conduct reconnaissance patrols as necessary.
- Measure 41.** Establish DRAGON and TOW positions as necessary to protect the task force from vehicular attack.
- Measure 42.** Position snipers as necessary.
- Measure 43.** Direct soldiers that weapons in possession of civilians and paramilitary forces are to be confiscated.
- Measure 44.** Comply with the matrix depicted in Figure B, which details what level commander must approve use of a particular weapons system or other listed action:
- Measure 45.** Establish direct communication links with local police, intelligence, and security agencies as well as coalition forces to monitor the threat to task force personnel and facilities. Such links may include stringing dedicated land lines, exchange of liaison officers, entry into radio

APPROVING COMMANDER	SMALL ARMS	MINES	DEMO- LITIONS	MORTARS		AVIATION		ARTILLERY		AIR DEFENSE	CAS	GUIDED MUNITIONS	FASCAM	NGF	RCA	DESIGNATE HOSTILE FORCE	ELECTRONIC JAMMING	SPARE	SPARE
				PA	UA	PA	UA	PA	UA										
SPARE																			
DIV OR HIGHER		X	X	X		X	X	1			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
BRIGADE					X				1	X									
BATTALION																			
COMPANY																			
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
																			T

NOTE:  
1. LESS FASCAM AND COPPERHEAD

LEGEND:	PA=Populated Area	CAS=Close Air Support	RCA=Riot Control Agent
	UA=Unpopulated Area	NGF=Naval Gunfire	

**Figure B**

nets, etc. Notify these agencies and forces concerning the ROECON RED measures that, if implemented, could impact on their operations.

- Measure 46.** Place all personnel on two hour recall.
- Measure 47.** Place quick reaction forces on 15 minute recall.
- Measure 48.** Activate a reaction force of helicopter gunships. Direct that they be loaded with 7.62mm/20mm/30mm ammunition. FFAR, TOW, and Hellfire will not be loaded but will be prepositioned in bunkers near the aircraft.
- Measure 49.** Suspend physical training (running) by task force personnel around task force compounds, restricted areas, and command posts.
- Measure 50.** Spare.

## ROECON RED MEASURES

- Measure 51.** Inform soldiers of any hostility criteria arising out of threat attacks or activity. If applicable, identify any hostile forces designated by higher headquarters. "Walk soldiers up" the RAMP factors, showing how any new intelligence RAMP up pertaining to the threat supplements the "A-Anticipate" rule. Remind soldiers that while they may shoot identified hostile forces on sight, the standing RAMP rules, as well as the five "S's" described in reference g, continue to dictate handling of civilians, prisoners, and casualties. Conduct sustainment training in RAMP on at least five scenarios that most closely match the new situation.
- Measure 52.** Direct that unboxing or preparing LAW's, AT4s, hand grenades, M-203 grenades, or M18A1 Claymore mines may occur under the controls specified in the ground defensive plan.
- Measure 53.** Direct the full arming of army aircraft (7.62mm, 20mm, 30mm, FFAR, TOW, Hellfire).
- Measure 54.** Direct that Measures 31, 32, and 37 pertaining to location of ammunition or ordinance in relation to weapon chambers, breeches, tracking devices, or other firing mechanisms no longer apply. Subordinate leaders as well as soldiers will make judgments using RAMP on when to chamber rounds or otherwise prepare weapons for firing.
- Measure 55.** Visually inspect all the interior of all civilian vehicles--as well as trunk, undercarriage, glove boxes, etc.--entering task force compounds, restricted areas, and command posts. As a condition of entry, search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, and other containers in these vehicles, but do not search individuals claiming diplomatic status without prior approval from the authority specified in the matrix in Figure C.
- Measure 56.** Comply with the matrix depicted at Figure C, which details what level commander must approve use of a particular weapons system or other listed action.
- Measure 57.** Recall all personnel to unit areas or positions.

APPROVING COMMANDER	SMALL ARMS	MINES	DEMO- LITIONS	MORTARS		AVIATION		ARTILLERY		AIR DEFENSE	CAS	GUIDED MUNITIONS	FABCAM	NGF	RCA	DESIGNATE HOSTILE FORCE	ELECTRONIC JAMMING	SPARE	SPARE
				PA	UA	PA	UA	PA	UA										
SPARE																			
DIV OR HIGHER		X	X	X	X	X	X	1	1		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
BRIGADE																			
BATTALION					X					X									
COMPANY																			
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
																			T

NOTE:  
 1. LESS FABCAM AND COPPERHEAD

LEGEND:	PA=Populated Area	CAS=Close Air Support	RCA=Riot Control Agent
	UA=Unpopulated Area	NGF=Naval Gunfire	

**Figure C**

- Measure 58.** Alert quick reaction forces and place on 5 minute standby.
- Measure 59.** Alert reaction force of helicopter gunships and place on 5 minute standby.
- Measure 60.** Direct subordinate leaders that, subject to any territorial restrictions in applicable operations plans or orders, pursuit of hostile forces is authorized as necessary to permit mission accomplishment and conform to RAMP.
- Measure 61.** Spare.
- Measure 62.** Spare.
- Measure 63.** Spare.
- Measure 64.** Spare.
- Measure 65.** Spare.

C-8-14

D-14

*Measure 66.* Spare.  
*Measure 67.* Spare.  
*Measure 68.* Spare.  
*Measure 69.* Spare.  
*Measure 70.* Spare.  
*Measure 71.* Spare.  
*Measure 72.* Spare.  
*Measure 73.* Spare.  
*Measure 74.* Spare.  
*Measure 75.* Spare.

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO TASK FORCE 55 OPERATIONS PLAN 04-96,  
OPERATION RESTORE VIGOR ( )  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- ( ) REFERENCES:      a.      ( ) STP 21-1-SMCT, Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks - Skill Level 1 (26 July 1996):
- (1) ( ) Task 181-906-1506--Use Force Appropriately
  - (2) ( ) Task 181-906-1505--Conduct Operations According to the Law of War
  - (3) ( ) Task 071-331-0801--Use Challenge and Password
  - (4) ( ) Task 071-331-0803--Report Enemy Information
- b.      ( ) TC 27-10-4, Selected Problems in Rules of Engagement (26 July 1996).
- c.      ( ) TC 27-10-1, Selected Problems in the Law of War (26 June 1979).
- d.      ( ) FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (18 July 1956) (C1, 15 July 1976).
- e.      ( ) FM 100-5, Operations (26 July 1996) (pages 2-3 to 2-4, describing "Disciplined Operations").
- f.      ( ) FM 27-100, Legal Operations (26 July 1996) (chapter 6, discussing rules of engagement).
- g.      ( ) FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad (31 Dec. 1980) (Appendix N- Prisoners and Captured Documents).
- h.      ( ) Appendix 8 to Annex C to 55th Infantry Division (Light) Tactical Standing Operation Procedure (TACSOP), The Rules of Engagement Conditions (ROECONs) System.
- i.      ( ) AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and

Security Duties (12 Mar. 1993).

j. ( ) AR 525-13, The Army Combatting Terrorism Program, para. 3-6 & App. B (27 Jul. 1992).

1. ( ) Situation.

a. ( ) General. United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 1027, acting under the authority of Chapter VII, has authorized member states to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Growmalia-Hertzebalina." Over forty countries have responded to the resolution, contributing small contingents of troops to a force led by the United States.

b. ( ) Enemy. See Annex B, Intelligence. No forces have been designated hostile forces by higher headquarters; however, any identification of uniforms and vehicle markings of Cerbian regular armed forces should be considered hostility criteria within the "A-Anticipate" rule of RAMP.

c. ( ) Friendly. See basic OPLAN.

(1) ( ) Higher Headquarters ROE. The multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF) ROE have been approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as well as by the U.N., and several nations influenced the final wording and emphasis of these high-level rules. Because the UNITAF Commander is also the Commander of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and III Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) [TF 55's immediate higher headquarters, which has planned the operation under the direction of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)], the UNITAF ROE bear a close resemblance to the CENTCOM Standing ROE (SROE). The UNITAF ROE are completely compatible with the RAMP/ROECONS/ROE Annex structure that TF 55 uses.

(2) ( ) Adjacent Units ROE. 1st Marine Division will implement the JTF/III MEF ROE using the RAMP/ROECONS/ROE Annex structure.

2. ( ) Mission. TF 55 moves by airlift from Fort Swamy to intermediate staging base (ISB) at Bonjarmi Island (TP7660) NLT 140900 Jan. D-day, H-Hour TF establishes lodgement at Togadishu Airport (QR4550). TF creates a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies in Togadishu city (QR4540) and prepares airport for evacuation of U.S. and foreign nationals by 1st Marine Division. On order, TF conducts

peacekeeping operations in support of ongoing diplomatic efforts.

3. ( ) Execution.

a. ( ) Concept of Operation.

(1) ( ) Phase I (Predeployment). TF prepares for deployment at Fort Swampy subject to normal installation rules on use of force. See references i and j.

(2) ( ) Phase II (ISB). ROECON GREEN, with following supplement: Measure 49.

(3) ( ) Phase III (Establish Lodgement). ROECON RED, with following supplement: Measure 1.e. (the structural integrity of the soccer stadium at QR45315021); Measure 1.f. (the structural integrity of the landing strip at Beirut Airport (QR45255067)); Measure 56.0.1; Measure 56.Q.2.

(4) ( ) Phase IV (Prepare for Evacuation). ROECON RED, with following supplement: Measure 1.e. (the structural integrity of the soccer stadium at QR45315021); Measure 1.f. (the structural integrity of the landing strip at Beirut Airport (QR45255067)); Measure 56.0.1.

(5) ( ) Phase V (On order Peacekeeping). ROECON AMBER, with following supplement: Measure 7.h;

b. Tasks.

(1) ( ) 1st, 2d, 3d Brigades. Observe territorial constraints depicted in scheme of maneuver, Annex B (Operation Overlay). Notify TF 55 headquarters immediately in the event of inadvertent entry into Growmalia district of Timers.

(2) ( ) Aviation Brigade. Observe territorial constraints depicted in Annex N (Airspace Management). Notify TF 55 headquarters immediately in event of inadvertent overflight of farms vic QR43305166.

(3) ( ) Fire Support (Artillery). Observe no fire areas for each of the protected places designated in Annex P Civil Affairs.

(4) ( ) 21st Military Intelligence Battalion. Conduct electronic jamming only during Phase III.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) ( ) All units conduct sustainment training on Problems 1, 2, 3, 12, and 13 of reference b.

(2) ( ) No unit or individual shall conduct operations across the international border between Growmalia-Hertzebalina and Cerbia. Notify TF 55 headquarters immediately in event of inadvertent crossing of this border.

4. ( ) Service Support. Basic OPLAN.

5. ( ) Command and Signal. Basic OPLAN.

Acknowledge

STONE  
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